

# GEOPOLITICS DISCRIMINATION GENDER & IMMIGRATION

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Edited by  
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**Julia Dobрева**

**Emilia Alaverdov**

**Emek Yıldırım-Şahin**

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## **Geopolitics, Discrimination, Gender, & Immigration**

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# INTRODUCTION

*Julia Dobрева, Emilia Alaverdov, Emek Yıldırım-Şahin*

Geopolitics has changed substantially throughout the last decades. While it is still generally focused on the relations between countries in terms of economic and political aspects and the role of modern societies for economic development, the impact of climate change, natural resources, religion, gender and refugee problems becomes more and more important for determining the geopolitical environment in the 21st century. The recent years have witnessed significant progress in terms of globalization, digitalization, poverty reduction, and institutional development. Yet, they have also given the floor to extremism, religious intolerance, natural disasters as a result of climate change and the unprecedented outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Also, developed world countries have become toxically polarized. Taken together, all of these trends (and even each one by itself) are likely to produce a global crisis of unforeseen scope. Governments and businesses will respond, but the scale of the challenges now is greater than it has ever been in the past, while global cooperation is not as strong as it was expected to become.

The book *Geopolitics, Discrimination, Gender, & Immigration* compiles research on various challenging topics. The works arranged in eleven chapters start from a thorough discussion on the role of Iran as a powerful regional force, the role of islamic discourse in modern-day Europe, and then move on with interesting analysis on immigration problems, women's political participation, as well as Islam and the Ottoman state with their influence today.

Chapter one, entitled *Imperialism and Sub-imperialism in the Middle East: US Sanctions and their Consequences for Iran* argues that the regional power dynamics and instability of the Middle East are deeply-rooted in the history of capitalist development, whose impacts in the region include the emergence of powerful regional forces such as Iran and the Gulf States (GS) of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Whilst the US remains the uncontested and dominant external power, and the close allies of the GS, supporting and sometimes opposing them with its huge financial and military resources, others such as China, Russia, and Iran continue to rival its dominance.

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Chapter two *Anti-Islamic Discourse in Modern Europe* deals with the modern European challenges, caused by the flows of numerous migrants. It describes the problem of Islam in Europe in all its aspects and completeness, which is currently considered as one of the most acute and hot debated topics since it draws the special attention of political circles and international society. The chapter examines the impact of migration on the social and political situation in the European Union and shows the tough integration processes of migrants in the EU Member States. It highlights the importance of mutual understandings, the demand for tolerance toward the religious identity, adequate assessment of Muslim lifestyle, and the importance of dialogue with the Muslim world, as well as the proper perception of Islamic identity and new vectors in the Muslim directions.

Chapter three *Understanding the Bolsa Familia Program as a Social Protection System in Brazil* is about the importance of the mentioned program, as it mainly supports poor social groups to fight against poverty, alleviate inequality and strengthen the human capital of the country in the areas of basic education and healthcare. It highlights the activities and cash transfers and describes the direct link of the mechanisms of the social security network in the country as the main source of human capital development. The chapter reveals certain trends of the World Bank which shows the effect of the increase in monetary and non-monetary public transfers that are connected.

The fourth chapter is entitled *Social Cleavage after Remaking National Identity: Case of un-Islamized Turkey and Un-Chineselized Taiwan*. This study aims at examining the methods used to remaking national identity in the causation of huge social cleavage. For this reason, it compares the methods and ideologies of un-Chineselized Taiwanese and un-Islamized Turkish identity-making process within given epochs as a result of which the social cleavage divide groups of people who should have shared the same identity.

Chapter five *Gendered Aid – The Jordan Compact and Economic Inclusion* offers a preliminary assessment of the Jordan Compact and its impact on Syrian refugee women's labor market participation. By drawing on field research conducted in Amman, analyzing emerging research on the Compact, and situating the discussion in scholarship on migration, humanitarianism, and development, the research outlines gender-specific challenges in labor market participation of Syrian refugees and explains the low issuance of work permits to Syrian refugee women.

Chapter six ***Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic on the Daily Life of Female Academics*** aims to discuss the daily life experiences of the female academics in the course of the pandemic process. It helps to understand how the gender inequality has occurred within the life of well-educated women under the quarantine conditions. For that reason, firstly a general view upon the actual situation of women and gender inequality within the pandemic days will be handled, and then, secondly the current difficulties female academics recently confront during the pandemic process.

In chapter seven ***Labor Migration from Georgia: Problems, Consequences and Challenges*** we find a discussion on the transformation processes through which Georgia has undergone after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The chapter shows that having gained the desired independence Georgia faced many other problems and among them was unemployment, which made the citizens of Georgia become labor migrants and seek jobs abroad. It gives to the reader the analyzes of Russia's Immigration Policy and describes the situation of Georgian labor migrants in Russia. It shows that despite the existing political confrontation between Georgia and Russia and the tough conditions which face Georgian migrants there, Russia remains an attractive country for Georgian migrants and the number of labor migrants is growing there.

Chapter eight entitled ***For the Improvement of Women's Political Participation in Georgia*** is about the gender factor in the electoral process of modern Georgia after its independence. It describes the problems of involving women in Georgian politics and the projects and activities implemented by the Georgian government to combat the existing problems. The chapter reveals the lack of women representatives in all Presidential Elections which were held in Georgia after its independence and gives a clear picture of dynamics of women's representation in the parliament of Georgia.

The ninth chapter is ***Development of Energy Resources in Ottoman State from the Industrial Revolution to the Republic***. This study aims to investigate the viewpoint of the Ottoman State in the coal and oil and its activities in this area, dating from the industrial revolution in Europe to the Republic. In this direction, the historical development of coal and oil in the Ottoman State is firstly discussed; then, the legal regulations and applications made for oil resources and coal mining in the 19<sup>th</sup> century are examined.

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In chapter ten ***Some Little-Known Aspects of Ottoman Waqfs and Their Function in Social Welfare Economy*** the discussion is focused on some little-known aspects of Ottoman waqfs, specifically the waqfs of the state officials, referred to in the literature as *sultanic and vizirate* waqfs. The purpose of this study is to set out details from works which have analysed original archival sources and, to present a wide perspective on Ottoman waqf practice.

Chapter eleven is ***The Strategic Management of Innovative Entrepreneurship in Turkey: A Workshop within the Scope of “Youthatworkeu”***. This study aims to discuss innovative entrepreneurship in Turkey in the light of Innovative Entrepreneurship Workshop organized by Mersin University Young Entrepreneur Center in 2019. Dr. Hıdıroğlu has coordinated sessions with Erasmus students and coordinators of the U.N. Strategic Partnership within the scope of “youthatworkeu”.

# 1

## IMPERIALISM AND SUB- IMPERIALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST: US SANCTIONS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES FOR IRAN

*Farhang Morady<sup>1</sup>*

### ***Abstract***

The continuing conflicts in the Middle East have been a stark reality for decades. These conflicts have included the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and the ongoing civil wars in Syria (since 2011) and Yemen (since 2014). For over a century now, the great powers, including the UK, France, Russia, and more recently the US and China, have all been competing for influence in one of the world's strategically and economically most important regions. The rivalries reflect the underlying tensions between states at both the regional and global levels. This paper argues that the regional power dynamics and instability of the Middle East are deeply-rooted in the history of capitalist development, whose impacts in the region include the emergence of powerful regional forces such as Iran and the Gulf States (GS) of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Whilst the US remains the uncontested and dominant external power, and the close allies of the GS, supporting and sometimes opposing them with its huge financial and military resources, others such as China, Russia, and Iran continue to rival its dominance.

**Keywords:** imperialism, sub-imperialism, capitalist development, regional powers, US, Iran, economic sanctions

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## 1. Introduction

The contemporary crisis in the Middle East is a product of the transition of the region's countries to capitalism and their growing influence in the international political economy that has come with it. This development is associated with the influence of (colonial and post-colonial economic) imperialism, especially since the discovery of oil in Iran in 1908 and subsequently elsewhere in the Gulf region. The growing importance of energy in the world since the 1970s has provided these countries with a huge source of income, enabling them to embark on capitalist development and giving them the financial muscle to wield influence in the region and beyond. What is sometimes called "sub-imperialism" is a product of this transformation, which occurred as centres of capital accumulation ceased to be concentrated only in core countries and shifted to include nations in the periphery, such as China, India, Brazil, the GS, and, indeed, Iran. In consequence, the dynamics of the states in the Middle East and their relationships to the great powers have changed. No longer passive actors, they have played a crucial role in the world economy.

This paper will argue that the tensions in the region between imperialist and emerging forces such as Iran is a result of capitalist development, and the attendant rivalries for influence and hegemony in one of the most important geo-political hot spots in the world. Both the confrontation between the US and the Islamic Republic and the latter's close relations with Russia and China can be seen to reflect a rivalry between imperialist and sub-imperialist forces. The US-imposed sanctions on Iran are an effect of the intense efforts of the US in the face of competition to maintain its hegemony in the region and bring disobedience states under its authority (Callinicos, 2009; Morady, 2020). Certainly, I argue that imperialism continues to play a major role in the Middle East, using a combination of methods, including sanctions and when possible direct intervention, as in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq 2003. The paper is divided into three parts: (a) an assessment of the concepts of imperialism and sub-imperialism; (b) a brief narrative of the transition to capitalism in the GS and Iran, and their emergence as powerful regional actors; (c) a discussion of the militarisation of the region as a consequence of the rise of these regional powers; and (d) the consequences of the sanctions imposed on Iran since the 1979 Revolution, particularly in shifting the balance of power away from the US and its allies in the region.

## 2. Theories of Imperialism

The term 'imperialism' is generally used in Marxist political economy and variants of it like world-systems and development theory (Wallerstein, 1979; Lenin, 1981; Frank, 1982; Bukharin, 1983; Harvey, 2003; Callinicos, 2009). Its most common use is to refer to the economic and political relationship (one of 'domination') between the advanced capitalist countries and less developed countries. Imperialism refers to the process of capital accumulation on a world scale in the era of monopoly capitalism, and the theory of imperialism is an attempt to explain accumulation in the context of a world market. Most theorists of imperialism, including Hobson (1858-1940), Lenin (1870-1924), and Bukharin (1888-1938), identify it in terms of three component features: the analysis of capitalist accumulation, the periodisation of capitalism, and the location of imperialism in the context of the political division of the world among nation-states. This analysis attempts to describe: (1) the relationships among advanced capitalist countries (rivalry between imperialist nations), and (2) the impact of capitalism on non-capitalist social formations (articulation between modes of production) (Bukharin, 1983; Harvey, 2003; Callinicos, 2009).

Hardt and Negri (2001) offer a new theory of post-imperialistic empire, claiming that the globalization of the world economy has brought about a new world order with interstate rivalries and global social and political integration. For them, capital is able to move freely to different parts of the world regardless of the rivalries of states. They reject Lenin and Bukharin's analysis of capitalist interests leading to inter-imperialist rivalries and conflicts. Instead, they offer a new theory of a post-imperialistic 'empire', claiming that the globalization of the world economy has brought about a new world order defined by global social and political integration. They argue that capital is able to move freely to different parts of the world regardless of the rivalries between states. Transnational companies that operate on a global scale dominate in such a way that they need no allegiance to any particular nation-state.

Michael Ignatieff (2002) identifies imperialism in the post-Cold War era as a new phase, which allows intervention to bring progressive transformations to failed states such as Afghanistan and Iraq:

## IMPERIALISM AND SUB-IMPERIALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST: US SANCTIONS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES FOR IRAN

Farhang Morady

Nation-building is the kind of imperialism you get in a human rights era, a time when great powers believe simultaneously in the right of small nations to govern themselves and in their own right to rule the world.

Thomas Friedman (2006) emphasizes that the world has become ‘flat’ as improvements in informational communications and economic organization have levelled the global economic playing field, including that of hierarchical economic organizations, as states are now being replaced by the market alone. He goes as far as to suggest that this leads inevitably to wealth creation and progressive change throughout the world.

Callinicos and Harvey conceptualize imperialism as involving the intersection of geopolitical and economic logics of power. Economic competition—rivalries between capitalist firms—drives the whole dynamic of capitalism as a system and leads to geopolitical competition as competing states look for resourceful territories in which to exercise influence (Harvey, 2003 and Callinicos, 2009). Harvey uses the term ‘new imperialism’, referencing US global domination, suggesting that it ‘*appears as nothing more than the revisiting of the old, though in a different place and time*’ (Harvey, 2003: 182).

They argue that the US does not enjoy complete domination, highlighting actual potential conflicts between leading capitalist states, especially China and the US. Harvey notes that the outcome of such a rivalry would be, ‘*increasing fierce international competition as multiple dynamic centres of capital accumulation compete on the world stage*’ (Harvey, 2003:124).

Harvey, Callinicos, and Arrighi emphasise that this global shift is the result of the decline in US hegemony since WWII. In an attempt to preserve its power, the US used its military strength and economic power. This was certainly the case in the Middle East, where the US has continued to use its military and diplomatic power to maintain its hegemony economically.

China and Russia, without resorting to direct military confrontation, so far have been building up their own bargaining power in the world, even occasionally challenging the US, over Georgia, Iran and Syria. Hore (2004) claims:

As economic ties deepen between the US and China, so too will political and military tensions. It is glaringly obvious that the neo-liberals’ dream of global

economic integration leading to a decrease in military competition is precisely the reverse in reality (p. 24).

China's search for raw materials, especially oil in the Middle East and Africa (Algeria, Angola, Sudan) is a necessity for it to ensure its energy security in the long run. Indeed, the US's continuing pressure on Iran may force it to open up space for the Chinese to extend their influence there as well. So far, the US has used its economic power to force Islamic Republic of Iran to conform to the US line, recently by imposing sanctions. This has included imposing hefty fines on countries and organisations having commercial activities with Iran.

### 3. Sub-Imperialism

The emergence of sub-imperialism is associated with the process of development, which has greatly facilitated the industrialisation of the 'third world.' As a result of this, new centres of capital accumulation outside the imperialist core have emerged. In this way, countries such as China, India, Brazil, and the GS have all come to play a significant role in the world economy (Callinicos, 1991; Halliday, 1971; Marini, 1965).

Bill Warren, in his book, *Imperialism: The Pioneer of Capitalism* (1980), suggests that imperialism has been fundamental in facilitating industrialisation in less developed countries. Warren challenges the dependency school's belief that imperialism held back the productive forces in the less developed countries (Amin, 1976; Frank, 1969, 1982).

Warren defines imperialism as "the penetration and spread of the capitalist system into non-capitalist or primitive capitalist areas of the world" (Warren, 1980: 60). Jazani, focusing on Iran's development in the post- WWII period, recognises the development of capitalism, and unlike Warren, goes on to suggest that the character of dependency is inseparable from the capitalist system, foreign exploitation, and imperialist domination (Jazani, 1980).

Fred Halliday (1974), focusing on capitalism and its impact, uses the term sub-imperialism<sup>2</sup> to characterise the relationship between imperialism and the Middle Eastern countries:

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2 On sub-imperialism and its impact in different regions, see Marini (1965); see also Bond, (2013); Shaw (1979); Warhurst (1984).

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The continued and altered relationship between imperialism and the Middle Eastern ruling classes is equally visible in the military field. The stability of the imperialist system in the area has rested on building up a set of intermediate capitalist states which are in general populous and strong enough to play a major regional role (p. 500-502).

Sub-imperial powers are wielded by states that are incorporated into the world system, and that can also act as regional agents of imperialism (Halliday, 1971; Marini, 1965). It is inaccurate to suggest that they are simply client states of the larger imperialist forces, as they enjoy a degree of autonomy from them (Desai 2013, Escobar 2013; Martin 2013, Shubin 2013). Iran before and after the Revolution is an example of this. It has posed a challenge to the US role in the region on a number of occasions, even when it was under considerable pressure. Although the cost to the Islamic Republic of taking a radical approach has been huge economically, as I will discuss later, Iran has managed to maintain degree of influence in the region and even expand it.

The Islamic Republic, like the monarchies in the GS, has been determined to protect its own economic and political interests. These states, like most others, have ensured and guaranteed the prevailing forms of property under capitalism. They have relied on their armed forces and engaged in dictatorial behaviour when it seemed necessary, because they wished to exercise control over the society and its economy. Indeed, the character of the state is capitalist, with the government guaranteeing the conditions for the reproduction and expansion of capitalist ownership.

The Islamic Republic has always looked to other nations as potential friends, including those that were 'Communist', not to mention 'secular'. These allies have included China, Russia, India, Cuba, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia. Two important factors in this have been the global rivalry between the US and the emerging economic powers of China, India, and Russia, which Iran has tried to get to outmanoeuvre each other, as well as to build alliances with countries that have an anti-imperialist Or ideology, regardless of its specific character. Although all of the countries in Latin America are secular and some have leaned socialist, and thus are very different from the Islamic Republic ideologically, their being socialist and so against the hegemony of the US and its European and East Asian allies has created a space for an alliance between 'Islam' and socialism.

Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia (until recently), Ecuador, and Nicaragua all have shared the same anti-US sentiment. They are all hoping for a new global power structure free of the dominance of the US.

This shared opposition to the US began in 1982, when Cuba became the first country to recognize the Islamic Republic formed three years before. Fidel Castro kept Cuban foreign policy favouring Iran, visiting the country in 2001 and supporting its right to access nuclear energy. In 2006, Cuba along with Venezuela and Syria voted against a resolution in the UN Security Council against Iran because of its nuclear program (Morady, 2012b).

#### **4. Capitalist Development in the Middle East**

Capitalist development in general is not uniform, but varies with specific features of time and place. It is characterized not only by economic growth and sometimes stagnation, but also various forms of resistance. The contradictions of capitalism can be expressed in various ways. As Halliday (2001) puts it:

Capitalism unifies the world into a single market and into a system of political dominations; yet the different subsections of this world system remain distinct. In many cases the differences between them are accentuated by incorporation into a single system. It is because of this unevenness that the weakest links in capitalism as a whole may be found not in the most developed countries but those countries where the retarded impact of capitalism creates contradictions that are all the sharper because the developments carried through elsewhere have not yet been completed.

The expansion of the European capitalist mode of production in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries promoted the transition in the developing world to capitalism, with such changes as the generalisation of the commodity market, the growth of wage labourers and the capitalist class, urbanisation, the development of a modern nation-state with a modern bureaucracy, army, and educational system, and the emergence of political institutions such as a parliament. In the GS and Iran these transformations were due to the internal logic of pre-capitalism nationally as well as the impact of Western imperialism and capitalism. This did not necessary lead to a progressive erosion of pre-capitalist economic and social relations, as the case of the Islamic Republic in Iran and the persistence of monarchy in various GS demonstrate. In the first half of the twentieth century, the

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UK and France dominated the Middle East, while later, and especially with the end of the Cold War, the US became the undisputed superpower. In this role, it has relied on allies in the region, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and until 1979, Iran.

Capitalism in the Middle East developed at different speeds, as nations and sectors came into contact with each other, and the global economic system incorporated even the remotest areas of the region into its division of labour. The process has thus involved a plurality of dynamics, including specific contradictions within and between society's economic, political, and cultural spheres (Callinicos and Rosenberg, 2008; Harvey, 2003; Trotsky, 1977; Weeks, 2001). In GS and Iran this development has been concentrated around the oil industry.

While the impact of energy was slight before the 1970s, it has grown as the world production of oil had increased tenfold (BP 2007). The GS and Iran have benefited handsomely with growing income from oil. The impact of energy accelerated since 1945, the income paved the way for the economic integration of the GS and Iran into the global system as well as the political transformations of subsequent decades. It has enhanced the geopolitical importance of GS and Iran, making it a centre of attention for the great powers. By the 1970s, Iran had become one of the world's fastest-growing economies, with oil revenues accounting for 90 per cent of Iran's total exports, up from 77 per cent in 1964. As a result of this increase, the government's total expenditure increased by 260 per cent in the period 1967–73, and by a further 200 per cent between 1973 and 1979 (Morady, 2020).

The flow of petrodollars from GS to international banks helped enable the latter to lend to multinational companies and various governments throughout the world. Some of the money from the GS thus went to Western countries, especially the US, in the form of equities.

Since 2000, the GS nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) moved up to over \$1 trillion, and together they became the fourteenth-largest economy in the world (Haniah, 2011:4). The financial resources of GS countries were used to expand their economic activities in areas such as development of infrastructure and tourism.

The GS purchased assets around the world, with one estimate that in 2008 about 80 per cent of the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency's (SAMA) foreign holdings were dollar-dominated, amounting to \$390 billion. The private holdings for the same year were about US\$420 billion (Setser and Ziemba 2009, p. 10). In a similar

way, the other GS such as the UAE have increasingly been emerging as among the biggest foreign investors in the world; in the period 2015-19, the UAE ranked in the top 20 nations in terms of foreign direct investment outflows (Haniah, 2020).

The transformations in the Iran and GS in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries are integrated and play a significant role in the global system. The GS and Iran have not been completely dependent on imperialist forces as semi-colonies, nor they are simply client states of imperialist forces.

The transition of the GS and Iran has given these countries the aspiration to become regional powers. At the same time, they need the US to provide security and protection, as well as financial support for the regional geo-political hegemony that they partly share in.

In Iran, the situation had changed since 1979 because of the Revolution, which empowered the clergy as leading the state. However, the Islamic Republic has remained capitalist, and energy has continued to be crucial in its economy. The Iranian Revolution was anti-imperialist in character because of the role the great powers had played in Iranian history, especially the CIA and the UK's MI5, which organize a coup to remove the elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, from power and supporting the Shah in this place (Abrahamian, 2013). This seemed to the Islamic Republic's leaders as giving them no choice but to take an anti-US stand. Since the Revolution, under considerable pressure of sanctions and threats of invasion by the US, Iran has moved closer to China and Russia.

There has been a continuity of imperialism, albeit in a different form, rather than a break from it, as has been witnessed in the region since the Cold War. While the US and its allies the GS and Israel continue to dominate in the region, China, Russia alongside of Iran have also been positioning themselves for influence in the region.

## **5. The Militarization of the Region**

One of the features of sub-imperialism is military competition between rival powers and hence an expansion of hegemony. Iran along with other GS has stockpiled weapons in an attempt to challenge any domestic opposition to the ruling elites, while demonstrating the nation's strength and reinforcing its bid for regional hegemony.

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
Arms production is one of the world's biggest and most profitable industries. With the transition to capitalism and especially since the global increase in oil prices in the 1970s, the market for arms in the Middle East has become attractive.

The growing military expenditures in the region started before the Iranian Revolution, and were largely due to the critical geopolitical location of the Persian Gulf and the importance of its energy resources. It had a considerable impact upon the legitimacy of these regimes both in the Middle East and globally. The US political and military presence in the Persian Gulf, including in Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq, has contributed to the growing militarization.

Since the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein in 1990, the GS have increased their military hardware from Western arms traders, especially the US. According to figures released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in 2014 Saudi Arabia spent £54 billion on weapons, more than any other country in the developing world. The UAE spent £15bn and Qatar spent £16bn. The seven nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE), between 1997-2014, together spent far more on their military spending than Iran (SIPRI, 2015).

Among GS purchasers of military hardware and services, between 2015 and 2019, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar ranked as the world's first, eighth, and tenth largest arms importers. Much of the arms imports are from the US. Saudi Arabia alone purchased one-quarter of total US arms exports during that period, up from 7.4 percent in 2010–14.

*Estimates of Gulf State Military Spending in Current US Dollars, 1997-2014*



*Source: Based on IMF Data, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2014*

Arms sales have also brought, from exporting countries, advisers, technicians, and the establishment of military bases around the region. In the face of various internal, regional and global crises, huge build-ups of sophisticated weapons have become a political necessity for the rulers in the region, both to boast their latest modern weapons as well as in the hope to shield them from internal and external threats.

The balance of military spending has favoured the GS, and is shaped by the level of US commitment and power projection capability supporting its Arab security partners. This has meant closer relations and growing exports of arms, especially to Saudi Arabia, since Trump's becoming US President in 2017. Domestic conflicts in countries like Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, along with Iran's growing strategic influence, have also been influential factors in arms spending in the GS.

The continuing influence of the Islamic Republic, the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and the civil wars in Yemen and Syria have provided additional reasons for the GS to increase their arm spending.

## **6. The Economic Cost of the US Sanctions**

The Iranian revolution has caused imbalances in the region, as the US lost one of its most important allies in the Middle East. This has caused much tension not just between Iran and the US, but also involving the other regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, UAE. Iran has also taken advantage of the conditions in the region that have developed since the US- and British-led invasion of Iraq in 2001, growing its influence there and later in Syria.


The Western response, especially that of the US, has been isolation and sanctions. Consequently, Iran has been forced, since 1979, to look for allies around the world in the hope of thwarting the US threat. Although this has helped Iran marginally, it has not been very effective.

The Islamic Republic has jostled for hegemony in the region with Saudi Arabia and UAE. Of course, Iran cannot, even regionally, serve as a power equivalent to that of the US, and it also lacks the financial muscle of the GS. Even though China and Russia, at times, have given tacit support to the Islamic Republic, this has not been substantial enough. Consequently, Iran has faced difficulties, especially since 2011, when, during Ahmadinejad's presidency, it began uranium

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enrichment for its nuclear project. The reaction by the US was immediate, with sanctions no longer being imposed unilaterally by Western countries, but taking the form of internationally imposed sanctions under a United Nations resolution, effectively involving countries and organisations around the globe (Morady, 2020). As a result, Iran's energy sector was hit badly, with oil exports reduced from over 2 million barrels a day to less than 1.5 million (Morady, 2017).




Source: Energy Information Administration, 2018

By 2012, the Islamic Republic's oil export revenues had declined to \$69 billion from \$95 billion in 2011. At this time, oil exports accounted for 80 per cent of Iran's total export revenue and 50-60 per cent of the government's income. The sanctions also curtailed much-needed investment in the oil industry as foreign companies cancelled many different projects.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)<sup>3</sup> between the great powers (the US, Russia, China, the UK, and France) and Iran ('the 5+1') in 2015 was expected to provide opportunities for the Islamic Republic in exchange for ending its nuclear enrichment. This amounted in some respects to accepting Iran as a dominant power, while the US also hoped to facilitate closer relations, involving collaboration in areas where there was strategic convergence between them. The Islamic Republic enjoyed a temporary breathing space as oil production and GDP started improving.

3 The Comprehensive Plan of Action was an agreement between Iran and the US, Russia, China, the UK, and France ('the 5+1') to halt Iran's nuclear program. It went into effect on July 14, 2015.



*Source: US Energy Information Administration, IMF, 2019*

However, with Donald Trump's becoming President, the US called for ending negotiations, and in 2017 finally withdrew from the JCPOA, the nuclear accord with Iran. Trump called for a return to comprehensive sanctions in an effort to pressure Iran to reduce its influence in the region.

Crude oil production and exports had continued to decline since the May 2018, as the US re-imposed sanctions against Iran. As a result, Iran's exports of crude oil and condensate were at about 2.7 million barrels per day (b/d). However, Iran's crude oil and condensate exports fell to 1.9 million b/d immediately after the US reinstated the sanctions.

The impact was a recession, which accelerated in 2019-20. Iran's GDP contracted by 7.6 per cent in the first 9 months of 2019, mainly as a result of a 37 per cent decline in its oil exports. Non-oil GDP growth in April-December 2019 was close to zero, a marginal improvement compared to the sector's 2.1 per cent contraction in 2018-19. Since the recent COVID-19 outbreak, Iran's economy has seen significantly disrupted trade, tourism, and retail businesses.

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Inflation rates in Iran have skyrocketed, to between 42.7-63.5 per cent, with this increase disproportionately affecting the nation's poor. Some reports suggest that between 23 and 40 per cent of Iran's population is now living under the absolute poverty line.

Whilst Iran has tried to influence the region, this has not been without cost as the sanctions have put the country under considerable pressure. It is apparent that the US has used its power to force Iran to accept the terms that the US is putting forward, or else face a strong challenge.

### 7. Conclusion

Nearly a century after oil was discovered in Iran, the Middle East continues to be a battleground for competing great and now regional powers. The outside intervention, in particular from the US, in the Middle East has reflected the vitality of an area that has also seen much instability. However, the integration with global capitalism of the GS, initially through energy resources, has impacted various social forces. The transformation of the Middle East, especially the GS and Iran, has heightened the geopolitical competition between regional powers. The regional powers of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, have shown the maturity of capitalist development in the region and the ability of the states to influence it. However, these sub-imperialist forces continue to rely on the support of the Western powers, especially the US, although the relationship involves much autonomy on their part.

The recent diplomatic development between the UAE and Bahrain and Israel, giving the former two nations full diplomatic relations with the latter, will intensify the geopolitical rivalries. Obviously, this relationship is based on economic, military, and security matters but undoubtedly, there has been a shift in the geopolitical positioning of GS by having Israel on their side. This is not just a direct challenge to Iran's influence in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon; it also is a response to Turkey's competing with the UAE for influence in countries such as Sudan and Libya. It is very likely that the other GS will recognise the state of Israel, and this will further transfer the geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East.

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# 2

## ANTI-ISLAMIC DISCOURSE IN MODERN EUROPE

*Emilia Alaverdov<sup>1</sup>*

### **Abstract**

The chapter deals with the modern European challenges, caused by the flows of numerous migrants. It describes the problem of Islam in Europe in all its aspects and completeness, which is currently considered as one of the most acute and hot debated topics since it draws the special attention of political circles and international society. The chapter examines the impact of migration on the social and political situation in the European Union and shows the tough integration processes of migrants in the EU Member States. The research highlights the importance of mutual understandings, the demand for tolerance toward the religious identity, adequate assessment of Muslim's lifestyle, and the importance of dialogue with the Muslim world, as well as the proper perception of Islamic identity and new vectors in the Muslim directions. In addition, the papers is focused on the problem of Islam in modern European socio-political discourse, which is extremely complex and is associated with a whole range of other problems related to the correlation of Islam and the secular state, the implementation of intercultural interaction within one society.

**The object of study** represents the Muslim world view and the modern world.

**The subject** of the research is the challenging processes of the modern world: the attitude of European society toward the Muslim migrants.

### **Research Methods**

The chapter is mainly based on the following research methods: descriptive, statistical and analysis.

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The descriptive method was used to characterize the mutual distrust of Islam and European society;

The statistical method was used to collect and analyze data on the percentage of Muslims and their harassment in the European countries;

The method of analysis was based on the study of certain research documents and empirical material. The basis of the source represents the books, scientific articles, press materials, and documents published on official websites in the field of migration policy and human rights. Papers dedicated to the migration process in European countries; works that present the problems of migrants' integration and the implementation of multicultural policies; studies criticizing approaches in this field.

**Key Words:** Harassment, Migrants, Islamophobia, European Union, Islam, Integration, Social Life, Islamic Identity.

### 1. Introduction

One of the main problems of the modern world's politics remains the relations between the Muslims and the world. The modern world is afraid of an Islamic lifestyle, cultural behavioral norms, and religious traditions. The problem is aggravated by mutual distrust and suspicion, counter-accusations of expansion, and political ideology. The increase of the Muslim population in the European countries has certain consequences; the reluctance of migrants to get acquainted with European culture accepts its values, adapt to the European lifestyle, and integrate into its society, which in its terms raise a kind of Islamophobia followed by human harassment and lead to radicalization.

The adaptation of Muslims in Europe is associated with both positive and negative processes. Many Muslims and their children join European values, receive education, work, and seek to integrate into the European multicultural situation. At the same time, they want to preserve their ethnic, spiritual, and cultural identity. However, some of them are attracted by the radical and extremist groups; commit illegal acts, which determine anti-Islamic outbursts.

However, with all this attention, those issues that are of fundamental importance usually remain in the shadows or are simply bypassed. As a rule, each of

the aspects of this problem is considered separately, and more often than not, attention is focused on the consequences of the phenomenon, rather than on its causes. The paper aims to consider the assertion of the Islamic world in Europe and try to understand its features, the determinations of the European policy-makers, and the attitude of some Europeans toward Islam.

While talking about Islam we have to understand that Muslims in Europe are, first and foremost, immigrants whose influx into the European continent over the past 20 years has seriously changed its demographic picture, which provokes the fare of European politicians and society.

## 2. Literature Review

D. Mukhetdinov and S. Borodai in their book *Islam in Europe* analyze the demographic situation, the general strategy for the integration of immigrants, the labor market, housing conditions, the media, etc. Certain chapters are devoted to the situation of Muslims in the UK, Germany, Lithuania, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, as well as in Central and Eastern Europe. Certain chapters are devoted to the situation of Muslims in Great Britain, Germany, Lithuania, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, as well as in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and analyze the current situation and the forecasts of the coming decades, which shows the prospects of Islam in Europe, as well as it overviews the situation of demography, education, ethnic and religious diversity in the separate countries.

P. Vimont, in his research *Migration in Europe: Overcoming the crisis of Solidarity*, describes the unification of European countries in the case of emergency and at the same time their deep political disagreements on migration. In the book we can observe the discussion of such topics as the mandatory and recommendatory distribution of migrants by country; the acceptance of migrants on a permanent or temporary basis; introduction of the financial solidarity principles.

T. Sarrasin, a well-known politician and former senator of Berlin, in the book *Germany: Self-Elimination* convincingly shows that the Muslim community in Germany does not seek integration into German life. He analyses the level of Muslim migrants' education and highlights that their participation in labor activities of immigrants remains much lower than the level of the indigenous population, which, with traditionally high fertility among Muslims, represents a real

threat to the country. The author speaks for tough migration policy and shows ways out of the crisis and predicts the country's future.

The valuable research, *Global Europe 2050* Directorate-General for Research and Innovation Directorate is a great work of twenty-five leading analysts who describe the future scenarios of the EU. They analyze scenarios of global demographic and societal challenges, geopolitics and governance, shaping the future EU's innovation policy, show the threat of European Union and Political and cultural integration.

Aleksei Malashenko, a well-known scientist in the field of the Muslim world in his research, *Building Relations with the Muslim World* tries to answer such questions as to how to improve relations of the Muslim world with America, Europe, and Russia, the importance of the politics of Muslim countries, the influence of religious identity on their social lives, to adequate assessment of Islamism, which has become one of the main ideological and political trends in the Muslim world, and the importance of dialogue with Muslim radicals, as well as the author deals with the proper perception of Islamic identity and new vectors in the Muslim direction.

The Data Booklet, *World Population Prospects 2019*: prepared by the United Nations department of economic and social affairs presents key population indicators at the global, regional, and country levels and highlights current and future patterns and trends in fertility, mortality, and international migration. Data presented in this booklet are based on the *World Population Prospects 2019*, the latest global demographic estimates and projections prepared by the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. The *World Population Prospects* provides a comprehensive set of demographic data and indicators to assess population trends at the global, regional, and national levels and to calculate many other key indicators commonly used by the United Nations system.

The research on *World Migration Report 2020* prepared by the UN Migration International Organization for Migration overviews the perspective on migration and mobility in increasingly uncertain times, the positions of migrants, the challenges of their inclusion and social cohesion, regional dimensions, and further perspectives of world migration developments.

Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey Muslims – Selected Findings EU-MIDIS II, conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights reveals the experiences of more than 10,500 self-identifying Muslim immigrants and their descendants in 15 EU Member States. The findings of this survey show the general lack of progress in tackling discrimination and hate crime. This report provides a unique insight into the experiences and perceptions of the EU's second-largest religious group. As the findings show, discrimination, harassment, and violence can undermine positive attitudes and hinder meaningful participation in society. The report provides policymakers with findings based on the most extensive dataset available on Muslims in the EU, focusing on issues ranging from citizenship, trust, and tolerance, through discrimination and police stops based on an individual's ethnic background, to rights awareness.

Fundamental Rights Report (FRA) of 2020 highlights several titles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The report covers the following directions: equality and non-discrimination, racism, xenophobia, and related intolerance, the migrants' integration rights.

### **3. Anti-Islamic Sentiment in Europe (on the Example on Germany)**

At the same time when Germany opened its borders to a large number of refugees and accepted these people, the rightists protested and demanded that Germany be protected from Islamization.

The arrival of large numbers of Muslim newcomers, grow the fears of terrorism and an Islamification of Germany. The population of the country looked at this with more national patriotism and greater emphasis on sovereignty. Since they doubt that Muslim migrants can manage to integrate into German society and at the same time preserve a sense of their dignity and cultural identity (Gedmin, 2019).

Even though fundamental human rights demands from the EU Member States to fully and correctly transpose and apply the provisions of the Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia and take the necessary measures to criminalize bias-motivated crime (hate crime), treating racist and xenophobic motivation is an aggravating circumstance. It states that the EU Member States should put measures in place that encourage reporting of hate crime and facilitate directing the victim to support services. Besides, they should ensure that any alleged hate crime is effectively recorded, investigated, prosecuted, and tried.

This needs to be done following applicable national, EU, European, and international human rights law. The EU Member States should make further efforts to systematically record data on hate crime, collect them, and publish them annually. The data should be disaggregated at a minimum by bias motivation, type of crime, and sex and age of the victim(s) and perpetrator(s), to enable them to develop effective, evidence-based legal and policy responses to this phenomenon. Any data should be collected following national legal frameworks and EU data protection legislation (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2020). However, the number of attacks on migrant shelters has increased and anti-migrant propaganda has spread throughout the country. These incidents of intolerance and violence have fueled German radicalization and anti-refugee sentiment. Several politicians have called for a change in the refugee policy to make the situation even worse.

Some politicians have said that receiving so many refugees threatens national security as they are followed by internal or inter-ethnic conflicts, and most importantly, Islamic State fighters or other terrorists may enter the country and at least try to influence the Muslim community living there and fuel the radicalization. Experts also suggest an increase in crime rates as people of different cultures will find it difficult to obey German laws and they even predict the increasing crime rate. To change these dynamics or at least ease the situation, these politicians are demanding tighter control and changing policies (Schmid, 2016). While the whole of European civilization is waiting for the Islamic threat, which was born in 2011, it is worth to recall the words of US President Bill Clinton, "The activities of fanatics do not define the whole Islamic world," then we can safely say that Islam itself is not a religion of evil. It is characterized by tolerance, in other words, elemental indifference. As for the fanatical groups, of course, their members are Muslims, but they do not interpret and apply the norms of Islam in their evil ways. It is also noteworthy that incidents of extremism and fanaticism include not only Muslims but also representatives of other religions.

Some politicians said that Germany should stop accepting refugees and migrants because there is a risk of a cultural problem. Moreover, the majority argues that refugees endanger the values, norms, and laws of the West and German identities. They point to the fact that most of the applicants coming to Europe have different cultures and normative backgrounds. So it will be very difficult and practically impossible to integrate them into European norms, standards, and values.

In this regard an initiative group, called Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West (PEGIDA) was established in Germany in 2014 with anti-immigrant and specifically anti-Muslim sentiment and rose to its height of popularity in 2015. The group members believe that Muslims suppress and infiltrate German culture (Selipsky, 2019).

It is worth highlighting that in 2017 the German State revealed around 71 attacks on mosques and 908 crimes against German Muslims (ranging from verbal to physical attacks and murder attempts). Germany also registered 1,413 attacks on refugees and 93 attacks on aid workers in Germany in the first 273 days of 2017. However, although the German state registered 71 attacks on mosques, the DITIB, which is an NGO, listed 101 attacks on mosques in Germany all throughout 2017. Therefore, bearing in mind also what the FRA revealed about the reluctance of Muslims to report incidents, one can claim that the estimated number of unknown cases might be more than eight times higher (Byrakli&Hafez, 2018).

*Anti-Islamic Sentiment in Germany (2017)*


Number of Attacks on Mosques	Number of Crimes Against German Muslims	Number of Attacks on Refugees	Number of Attacks on Aid Workers
71 – Recorded by State Bodies 101 Recorded by DITIB - NGO	908	1,413	93

The German politicians are expecting negative results, such as neglect and disruption of European and German culture, resulting in violent cultural conflicts, total social divisions, and general diffusion. They claim that the refugee crisis will not only be quite a challenge for the country but will also become a difficult problem to solve. Moreover, some politicians said that they do not expect social integration from these people because they are used more to wars and chaos and they do not know such things as peace, tolerance, order, and prosperity.

While some public figures still believe that refugee assistance and shelter are necessary, there is growing skepticism about the future scenario about the peaceful co-existence of mixed cultures. And as a result in the East German thousands of people went to the streets with the anti-refugee protests, which was named the “Islamization of the West.”

However, according to the survey conducted by EU-MIDIS II, Four in five Muslim respondents have friends with other ethnic minority backgrounds (79 %) and from the majority population (84 %). Almost nine in 10 have friends of a different religion (88 %) – that is, non-Muslim friends. Those with friends from different religious backgrounds tend to feel slightly more attached to their country of residence. The Muslims surveyed in EU-MIDIS II are generally open towards other groups of people in the sense of feeling comfortable with having neighbors of different religions, other ethnic backgrounds, or persons with disabilities. However, the level of acceptance is lower regarding lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or transsexual people. Respondents were asked to indicate how comfortable they would feel with different groups of people being their neighbors, on a scale from 0 to 10. There is a very strong acceptance of people with a different religion, the same ethnic or immigrant background, people with another or no ethnic minority background, and disabled persons – with average values of 8.8 regarding people with another ethnic minority background and 9.0 regarding people with a different religion. Some 92 % tend to feel comfortable with having neighbors of a different religious background, meaning they selected a value of six or higher; only 2 % tend to feel uncomfortable, with values between 0 and 4 (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017).

*Results of EU-MIDIS II Survey 2017*



About one in three self-identified Muslim men and women who took part in FRA's Second EU Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS II) and

who wear visible religious symbols indicated that they experienced discrimination, harassment, or police stops. This contrasts with Muslim men and women who do not wear such symbols, about one in four of whom indicated having had such experiences. The survey findings also show that about three in 10 women who wear a headscarf or a Niqab are in employment, compared to about four in 10 for women who do not. Restrictions on religious clothing or symbols at work or in public spaces remained a subject of attention in the EU in 2017, particularly regarding face-covering garments worn by some Muslim women. These developments mainly concern the religious practices of some Muslim women (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2018).

The European Monitoring Center for Racism and Xenophobia warns against “Islamophobia” and criticizes: “Muslims believe that their acceptance by society is increasingly perceived as assimilation, which implies the loss of their Muslim identity (Sarrazin, 2012). However, it is wrong: they only need to learn the language, accept the European values, and integrate into society. According to Sarrazin, Muslims should think about the prejudice against them throughout Europe; they have to realize that no other religion in Europe declares itself so demanding; no other immigration is connected as much as Muslim, with the use of the welfare state and criminality; no other group publicly emphasizes their difference, especially through women’s clothing; in no other religion, there is such an easy transition across the line to violence, dictatorship, and terrorism (Sarrazin, 2012).

#### **4. Historical Roots of Islam in Europe**

The history of Islam in the European region began in 652 when Arab-Berber troops appeared in Sicily, which at that time was part of Byzantium. A more thorough conquest of Sicily took place in the 10th century and lasted until 965, until the establishment of the Sicilian emirate. Arab-Berber troops occupied most of the Iberian Peninsula; the area was under Muslim control until 1492 and became one of the main world centers of philosophical and natural sciences. Lately, it re-conquered the Catholic kings (Attar, 2018).

The Ottoman Empire began to advance to the northwest, to the Balkans, completely subjugating Thrace and most of Macedonia after the battle of Maritsa, which took place in 1371. In 1382, Sofia fell, and later in 1460, the Ottoman Empire conquered Greece (Rossos, 2008). The expansion of the Ottoman Empire

in the European region continued until the 17th century. Eastern Europe has been under Islamic rule since the fourteenth century when the Golden Horde became a Muslim state. In the Middle Ages, Islamic civilization had a strong influence on European civilization in cultural terms. Muslims embraced and creatively re-worked Greek science and philosophy. They transferred their knowledge of algebra, astronomy, chemistry, medicine, geology, etc. The technological achievements of Muslims, such as astrolabes, surgical instruments, water clocks, also came to Europe; it is considered to be one of the largest technological transfers in world history (Mukhetdinov, Borodai, 2016). A strong Islamic influence is also found in art, music, literature, and much more. Experts agree that without interaction with Muslims, Europe would not have been able to make the technological and cultural breakthrough that has been observed since the fourteenth century, that is, from the Renaissance. A major specialist in this matter, Watt Montgomery, draws the following conclusion: in his opinion Islam not only shared many achievements of its material culture and technical discoveries with Western Europe, it not only stimulated the development of science and philosophy in Europe, but it also led Europe to create a new understanding of it to herself (Montgomery, 1994). One can speak of the current stage of active interaction between Europe and Islam from the second half of the 20th century onwards when an influx of immigrants began to flow into the states of Western Europe (Pugh, 2019). At that time, Great Britain, France, and Belgium, anxious about the restoration of their economy, turned to former colonies as a source of the cheap workforce. In the early 1960s, Germany was also forced to resort to the services of foreign workers by concluding a special agreement with Turkey. Subsequently, members of their families, political immigrants, and students joined the workers. In Germany, most migrant workers began to stay from Turkey since the 1950s.

Despite having deep historical roots in Europe, Islam has not become a part of European culture, and on this basis, there is a certain conflict of identities, ideologies and worldviews. The first attempts to integrate visiting Muslims into society, without changing the nature of society itself, were a failure, so the question of moderate integration, the inclusion of immigrants in the European public life, in which they would become full members of European society, but did not lose their identity, is still an acute issue.

## 5. The Challenges of New Surges

The modern migration flow started in the spring of 2015 and greatly differs from the previous ones both in scale and in reasons - mainly people fleeing the civil war in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Modern Europe has not yet encountered such challenge; Syrians and Iraqis fled from the ongoing armed conflicts in their home countries - by the end of 2015, in less than eight months, there were more than 800,000 people in Europe, that is, an average of 6,000 people crossed the EU's borders per day; a new migration route was opened, through Turkey, Greece and the Western Balkans, and then through the EU countries - Hungary, Austria, Germany and further to other European countries. Europeans were and still are concerned about the determination of the new wave of migrants, who showed a rare ability to anticipate a change in circumstances and adapt to them.

Unlike migration that went to Europe along the Mediterranean Sea and was driven by economic considerations, migration from the Middle East was political in nature. Migrants fled from ever-increasing violence to save their lives. Moreover, they had a legal right to international protection - according to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, everyone can be considered as a refugee who has fled from persecution or from the dangers of war (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951). This imposed an obligation on EU member states to accept and give asylum to refugees and migrants in need of international protection. The EU has already faced a similar situation before, in the 1990s; Western Europe accepted a significant number of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. But the current situation is distinguished by an extremely powerful influx of refugees in a very short period, which has shaken domestic political stability in most EU countries; the involvement of a significant number of Central and Eastern European countries; the geographical nature of the migration routes, due to which several non-EU Balkan countries were involved in the collective decision-making process; the specifics of the Middle East migration flow, which is almost entirely composed of Muslims.

An additional difference between the current migration from the previous ones and at the same time a factor complicating the situation was the violent emotional reaction of the population of European countries, which significantly affected the political situation in Europe. Moreover, there are certain problems of cultural integration and the level of education. 30% of Muslims living in Germany do not finish school at all and only 14% have a matriculation certificate.

Due to this fact, newcomers can be engaged in only lower social layers and work as cleaners, workers, etc. Thus, they are far behind their German peers, which represent a solid ground for radicalization. Some Germans, including those from the elite, have realized it and experience the Islamophobia.

Migration accelerated change on the European political scene, unexpectedly adding support to new (and some old) populist parties and significantly reducing the number of supporters of the ruling parties. At the same time, she updated the political agenda, highlighting the themes of integration and security. The sharp aggravation of these two problems - security in the face of terrorist threats and the preservation of national identity and social cohesion - was not a surprise (Vimon, 2017).

### **6. Islamic Factor in the European Migration Politics**

In recent decades, Europe has used several strategies for integrating foreign cultures. The leading countries are considered Germany, France, and the UK. The German authorities for a long time adhered to the ethnocultural concept of the nation. This approach counteracted the inclusion of immigrants in the German nation. In 2000, Germany officially revised its ethnocultural strategy. It was replaced by the principle of “constitutional patriotism”, Müller 2007) according to which a nation is determined not by hereditary biological criteria, but on the ground of loyalty to the basic values of the state. In contrast to the relatively recently revised ethnocultural approach in Germany, the main role in obtaining citizenship in France historically is not played by the right of blood, but by birth and residence on the territory of the state. French strategy aims to assimilate immigrants. The French Constitution of 1958 states that “France is an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic, guaranteeing that all citizens regardless of their origin, race or religion are treated as equals before the law and respecting all religious beliefs” (The French Constitution, 1958).

The approach to the integration of immigrants in Britain was initially imbued with a spirit of tolerance, strengthened by the coexistence of different peoples and cultures within the British colonial empire. There are three main ways of becoming a UK citizen: automatic acquisition at birth, registration (usually for children), and naturalization (usually for adults). Children who are born in the UK are not necessarily British nationals. They will automatically be UK citizens if at least one of

their parents is either a UK citizen themselves or a settled or permanent resident there; these children do not need to apply for citizenship but can apply directly for a passport. UK-born children can also register for citizenship if their parents receive either ILR or citizenship or if they have lived in the UK until the age of 10. In 2018 and 2019, the government proposed some potential changes to citizenship policy, although it is not currently clear how and when they might be implemented. Specifically, it proposed ‘strengthening the language requirements’ and ‘revising the content of the Life in the UK test to give greater prominence to British values’ (Fernández-Reino, & Sumption, 2020). A distinctive feature of the British strategy is that integration takes place here not only individually, but also through ethnic communities to maintain their cultural identity. Despite all the differences between these strategies, they were based on (as well as the others used in Europe) the historical liberal democratic paradigm, based on respect for human rights and non-interference in the life of foreign cultures. In other words, European states implemented a policy of “multiculturalism”, recognizing the cultural diversity of society and creating conditions for the public practice of Islam. This policy allowed migrants to remain a closed community (periphery) within the country of residence.

The growth of Islamic extremism in the modern world prompted European governments to abandon this peculiar “policy of non-interference”, uncontrolled multiculturalism, and switch to controlled multiculturalism, which implied a more thoughtful and “targeted” building of relations with Muslim communities (Pratt, 2018).

The European Union is developing general principles of immigration policy, adopting separate legislative acts, organizing events aimed at developing intercultural dialogue. One of the general principles states that a critical aspect of managing migration is the successful integration of legally residing immigrants and their descendants. At the same time, immigration policy can contribute to the success of the integration policy. The Member States need to maintain and further develop societies in which newcomers feel welcome, which are defined by a spirit of mutual understanding and accommodation, and where there are clear expectations of all residents — new and old. Integration takes place simultaneously at the individual, family, and general community and State levels, and occurs in all facets of life: in fact, integration can easily span a generation or more. Consequently, successful integration policy must engage the local, regional, and

national institutions, with which immigrants interact, in both the public and private realms. The development and implementation of integration policy is therefore the primary responsibility of individual Member States rather than of the Union as a whole (Council of the European Union, 2004).

However, the principles that are being developed are more likely to be recommendations rather than binding norms, which is due to both the various integration backgrounds of the member countries and their resistance to Brussels' interference in this complex sphere of domestic politics. In general, the EU seeks to harmonize national approaches in a "soft way" - by defining recommended standards and supporting specific projects. Given the not-too-successful experience of past years, European countries are looking for more balanced options for integration policies that at the same time meet the interests of host societies and take into account the needs of Muslims themselves (Tibi, 2008). A significant place is given to solving socio-economic problems. It is assumed that the realization of the rights of Muslims in the areas of employment, education, healthcare, and housing will lead to their greater openness, rapprochement with the indigenous population and will favorably affect political integration. At the same time, stating the fact of the crisis of multiculturalism, European leaders tighten immigration policy in several aspects.

The attitude to religious symbols of Muslims is being toughened. In France, in 2004, public school students were prohibited from wearing hijabs. Its example was followed by some lands in Germany. In Switzerland in 2009, the authorities raised a referendum on the construction of new minarets, during which 57.5% of citizens voted against their construction (Green, 2011). In the Muslim community, the policy of the European authorities often provokes various reactions. In this regard, we can use the ban on wearing the burqa and niqabs in public places, introduced in 2010-2013 – these are clothes that interfere with personal identification in Belgium, France, the Swiss canton of Ticino, and some cities in Italy and Spain.

This ban, dictated by security requirements, was met with understanding by many Muslims condemning Islamist terrorism. At the same time, it was not welcomed not only by supporters of traditionalism but also by liberal-minded Muslim public figures, who saw such decisions as an encroachment on the right to choose and identity (Khenkin&Kudryashova, 2015).

## 7. Summary

The influx of immigrants in European countries has increased especially in connection with the recent events in northern Africa and the Middle East. Thus, the number of Muslims is growing, and immigration processes significantly affect the socio-cultural image affecting both the European and the traditional Muslim populations.

Contemporary Europe faces the tough problem of intercultural and interreligious interactions within the framework of unite society. Many politicians and the major part of European society assume the migration and especially such high number of Muslim arrivals as a disaster. As a result a severe Islamophobia arose in Europe that has a strong negative impact on the both, European society and Muslims; it represents an obstacle for European international relations; circulates hate speech and social hostility against Muslims; increases tension between religions and cultures, moreover it causes a threat to the people's physical life. The phenomenon of Islamophobia should be considered as a particular aspect of xenophobia, which in general, is a violation of human rights, of the democratic foundations of European society, and non-recognition of individual human dignity.

Thus, according to the above described facts and despite the policy of multiculturalism pursued in the EU countries, there are anti-Islamic sentiments in European society, which are expressed in anti-Islamic propaganda, demonstrations of social movements and even in physical violence.

## 8. Recommendations

If Europe wants to competently and in essence deal with such high number of newcomers, it can manage to find an adequate and realistic solution to the problem of migration, which may be considered as the first step towards the revival of modern Europe. For this it has to:

- change their current attitude and develop dialogue with external partners, resist the temptation of intolerance and isolationism;
- analyze its previous experience - in particular, the rich experience in implementing development assistance programs that are directly related to the issue of migration measures;
- to adapt its methods and concepts to the conditions of the new reality;

- to strengthen the collective component: in order to solve the problems associated with migration, Europeans must act in cooperation with international partners;
- to understand the fact that the newly arrived Muslim migrants already have their own, firmly formed identity with embedded strong religious roots, which will grow even stronger under the influence of a foreign and often hostile environment;
- to have more tolerant approach and be more patient toward the refugees;
- to remember that all the religions ask for tolerance and patience and Islam is not an exception and does not cause any threats to the EU society;
- it needs to have a specific attitude and see the situation not only from the side of Islamophobia but from the point of the refugees and asylum seekers view;
- develop programs for integration such as language courses;
- not to be focus on the religious and ethnical aspects.

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# 3

## UNDERSTANDING THE BOLSA FAMILIA PROGRAM AS A SOCIAL PROTECTION SYSTEM IN BRAZIL

*Hikmet Gülçin Beken<sup>1</sup>*

### **Abstract**

Launched in Brazil as of 2003, Bolsa Familia is an example of conditional cash transfer programs. Under Bolsa Familia, extending support to the poorest groups is targeted by fighting against poverty and alleviating inequality. Besides, preventing poverty from being transmitted across generations and supporting the human capital in terms of education and healthcare are also targeted. Bolsa Familia constitutes the social protection system of the country along with integration of both social insurance and social support programs. Bolsa Familia was transformed into a more comprehensive program by gathering previous programs implemented in the country under a single roof, and it allowed the government to reduce administrative costs. In this study, the focus will be placed on the effect of Bolsa Familia on the fight in the country against poverty and inequality by a theoretical analysis.

**Keywords:** Conditional cash transfer, social protection scheme, Bolsa Familia, Brazil.

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

While examining the performance of Brazil by means of socio-economic indicators throughout the historical process, it will be misleading to make an individual evaluation disconnected from the basic dynamics of the Latin America region. When social policy and social protection systems in Latin America are considered from the perspective of the Brazilian case, it is observed that similar practices and mechanisms have come into being also in the Latin America region. Evaluations based on three main periods which affected the social policy of Brazil and determined its macroeconomic performance will be enlightening about the conditions

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giving rise to the Bolsa Familia Program. It is discerned that the export-oriented growth period until 1930s and the subsequent import-substitution industrialization period of 1930-1980 were followed by the period of neo-liberal policies as of 1990s until today (Saad-Filho, 2015:1229).

Social aid and support becoming more prevalent in 1990s may be perceived particularly as a response given by less developed and middle-income countries to economic crises, structural adjustment programs and globalization. Policies such as cuts in public expenditures and privatization in 1980s and 1990s lowered the quality of services besides aggravating poverty and inequality (Tillin & Duckett, 2017:255). Privatization of welfare services, withdrawal of the state from these areas and delivery of moderate and targeted social aid to those in need were prioritized along with the transition to the neo-liberal period (Saad-Filho, 2015:1233). Neo-liberal policies, in this sense, set forth that new rules and tools found room for implementation in the transformation of social policy and social welfare.

Along with the Constitution of 1988, a new episode which went beyond contribution-based supports, in which income security plans and the scope of these plans were expanded and which was shaped on the basis of social citizenship and social rights was initiated in the field of social policy in Brazil (Hall, 2013:168; dos Santos, 2013:131). Adoption of the conditionality principle has the function of improving and developing the citizenship conditions of people benefiting from these programs (enabling people to have access to basic social rights) (Mourao & de Jesus, 2012:44). Upon the review of the period after the Constitution of 1988, it is discerned that the system was based on extension of both services and monetary support to disadvantaged people; however, certain challenges such as financing the system and clearly specifying the areas of responsibility were confronted (Jaccoud et al., 2010:4).

The review of conditional cash transfers through the case of Latin America, particularly Brazil, indicates that conditional cash transfers with their structures in the form of residual welfare policies tended to deepen the existing unequal distribution of social rights. Due to the fragmented structure of social protection, the conditional cash transfers in fact mean to maintain the status of poor people as second-class citizens. 'Targeting,' which is a part of conditional cash transfers (children, women and so on), produces also results likely to pave the way for the failure of the system (such as social exclusion) (Molyneux, 2008:63).

The Bolsa Familia Program of Brazil found room for implementation in several places across the world (South Africa, Indonesia, Chile, Mexico and so on) (Barrientos & Villa, 2013; World Bank, 2007), and there were 67 countries using the Bolsa Familia model across the world as per the 2017 data (Paiva et al., 2019:21). The next part will explore what conditional cash transfers signify and what their properties are in general and will subsequently present the results which come into play specifically in the context of the Bolsa Familia program.

## **2. DEFINITION OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS AND THEIR PROPERTIES**

It is important to make evaluations based on the properties and coverage of conditional cash transfers. It is discerned that conditional cash transfers are most commonly addressed within the context of economic development and poverty as they are likely to affect and be affected by several areas. If the scope in which conditional cash transfers are implemented across the world is examined, it is observed that they are focused on the entire country, or as pilot projects on a small scale, on regions or small populations (Fizbein & Schady, 2009).

Upon the review of practices of conditional cash transfers in the Latin America region, particularly in Brazil, it is ascertained that they are reshaped on the basis of targeting, cash transfers, conditionality and attainment of short- and long-term socio-economic goals. However, in each country, the prioritized goal differed, and conditional cash transfers were associated with social policy and social protection at varying degrees (Holmes et al., 2010:2).

Support provided under conditional cash transfer programs may have either a demand side or a supply side. Demand-side programs are categorized as transfers (monetary and non-monetary) and services (directly or indirectly non-monetary). Supply-side programs are in general in the form of transfers (monetary) (Cecchini & Madariaga, 2011:44). In planning, conditional cash transfers may be oriented toward efficiency (compensating market failures) or equality (intended for redistribution of resources). In the design of conditional cash transfers as equality-oriented and efficiency-oriented, certain tradeoffs may come into play on the basis of the conditionality principles and eligibility criteria of conditional cash transfers (Das et al., 2005:76).

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The direct link of the mechanisms of the social security network in the country is established by conditional cash transfers with development of human capital, and therefore, in order to receive transfers, beneficiaries are asked to meet certain conditions such as attendance to the school, health checks and vaccination of children (Handa & Davis, 2006). It should be borne in mind that there may also be a tradeoff between the human capital development function and redistribution function of conditional cash transfers (Fizbein & Schady, 2009).

Cecchini (2009) asserted that, even if the conditional cash transfer program succeeded in covering the poor and the poorest in an upper middle-income country like Brazil, the same situation was not in place in low-income countries. It is emphasized that the disadvantaged population could not be reached in low-income countries due to the lack of institutional capacity, the failure to establish coordination between state and non-state actors and the vulnerability of practices to the changes in government. This is a situation which stresses the importance of existing economic and institutional structures and the initial conditions of countries to the successful functioning of policy practices such as conditional cash transfers.

The reason for selecting cash transfers in any form is in fact to transfer the responsibility for fighting against poverty to the poor and enable that the poor change their lives with the received cash support. Thus, the poor themselves will have the initiative in the fight against poverty. Here, what is interesting is that the policy choices which combine both economic growth (indirect effect) which is supposed to be accompanied with economic liberalization and biopolitical interventions which are targeted to the poor are made (Ballard, 2013).

Lomeli (2008) argues that it would be impossible to know the long-term effect of conditional cash transfers on the socio-economic performance of the society. Even though conditional cash transfers have positive effects on schooling, health-care and nutrition in the short term, their effect on poverty is small in the short term, and there is uncertainty about their effects on poverty in the long term. To what extent conditional cash transfers may be used for solving social problems actively by being incorporated into other social programs within the country is the essentially important point.

Conditional cash transfers are paid to the woman in the household, and as women are held responsible for adhering to the conditionality principles, they become visible and obtain a status by and large both in the household and in the society

in which they live (Molyneux, 2007:69). However, at the same time, this support creates problems in terms of women's economic security and autonomy. Conditional cash transfers function through the gender-based division of labor, deepen this division and raise the workload of mothers in the society (Molyneux, 2007:69; Lomeli, 2008). It also needs to be highlighted that conditional cash transfers are not sensitive to the societal gender roles. Being endowed with the right to benefit from cash support simply because of having a child, rather than a perspective that women are subjects of this support or have entitlement to it, is a topic of debate (Paes-Sousa et al., 2013:71).

As emphasized by Molyneux and Thomson (2011:209), principles in support of promoting societal gender equality or strengthening women were not the main focus of conditional cash transfers. This in turn causes women to suffer certain vulnerabilities peculiar to the societal gender division (working for precarious and low-wage jobs) despite being a recipient of conditional cash transfers. Corboz (2013:78) also underlines the concern that tools of neoliberal policies which place the emphasis on strengthening and participation of women will likely give rise to certain unintended negative consequences.

Conditional cash transfers are essentially differentiated from the social policies of the previous period in the way they are implemented because they focus on the beneficiaries of the program and beneficiaries' roles and responsibilities in long-term development of human capital. Conditional cash transfers are also an expression of the transformation in the context of social policy (as in the case of providing support passively) (de la Briere & Rawlings, 2006:6).

The main criticisms against conditional cash transfers are the uncertainty about what the future of these programs will be especially in terms of financing and sustainability, the conflict between their short-term goals (alleviation of poverty) and long-term goals (development of human capital) and the neglect toward other programs which are likely to be alternatives in the context of rural development (Handa & Davis, 2006). Moreover, another criticism against conditional cash transfers is that other vulnerable groups (the elderly, the disabled and so on) are left out of the scope of conditional cash transfers as the focus is solely placed on households with children with a view to preventing transmission of poverty across generations (de la Briere & Rawlings, 2006:6). In this conjunction, so that conditional cash transfers can fully cover those in need, that is, the disadvantaged

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groups, they should be offered in a way (i) to include the household as a whole into the analysis, (ii) to integrate conditional cash transfers with other social policy programs and (iii) to create sustainable living conditions for individuals at places where conditional cash transfers are applied (Molyneux, 2008:65).

Upon evaluation of cases of conditional cash transfers across the world, the point that can be generally expressed is enhancement in alleviation of poverty and especially in the use of education and healthcare services in the short term (Fizbein & Schady, 2009). On the other hand, conditional cash transfers are also criticized for their inefficient, unequal and arbitrary structures because they generally utilize methods of targeting and means-tested (Standing, 2007). A distinction categorizing the poor as deserving or undeserving is an expression of withdrawal from the universality of social protection and social policies.

So as to implement conditional cash transfers successfully, it is necessary to identify the beneficiary households properly and transparently, monitor the outputs and effects of the conditional cash transfer program constantly and make well-suited arrangements (Paes-Sousa et al., 2013:71). On the other hand, among factors that affect the decision of countries to implement cash transfer programs, the condition of the national and international economic environment, whether the political justification is secured, the support of international organizations and whether each actor on the national level participates and supports will be the key determinants (Sarwar, 2018:18).

### 3. EVALUATION OF BOLSA FAMILIA AND ITS EFFECTS

In the form of conditional cash transfers (cash payment) and transfers to families (payment to families), the Bolsa Familia Program is implemented by targeting a specific group (the poorest in general) and on the basis of certain conditions (to be met in the areas of health and education) (de Souza et al., 2019). In the early 2000s, it was created by grouping all conditional and unconditional cash transfer programs in the country under the same umbrella (Machado et al., 2011:7). It is a program financed fully by the Brazilian government (Stolk & Patil, 2015).

The Bolsa Familia Program represents a departure from the previous contribution-based and elderly-oriented system as it is the first social protection system which covers the working age population and the children of this population (Paiva et al., 2019:22). What makes the Bolsa Familia Program come to the

forefront as such pertains to the size which it reached and the number of people it has covered. As of 2019, support has been extended to 50 million people that make one fourth of the Brazilian population and 14 million families (Eiro, 2019:387). It is a premise that Bolsa Familia is a type of income-supporting program, in other words, its beneficiary has another income besides these transfers (Medeiros, 2008:16). The point which makes the Bolsa Familia Program so important is that it has covered low-income individuals/households that were really in need and reached also the groups that were unable to benefit from social programs prior to its implementation (World Bank, 2007).

*Table 1: Number of Beneficiary Families of Bolsa Familia, (2004-2020)*

2004	6,571,839
2005	8,700,445
2006	10,965,810
2007	11,043,076
2008	10,557,996
2009	12,370,915
2010	12,778,220
2011	12,952,039
2012	13,902,155
2013	14,086,199
2014	14,003,441
2015	13,936,791
2016	13,569,576
2017	13,828,609
2018	14,142,764
2019	13,170,607
2020*(June)	14,283,507

Source: MDS, [http://aplicacoes.mds.gov.br/sagi-paineis/analise\\_dados\\_abertos/](http://aplicacoes.mds.gov.br/sagi-paineis/analise_dados_abertos/)

The Bolsa Familia Program, the effect of which was more deeply felt in crisis periods, supported both the revival of the economy via the consumption channel and the long-term structural transformations in the economy along with conditionality principles which were based on criteria such as education and healthcare

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(Berg, 2010). The Bolsa Familia Program allows individuals to participate in the economy as consumers and enhance their individual capabilities by virtue of having responsibility for their own healthcare and educational careers along with the satisfaction of the conditionality principles, and it contributes to the development of human capital (Santos, 2010:29).

The summary of elements on which the Bolsa Familia Program rested are as follows: (i) 'family' as the unit benefiting from the program, (ii) criteria of conditionality principles based on the development of human capital, (iii) development of complementary cooperation efforts for assuring the implementation of the program and (iv) facilitation of the functioning and follow-up of the system through the Unified Household Registry (Santos, 2010:22).

Prioritization of social aid and social inclusion in Brazil was launched with the Constitution of 1988. In Brazil, the Constitution of 1988 initiated a new episode in which, on the basis of the concept of citizenship, social aids were supported, and the responsibilities of the state in this area were brought to the forefront especially in terms of the fight against poverty. For the purpose of enabling this social inclusion, policies in which those employed informally were included into the social insurance system, income transfers to the elderly and the disabled were in place, and income transfer programs focused on human development were adopted for the poor, were set in motion. Bolsa Escola (the School Stipend) program, one of the examples of these policies, was launched on the municipality level in 1995, and across time, it was transformed into a program implemented on the federal level. In 2003, it was added to other social support plans which were covered and embodied by the Bolsa Familia Program (Barrientos, 2013; Barrientos et al., 2014:7).

Together with the combination of social programs which had different structures, the process paving the way for the Bolsa Familia and Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) programs was initiated. Bolsa Familia came into existence along with the combination of previously-implemented conditional cash transfer programs such as Bolsa Escola (the School Stipend),<sup>2</sup> Bolsa Alimentação (Food Grant Pro-

2 The requirement for parents to benefit from this program is that the parents prove that their children aged 6-15 years attend the school (minimum 85%), and they have minimum income or below (de Lavra Pinto, 2018:32). This program gave rise to positive effects such as elimination of child labor and improvement in the attendance of children to the school (Carneiro, 2003:4).

gram), Cartao Alimentação (Food Card) and Auxilio Gas (the Gas Help) (Stolk & Patil, 2015). Cash support provided through the aforementioned programs is supposed to be spent in compliance with a previously specified target. Using this support which was supposed to be used for purchasing foodstuff, schoolware and so on was banned for the purchase of other products. The control on where the received support would be spent was another aspect of these programs in which the conditionality principle was put in place (children's continued attendance to the school, compliance with children's vaccination timetables, pregnant women's regular checks during pregnancy and so on) (de Lavra Pinto, 2018:132).

As each of the conditional cash transfer programs mentioned above were implemented by different municipalities or ministries and focused on different groups, they overall exhibited a fragmented structure, and thus, they failed to ensure that the fight against poverty was comprehensive, systematic and coordinated, and they lacked effectiveness (Cirkovic, 2019; Pero & Szerman, 2005). On the other hand, this policy became worthy of attention since it was a policy starting from the local level and reaching the national level, municipalities were covered by the system, they were responsible for the follow-up of the application of the program, and the system included the civil society. The program is also important as it demonstrates that the families supported on the micro level contributed to the economic development on the macro level (Guanais, 2011:8).

In the Bolsa Familia Program which covered the poor and the extremely poor on the basis of income per person, the value of the Bolsa Familia allowance to be received by each family varied. Besides income per person, the calculation of the Bolsa Familia allowance was based on the number of family members, composition of the household and whether there was any pregnant woman in the family (de Lavra Pinto, 2018). In general, the payment types were designated on the basis of the Basic Benefit, Variable Benefit, Youth Variable and Benefit for Overcoming Extreme Poverty components. Even if it is compulsory to have an income lower than a specified income per person for each component, other applicable conditions may be different.<sup>3</sup> Basic Benefit is the payment made to extremely poor families. Variable Benefits have varieties based on different conditions: Those

3 Since 2003, in the program, changes and updates were made in income per person (poverty line), eligibility criteria for people to be covered by the program and program types. For further information on these changes, the following may be checked: Berg (2010), Hellmann (2015), WWP (2017), Ministry of Citizenship (<http://mds.gov.br/assuntos/bolsa-familia/o-que-e/beneficios/beneficios>).

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in relation to children and youngsters aged 0-15 years, those depending on the existence of a pregnant woman in the family and those on the nutrition of the baby for families with a baby aged 0-6 months. To be eligible to benefit from the Youth Variable, there should be a maximum of two youngsters aged 16-17 years in the household (WWP, 2017; Ministry of Citizenship, <http://mds.gov.br/assuntos/bolsa-familia/o-que-e/beneficios/beneficios>).

In the period of 2003-2012, the program was revised and reorganized on the basis of emerging needs, primarily, the eligibility criteria, the amount of payments and allowance structures (Osorio & de Souza, 2013). If recipient families under the Bolsa Familia Program fail to satisfy the conditionality principles, they are firstly warned, and then, payments are blocked, and finally, as the most serious sanction, the support is cancelled (Ministry of Citizenship, <http://mds.gov.br/assuntos/bolsa-familia/o-que-e/acesso-a-educacao-e-saude/acesso-a-educacao-e-saude>).

For Guanais (2011:8), the success of the Bolsa Familia Program arose actually from the integration of the public and civilian spheres. The poorest group previously with no formal relationship with the state had no right to have access to any public service. Along with the new spending capacity obtained by households, this support influenced the economic dynamics of the country.

The Bolsa Familia Program makes up the most integral part of the Fome Zero (Zero Hunger)<sup>4</sup> program launched in 2003. By supporting 'income', the Bolsa Familia Program ensures that the goal of having access to food, one of the key pillars of Zero Hunger, is achieved. Hence, the relationship between social policies and economic growth which are in support of each other actually comes into existence (Graziano de Silva, 2019). Although poverty is perceived to be stemming primarily from hunger and malnutrition as per the Zero Hunger Program, the Bolsa Familia Program conceives poverty as a multi-faceted concept. Therefore, healthcare and education are covered by the conditionality<sup>5</sup> principles of the Bolsa Familia Program. It is discerned that there is a transition from the Zero Hunger

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4 Implemented in 2001 for guaranteeing food security in Brazil, it is a policy endeavoring to ensure that individuals have access to sufficient and good quality food and satisfy their basic nutritional needs (FAO, 2011).

5 Conditions to be satisfied in the area of education is school attendance (85% and 75% successively for children aged 6-15 years and 16-17 years), while conditions to be met in the area of health are the regular follow-up of the development of children until they are 7 years-old and vaccination of these children, and regular checks of fetuses and breastfeeding mothers (WWP, 2017).

Program to the Brasil Sem Miséria (Brazil without Extreme Poverty) Program. Transformations in strategies for fighting against poverty and the inclination toward a more comprehensive economic development strategy paved the way for changes in the tools to be used (Paes-Sousa & Vaitsman, 2014).


In shaping citizenship, Bolsa Família as a case of conditional cash transfers was created as a means of having access to citizenship rights. In this respect, it is possible to refer to Bolsa Família as a case of social welfare programs used for regulating the relationship between the state and its citizens (Hunter & Sugiyama, 2014:838). However, whether these programs endeavoring to establish relations between the state and the poor create a more robust citizenship structure is questioned (Garmany, 2017:385). At this juncture, considering the fact that poor migrants without citizenship status are not covered by conditional cash transfers, it is emphasized that conditional cash transfers should be reorganized in the light of the new conditions coming into play in view of gradually growing migration movements (Cecchini & Madariaga, 2011:15)

The primary achievement of Bolsa Família pertains to the falls in poverty and inequality. Just as the Bolsa Família Program had significant achievements in reaching its main goal of fighting against poverty and alleviating extreme poverty, it also made important contributions to reduction of income inequality in the country (Soares et al., 2010). Likewise, in support of this assertion, the study by Mendonça and Esteves (2014:22) underlines that, as a case of social policy which directly influenced the poorest families, Bolsa Família contributed to the decrease in the inequality figures in the country.

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Diagram 1: People Living Below the International Poverty Line by Poverty Headcount Ratio (%) and Number of Poor People (1990-2018)



Source: World Bank, Poverty and Equity Data Portal

Upon a closer look at the change in the Gini coefficient (indicator of inequality) across years, the effect of the Bolsa Familia Program on the fall in the Gini coefficient is to be observed from Table 2. The value of the Gini coefficient which was 0.58 in 2003 went down to 0.54 in 2009. According to the World Bank Report (2019:5), along with the Bolsa Familia Program, poverty and inequality fell down in the country by 20% since 2001. At this juncture, besides other factors, the effect of the increase in monetary and non-monetary public transfers on lowering the inequality rate should also be taken into consideration. However, upon a general evaluation, it is discerned that there are still certain things to be done for lowering the inequality in income distribution in Brazil. On the other hand, notwithstanding other economic variables, the effect of social policies is a determining factor in reduction of inequalities (Barros et al., 2010:3).

*Table 2: Gini Index, Brazil (1990-2018)*

1990	60.5
2000	....
2001	58.4
2002	58.1
2003	58.0
2004	56.5
2005	56.0
2006	55.6
2007	54.9
2008	54.0
2009	54.0
2010	....
2011	52.9
2012	53.5
2013	52.8
2014	52.1
2015	51.9
2016	53.3
2017	53.0
2018	53.9

*Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.*

An upward trend in figures for poverty catches the eye in the period of 2014-2018. It is observed that there is a 71.8% increase in the number of people (an additional 3.4 million people) under the extreme poverty line. As well as the economic recession in the country, the changes in the structure of the Bolsa Familia Program which contributed to alleviation of poverty and inequality in previous years (fall in the number of beneficiaries, high number of those waitlisted, those withdrawn from the system and cuts) had effects on this increase in the number of people under the extreme poverty line (FGV Social, 2020). The Bolsa Familia Program is financed by the Brazilian state. The main concern is the sustainability of BFP payments. Whilst 10% of the budget allocated to social aid was made up of expenditures under the Bolsa Familia Program in 2001, this rate reached

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40% in 2008. In 2009, 0.4% of the Brazilian GDP was allotted to the Bolsa Familia Program (World Bank, 2019; Bastagli, 2009).

There are some studies towards measuring the socioeconomic effect of Bolsa Familia. These studies are on whether or not the consumption habits of individuals have changed, and whether or not the schooling and school attendance rates of children and youths have increased as a result of monetary support. Moreover, some of these studies also measure whether or not contribution to labor markets and incentives towards working have changed due to BFP.

Regarding whether or not BFP has created a change in consumption habits, Sperandio et al. (2017) used the 2008-2009 Household Budget Survey data and conducted an analysis for the northeastern and southeastern regions of Brazil. While it was concluded that those who received BFP cash support in both regions consumed processed foods to a lower extent, it was observed that fresh or mildly processed foods were consumed more in the northeast of the country.

Over a sample of households that were the recipients of conditional cash transfers in the period of September-October 2017, De Bem Lignani et al. (2010) examined household perceptions on food consumption and food insecurity by both surveys and in-person interviews. Although they encountered an increase in the consumption of all food groups (grains, milk, meat, sugar, etc.) in the households that received the BFP cash support, it was concluded that, with the increase they experienced in terms of purchasing power, these households increased their preferences and choices towards unhealthy foods. The study carried out by Ferrario (2014) for measuring the effects of the Bolsa Familia Program on its beneficiaries found that this cash support was used by households for buying food products which would save them from poverty and for educational purposes as in the case of purchasing school supplies.

Bolsa Familia did not discourage people from working. In contrast, along with the provided cash transfers, there was an increase in the participation of both women and men in the labor force (Berg, 2010; Medeiros et al., 2008:17). Moreover, it provided the poorest with the opportunity to refuse to work for insecure, dangerous and the worst jobs (precarious work, low wages, child labor and so on) (Machado et al., 2011:16). Likewise, the study by Fruttero et al. (2020) demonstrates that cash support obtained through the Bolsa Familia Program had a positive effect on formal employment and infers that this effect varies across age

groups was strong especially for young people benefiting from the program. Monthly cash support under the Bolsa Familia Program has an effect on working adults' weekly work hours. The effect of women and men on the labor supply is determined on the basis of where (formal -informal) and in which sector (agriculture or others) they are employed and the general wage level (Teixeira, 2010).

The analysis by De Brauw et al. (2015a) also concludes that receiving BFP cash support did not have a significant effect on labor force participation or the weekly working hours of households. The study also separates the results in terms of urban/rural, male/female and formal/informal aspects. One of the noteworthy findings is that there was no change in the total weekly working hours of households, but there was a shift from formal work towards informal work in the urban area.

In another empirical study of theirs, De Brauw et al. (2015b) found that Bolsa Familia made a significant contribution for schooling of girls, while a similar effect was not seen in boys. Considering the urban/rural distinction, the program's contribution to schooling of girls varied based on age groups. While BFP deepens the gender gap in favor of female students in terms of schooling, it also reveals the fact that turning towards gender-neutral policies is a necessity.

Chitolina et al. (2016) measured the effects of BFP on not only school registration of youths but also the decisions of parents towards labor supply. It is emphasized that, as aimed, the program increased the school participation rates (with better results in rural areas than urban ones) and had a contribution in the long-run in reducing the transfer of poverty from generation to generation. It was also determined that BFP did not have any effect on the work-related decisions of parents (in terms of not only participation in the labor market but also working hours).

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*Table 3: Brazil's HDI Value, Life Expectancy at Birth, Expected Years of Schooling,  
Mean Years of Schooling (Selected Years)*

	Life expectancy at birth	Expected years of schooling	Mean years of schooling	HDI Value
1990	66.3	12.2	3.8	0.613
2000	70.1	14.3	5.6	0.684
2001	70.5	14.6	5.8	0.691
2002	70.8	14.8	6.0	0.698
2003	71.2	14.0	6.2	0.694
2004	71.5	13.8	6.2	0.697
2005	71.9	13.8	6.3	0.700
2006	72.3	13.5	6.4	0.701
2007	72.6	13.3	6.5	0.705
2008	73.0	13.8	6.7	0.716
2009	73.3	13.8	6.8	0.718
2010	73.6	14.0	6.9	0.726
2011	73.9	13.9	7.1	0.730
2012	74.2	13.9	7.3	0.734
2013	74.5	15.2	7.4	0.752
2014	74.7	15.3	7.4	0.755
2015	75.0	15.3	7.6	0.755
2016	75.2	15.4	7.7	0.757
2017	75.5	15.4	7.8	0.760
2018	75.7	15.4	7.8	0.761

*Source: <http://www.bdr.undp.org/en/data>*

Sanchez-Anchochea and Mattei (2011:313) highlighted that the Bolsa Familia Program did not have immense contributions to alleviation of poverty and inequality and to improved indicators in the areas of healthcare and education in the long term. It is asserted that, for having improvements in this area on the desired level, there should be an increase in the quality of healthcare and education services in tandem with the transformation in the economic system. In this respect, there are certain criticisms against the Bolsa Familia Program arguing that it is incapable of offering the full picture of multi-faceted poverty and

inequality, and its coverage is not comprehensive enough to embrace all social risks (Paiva et al., 2019:35).

#### 4. CONCLUSION

As a case of conditional cash transfers, Bolsa Familia finds room for implementation in several countries, particularly in Brazil. It aims to fight against poverty in the short term and strengthen the human capital of the country in the areas of basic education and healthcare in the long term. Even if Bolsa Familia is a program whose success in fighting against poverty and inequality is well-acknowledged, it needs to be even more comprehensive in terms of several socio-economic indicators in a country whose development process still goes on.

While conditional cash transfers such as Bolsa Familia are implemented, it should be borne in mind that, as well as differences in the initial conditions of countries in terms of reaching the desired outcomes (in the sense of socio-economic indicators and the structure and coverage of social protection systems) and in the level of individuals' demands for public services, different tools may be needed for elimination of poverty and vulnerabilities (Jaccoud et al., 2010:27).

To ensure that Bolsa Familia is compatible with future economic development strategies of Brazil, it is essential that cash transfers are designed in a manner to be more closely related to both employment and income-generating activities (Hall, 2008:819). In this conjunction, the role of cash transfers in societal reproduction should be evaluated on the basis of the concept of economic development, and the long term effects of cash transfer practices on the economic development process of societies should be taken into consideration (Ballard, 2013).

The Bolsa Familia Program finds room for implementation both in the Latin America region and in the rest of the world due to its contribution to alleviation of poverty and inequality in Brazil. As it rests on conditions which are likely to improve individuals' long-term development in the areas of education and healthcare and hence contributes positively to the development of the human capital of the country, it will serve as a determining factor in the economic development performance of the country. On the other hand, through alternative systems in which economic growth is perfectly set in motion and universal and rights-based support is implemented, it will be possible to reach more successful results in the solution of problems such as poverty and inequality.

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# 4

## SOCIAL CLEAVAGE AFTER REMAKING NATIONAL IDENTITY: CASE OF UN-ISLAMIZED TURKEY AND UN-CHINESELIZED TAIWAN

*Ting-Ya Hsu<sup>1</sup>*

### **Abstract**

This study aims to examine the methods used to remaking national identity in the causation of huge social cleavage. National identity collection of cultural elements is continually (re)constructed or reinforced whenever the nation needs to promote solidarity among its citizens. In the case of Taiwan and Turkey, two essential elements-Chinese and Islamic culture, which has embedded in the national culture for centuries, was eliminated from the new national identity. Thus, enormous social cleavage emerged between people who have adopted or refused to the new national identity. This research would compare the methods and ideologies of un-Chineselized Taiwanese and un-Islamized Turkish identity-making process within given epochs as a result of which the social cleavage divide groups of people who should have shared the same identity. Through the comparative analysis between the two cases, hopefully, it can shed some light on the remedy of the cleavage.

**Keywords:** identity reconstruction, national identity, social cleavage, un-Chineselized Taiwan, un-Islamized Turkey

### **1. Introduction**

This study is about the occurrence of the social division after remaking national identity by comparing two distinct cases- Taiwan and Turkey. National identity is a continually (re)constructed or reinforced whenever the nation needs to promote solidarity among its citizens. In the case of Taiwan and Turkey, two essential

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elements-Chinese and Islamic culture, which has been embedded in the national culture for a long time, was eliminated from the new national identity. Therefore, people who should have shared the same national identity were divided into adversaries. This study is going to explore the reconstruction of national identity in the causation of social division. In order to have a full inspection of the social cleavage, the first task is to have some general idea about historical events that are substantial to shape national identity. The following section will examine ideologies and approaches conducted by the advocates at the identity remaking progress, which consequently segregated groups of people asserting different perceptions from the dominant culture. Remaking national identity involuntarily has an exclusivist tendency while aiming to create a homogeneous culture that would eventually enhance internal integrity. Then, it will speculate the discourses of adversaries that generate social fissures become so irretrievable. In the last part, through comparisons of the similar but distinct identity-making trajectories in Taiwan and Turkey, perhaps people can find a cure to ease the contradictory stance on national identity.

## **2. Historical overview of identity politics in Turkey**

Islam has played an essential role in making Turkish people's national identity. Religion has been the most effective invisible hand controlling society, culture, and politics in Turkey. It is because it has been a thousand-year since Turks converted to Islam. The first group of Turkish people converted to Islam were the Bulghar Turks of the middle Volga region and the Turks under the Karahanid dynasty in the 8<sup>th</sup> century (İnalçık, 2016, p. 197). Islam is a rather enduring cultural element than others in forming modern Turkish national identity. Rome did not build in a day. The conversion to Islam of the Turks was a result of long processes of acculturation, and that made the status of Islam beyond doubt. Also, Islam is not merely a metaphysical theology but guidance of life, which unite different ethnic Muslims.

### **2.1 Ottoman Legacy**

The Ottoman Empire had conducted Islamic law, which is historically prestigious and elastic in application over non-Muslims and the state law to consolidate their power over various ethnic groups and vast territory (Hayashi, 2019, p. 20). As the Empire expanded, the Ottoman sultan assumed the title Caliph to

signify supreme leader of the Muslim lands after they became the protector of the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina, which granted religious significance to the Empire. Being a guardian of Islam, the Empire paid attention to comply with the requirements of religious law in all aspects of life. Yet the title of Caliph was somewhat symbolic since the Sultan of Kanunî (lawgiver) Suleyman set up a separate state law apart from religious institutions. There is no doubt about the Sultan's independence and prerogative on issuing official decrees, but the Sultan would take Islamic law into account for justifying their conduct (İnalçık, 2016, p. 200). Overall, the Ottoman Empire was not at all a conventional Islamic state. Sultans have the authority to set the parameters of proper religious conduct, and that created an idiosyncratic Turkish-Islam political management of religion that the modern Turkish state has inherited it to an extent (Öztürk, 2016).

## **2.2 Confrontation with Europeans**

As Europeans growing political and military influence in opposition to the Ottoman Empire in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, various reform was taken place for reviving the Empire from decaying. The Treaty of Carlowitz (1699) and Passarowitz (1718) with Hapsburg was a sign of ending Ottoman's control in much of Central Europe, with their first significant territorial losses. Since then, the Ottoman changed from the aggressive territory expander to a more conservative defender. The Sultan Ahmet III began to take the European example earnestly and to lead series reforms in the military, political system, which Berkes (1973, p. 42), Lewis (1961, p. 45,52) described as the first attempt at Westernization and getting some peek at European knowledge.

The impact of new ideas from Europe, notably after the French Revolution, had changed the traditional Ottoman ethos and affected the group cohesion and loyalty. By witnessing Europe's economic, military supremacy, the Ottoman administration carried forward reforms in different aspects for a century, culminated with the constitutional revolution in 1908. A group of modern- educated and well-organized bourgeois known as Young Turks had played an active role in proposing a constitutional revolution to modernize and so strengthen the state and society. Despite the efforts of resurrecting the Empire from the brink of collapse failed, the constitutional period created an incipient bourgeoisie and transformed people from Ottomans to Turks who were willing to fight for constructing a new patriot state with the spread of "country and nation" (Ahmad, 2003, p. 73,75).

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On the other hand, the religious leaders opposed to Westernization were more anxious about the internal decay and the loss of Islamic inspiration among the administrators. The reason behind this was the ontological Muslim rejection of Christianity, which could not hold any value for the people of the universal Islamic Empire (Lewis, 1961, p. 52). Religious scholars considered themselves as servants and defender of Islamic civilization, protecting the unity of Muslims from anything posing risk to it. They were aware of the consequence of losing Islamic spirits among the ruling elites, given the Mogul in India and Al-Andalus in the Iberian Peninsula. On the other hand, the primary Muslim population inhabited rural areas where they were able to continue agrarian life attached to Islam. The opposite reactions toward the rising European power were the harbinger of the growing division between Empire administrators and religious leadership (Özdemir & Frank, 2000, p. 14). The debate over whether to adopt modernization for competence in the world or to retain well-established religion against the non-Islamic ideas remained debatable.

### **2.3. Republican Reform**

After the victory of the independent war in 1922, the first National Assembly proclaimed the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, and the leader of the independent war, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, became the first president. Atatürk and the elites needed to re-define the national ideal with a reduced territory and less heterogeneous ethnic composition. Atatürk established the CHP (Republican People's Party), which enacted extensive programs of secularization and modernization to design an independent modern secular Turkey. The modernization process, excluding religion, had a twofold basis. First, the Republican elites took the Western model as the ideal polity and thus rebuked religion and institutional Islam as the greatest obstacle to modernity and progress, which was the reason for the political, cultural, economic decline of Turkish society. Second, over centuries of Ottoman rule, Islam had been the mediating link between local social authorities and the political structure. Seeing that Islam was multifunctional apparatus by which ideologies, values, and power can be used, the Republican elites were determined to reduce the power of religion and religious authorities by introducing a legitimating framework for state and political authority that religious jurisdiction was excluded (Mardin, 2006, p. 199,202; Öztürk, 2016).

The Republican reform set up a secular principle for modern Turkey, but the Turkish version of secularism managed religion as a state instrument, inevitably auguring the resurgence of political Islam. Since secularism has been the irrefutable doctrine in politics and society of Turkey, political Islam appeared to be the anathema of the Republic. On the other hand, radical secularization and modernization reform faced some resistance from the more religious community. Notably, the rural Muslim community concerned their religious scholars more than the secular elites because, for them, Islam is ultimate and eternal. It is not something that can be transformed or subverted.

### **3. Historical overview of identity politics in Taiwan**

#### **3.1. The emergence of Taiwanese consciousness in the colonial period**

The Qing dynasty ceded Taiwan to imperial Japan after losing the first Sino-Japanese war in 1895. At the outset of Japanese colonization, Taiwanese guerilla resistance to Japanese troops was suppressed mercilessly; not until the 1920s did the tensions of resistances lessen, the colonial administrators rolled out their plans to improve the social, economic conditions in Taiwan. Since then, the armed uprisings were replaced by nonviolent resistance facilitating by the first generation of modern educated youth. These elite, fascinated by the urge of democratization, rise of liberalism, and trend of self-determination of nation, became the initial driving force of Taiwanese nationalist consciousness (Hsiau, 2013, p. 76).

The colonial government implemented many strategic cultural and social institutions to modify Taiwanese identity fundamentally. So if Taiwan was to become an integral part of the Japanese Empire, linguistic and cultural unifications are the precondition. Thus, the primary strategy for shifting away from the legacy of Chinese cultural inheritance was to introduce a modern education system in which Japanese authority exerted linguistic assimilation between 1919 and 1922. At the time of Japan invaded into China in 1937, the authority further the program of Japanization by launching a National Language Movement, which using Japanese become mandatory in public domains (Dupré, 2017, p. 35). Hsiau (2013, p. 107) asserted that the younger generation acquired fluency in Japanese, and the usage of Japanese become popularized, especially in the public domain.

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The employed Japanese policies cultivate the first generation of local intellectuals with Taiwanese consciousness distinctly differentiated from Chinese and Japanese culture. Generally, the Taiwanese had accepted the colonial policies as they perceived the merits from colonialist apparently (relatively compared to the poor management and negligence of the prior Qing dynasty rule)<sup>2</sup>. The new generation of Taiwanese elites growing up with Japanese ideals and language was, to some extent, forced to become Japanese. The oppressive feeling instigated the anti-colonialism sentiment that makes the elites orientate the cultural uniqueness of Taiwan. In other words, the prototype of Taiwanese consciousness was derived from anti-colonialism sentiment per se (Cheng- Feng Shih, 2013, p. 363). Japanese colonization not only had a profound influence on infrastructures but also crafted the prototype Taiwanese national identity, which attenuates the cultural bonds with China (Ho & Park, 2004, p. 12).

### **3.2. Re- Sinicization after ROC takeover**

The surrender of Imperial Japan after World War Two marked the end of the colonial period; in 1945, Taiwan reverted back to the sovereignty of the Republic of China (ROC) under the Cairo Declaration in 1943. After the arrival of the KMT troop<sup>3</sup>, Taiwanese people encountered less disciplined and more corrupt Chinese administrations than Japanese colonists. The excitement of emancipation from colonists had been gloomy and led to mass protections in the first years of the takeover, which were suppressed harshly by the KMT regime. However, the resentment worsens following the defeat of the KMT to the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1949, with the massive Mainlanders dropped back to Taiwan. As the People's Public of China (PRC) officially established in Mainland China the same year, the KMT government declared Martial law that lasted for 38 years. The distrust and hostility between local Taiwanese and the new 'colonial ruler' sow the seed of the social fissures in Taiwan society (Dupré, 2017, p. 38; Hsiao, 2013, p. 123).

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2 Some of the pro- independent Taiwan nationalists still praise and cherish the Japanese colonization as the golden age of Taiwan. It is the Japanese occupation that shapes Taiwan's unique character distinctive from cultural and political shadow of China. This uniqueness thus has served to intensify the fervor of anti-Chinese sentiments, ultimately creating a peculiar Taiwanese identity with less influences from Chinese culture (Ho & Park, 2004).

3 Kuo Min Tang, the Chinese Nationalist Party, founded by Dr. Sun Yat- Sen was the political party initiate the first modern democratic republic in East Asia namely the Republic of China (ROC).

The KMT administration's first task was to get rid of the Japanese legacy and to re-Sinicizing Taiwanese people to enhance patriotism and belongingness toward the motherland- China. Nevertheless, popularizing the usage of Chinese through the education system and media was the most effective tools at the disposal of the KMT administration in trying to adjust Taiwanese' Chinese identity. Later with the launch of the National Language Campaign containing binary ventures of 'de- Japanization' and 're-Sinicization,' Mandarin replaced Japanese in the school curriculum, and Japanese newspapers and publications were banned (Chen, 1997; Dupré, 2017, p. 38). After defeated by CPC and lose control of Mainland territory, the KMT regime imposed Mandarin- only policy in the education system and mass media, which privileged Mandarin and prohibited local dialects, and degraded local culture in all public spheres. Furthermore, recruitment in public offices exclusively preferred Mainlanders because of their better fluency in Mandarin. Mandarin became the superior admission to higher social and economic status.

The motives behind readjustments in national language were ideological since a common language was considered a precondition to the creation of homogenous Chinese culture and political identification with a unified China against the Chinese Communists (Chen, 1997; Dupré, 2017, p. 38). The local Taiwanese who used Japanese and local dialects were desperate and precipitated social and political inequality. Hegemony Chinese culture had enhanced the sense of inferiority to local Taiwanese that deepened their antipathy toward the Mainlanders. The stringent re-Sinicization and institutionalized discrimination among Mainlanders and local Taiwanese backfire in the late 1980s.

### **3.3. De-Sinicization and Taiwanization**

The ROC in Taiwan has survived 22 years of military confrontation with Communist China until the United Nations pass the resolution of recognized the PRC as "the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations" in 1971<sup>4</sup>. Since the ROC has lost its legitimate cultural and political Chinese representative, Taiwanese began to query about their cultural and national identity. Following sequences of diplomatic frustrations, the request for reformation rose. One subject about the reform is that the government should accept the fact that the KMT regime no longer represented China. The second is to re-discover and

4 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 retrieved from <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/192054> on July 29, 2020

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elaborate on the Taiwanese culture, which had been purposely excluded by the authority. The constant concern over local culture and reformation had woken people's consciousness, which prefaced further Taiwanization in the following decade (Hsiau, 2013, p. 150).

1980 and 1990 was the hay day of calling for localization and Taiwanization of culture and politics in Taiwan. The Taiwanese cultural nationalism, once an ideology having little impact and with few advocates instilled in the society. Especially after the death of Chiang Kai-shek, the generalissimo and authoritative leader, more active and progressive movements for promoting democratization and critics over the KMT regime was tolerated. The successive president, Chiang Chin-Kuo, rescinded martial law and made the unprecedented political changes and in the 80s. For instance, he stepped forward to the Taiwanization of the KMT and its bureaucracy; the democratization movement was given some freedom (Chang, 2006, p. 47). The government also turned a blind eye when activists later formed the Democratic Progressive Party, which demand democratization and the urge to cherish the Taiwanese value.

The local- bred elite Lee Teng- Hui, the first high ranking KMT member, succeeded presidency after the death of Chiang Chin-Kuo. His presidency signified the threshold of the native Taiwanese' being mainstream in the bureaucracy. During his presidency, he pushed forward Taiwanization and democratization with the idea of 'new Taiwanese,' 'community of shared future' and 'ROC in Taiwan.' He said:

Taiwan had been a periphery outside of Chinese civilization and was abandoned land. Taiwan was developed in its own way, all alone... Thus, we should put those past conflicts between Mainlanders and Native Taiwanese aside and unify as one. The 'new Taiwanese' is those who recognize himself/ herself as Taiwanese, having sympathy with Taiwan, and willing to exert himself/ herself as Taiwanese. For the KMT, the precondition of survival and development depends on prioritizing Taiwan... (Chang, 2006, pp. 56–59)

Lee's idea had a profound influence on a unified domestic identity. His efforts on transforming the ROC state "from a cultural agent of Chinese nationalism to a powerful agent sponsoring the growth of Taiwanese identity (Chu, 2012)" preluded the mass awakening of Taiwanese consciousness and the DPP, the pro-independent party, winning their first presidential election in 2000. Since then,

the power grassroots provocations on Taiwanese consciousness devolved to the official bureaucracy.

## **4. Remaking the National identity**

### **4.1. Ideology**

The emergence of modern nations and the discourse of national identity have direct effects on plotting the history of the nations. Historically inherited culture can be selected and transformed to construct the ideal 'imagined' nation-state (Anderson, 1983). Ruling elites adapt old traditions to new situations or invent new traditions that suit best for their ends. Albeit the invented traditions are considered current and manipulative, they ought to establish continuity with a suitable past and use history as a legitimator of action and cement of group cohesion (Hobsbawm, 1983, p. 12). In this fashion, ethnic bonds and cultural elements which claimed to be 'national' do not mostly have connections with primordial indigenous culture. In fact, it is not the antiquity that grants tradition or culture authenticity; it is instead the immediacy and adaptability (Calhoun, 2007, p. 34).

The scheme to remake national identity is to enhance solidarity among people. The authority would orient their national culture and reconstructed a new discourse on national identity, which is a robust assessment that can recruit an individual's loyalty toward the state. Given that Taiwanese have claimed uniqueness of local culture and historical experiences out of Chinese cultural legacy by denying the fact that Chinese culture constitutes part of Taiwanese culture. Concerning Atatürk's ambition to establish a modern secular state and the 'Turkish ideal' - 'the unity of thoughts and feelings' (Zürcher, 2001, p. 213), he abrogated the multi-ethnic and Islamic tradition which had been tagged as Turkish for centuries. In this manner, national identity is like a synthesis of cultural, ethnic, historical elements available for selection. However, no matter the degree of authenticity of national culture is, it is all about mobilizing the mass for national allegiance.

### **4.2. Motives**

In the wave of nationalism, domestic separatism, and foreign occupations after defeated in World War I, the Ottoman Empire's fate to collapse was inevitable. Though there had been several attempts to revive the Empire from decaying, the great flourishing Empire after years of warfare was depopulated and impoverished.

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The backwardness of the Ottomans was relative but not absolute. As Lewis (1961) described, “the decline in readiness to accept new techniques and ideas that kept the Ottoman Empire remaining to a medieval state, with a medieval mentality and economy. In a world of fast modernizing states, the Empire had very little chance of survival” (p. 36). Following the victory of national resistance movements, the Grand Assembly of Turkey proclaimed the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Atatürk, the founder of the Republic, believing that if Turkey wants to survive without foreign invasion in the modern world, it must be part of the West. To be part of the West, modernization and Westernization was unavoidable. Turks had to free themselves from the burden (religion) by secularization and make a new start away from the Ottoman legacy (Kasaba, 1997, p. 15; Lewis, 1961, p. 268). Hence replacing the Ottoman-Muslim identity with Turkish national and secular identity seemed reasonable.

From the Japanese colonialization to the KMT take over, the Taiwanese were encouraged to be Japanese then Sinicized as Chinese. These ‘foreign’ administrations ruled out local Taiwanese culture and language from the dominant culture to achieve their political agenda. The re-Sinicization under KMT’s rule was quite successful with tight control over the society, yet the urge to revive local culture started to emerge. After losing the legal representative of China in the UN and diplomatic breaking off with the United States, which has been the significant ally for the ROC regime in defending communist China, burst ROC’s bubble in building Chinese nationalism among Taiwanese. The ongoing international isolations and cross-strait military intimidations have enhanced the determination of making a distinct Taiwanese consciousness and identity that should not be overshadowed by Chinese ethnic and cultural legacy.

National identity can create solidarity in the form of cultural hegemony where Turkey implemented secularization and modernization, and Taiwan decided to focus on local culture. National identity is the handy choice when the state faces a struggle for survival and thus needs massive unity against the threats. As Ottoman to Europe and as Taiwan to China, it was exterior threats or a sense of pressure that triggered the remaking of national identity.

### 4.3. Advocators

Turkey was established by a group of military and bureaucratic elites who were educated in the modernized military academy and profession schools. The secular

national identity remade in Turkey was under the order of Atatürk, and his adherents are known as Kemalists, who were also the decision-makers during the early republican period. From their perspective, only scientific rationalism can help Turkey preparing for the modernization, and it was indispensable to achieve modernization without secular Turkish nationalism (Zürcher, 2001, p. 210). The obstacle that kept Turkey from civilizing is the religion that needed to be removed. In the center of Kemalists, once members of the People's Party secured their political and military position after independence, they began to implement the modernization program through centralized modern education and civil law system. Although the radical reform encountered some resistance, it was carried out with speed and efficiency by the undoubted authority of the Atatürk and one-party regime.

Contrary to Turkey, the desire to remake Taiwan's national identity was proposed by mostly local Intellectuals and university students. The urge of Taiwanese consciousness was the backlash against KMT's Sino-centrism ethnic and cultural policy, which generated social, economic, cultural inequality between Mainlanders and local Taiwanese. The turning point of public awareness was the suppression over a pro-democratic demonstration, Formosa Incident, by the KMT government in 1979. Not until the late 1980s with the abolishment of the martial law and democratization process, could oppositions (including non-KMT members, pro-independents) organize political movements in public. Later the key participants of the Formosa Incident founded the first opposition political party- DPP, to attain their goal of independence by Taiwanese consciousness and localization.

#### **4.4. Approach**

Atatürk's reform on modernization and Westernization was a radical and top-down procedure. He was determined that religion should not impede his revolution. So he abolished the Caliphate that overturned the existing social and political hierarchy, and stepped forward to repeal the Islamic law institutions like the Ministry of Şariat and Şariat court where theologian judges' practice of Islam. The religious institutions and clergies used to have immense power and influence on the educational facilities and dominated personal and family affairs could no more challenge the authority of the regime (Lewis, 1961, p. 265). The constitution affirmed the legislative authority of the National Assembly reserved the judiciary to the courts, yet the actual commander during the early Republican period was Atatürk. To sum things up, the construction of the national ideal

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was made up of a different framework of economic, social, and political reform encompassing Turkish law, calendar, alphabet, numerals, clock, costume, gender relations, and other aspects of daily culture (Aytürk, 2011).

The Taiwanization movements emerged to protest the social, cultural, and economic inequality under the authoritative regime in which public demonstrations, gatherings were not allowed. The pro-democracy and Taiwanization activities were mostly underground; hence, what they could do on the edge of illegality was publishing Taiwanese literature magazines with the implicit agenda of promoting Taiwanese consciousness. The typical example of moderate reform is 'The Intellectual' called for political reform by discussing various political, social, and economic issues. Although 'The Intellectual' did not obtain many echoes from the public as among the students, but it encouraged the young students to discover the value of local Taiwanese and culture. The likely peaceful demonstrations intensified and drew the masses' intention as the government brutally razed non-KMT oppositions in the Formosa incident. In the late 1980s, the demonstrators legally found DPP, which embodied the Taiwanese nationalism and to urge further democratization by organizing mass gatherings and protests. Meanwhile, the local dialect, Taiwanese (Hoklo), was widely promoted and used in such public events, which implied firm nationalist ideology (Hsiau, 2013, p. 205; Ye, 2010, p. 53).

## 5. Social Cleavage

### 5.1. The confrontation between secularism vs. resurgence of political Islam in Turkey

Ataturk's secularization reform was the first time that a reformer dared to demolish Islam from bureaucracy by the authoritative method. The Assembly repealed the Islamic law, superseded by the new Turkish civil code (Lewis, 1961, p. 273). Western civilization meant to replace Islam as the high culture through the education system, whereas it was difficult given the power of Islamic high culture in Turkey for centuries (Gellner, 1983, p. 36). The aggressive Westernization reforms unavoidably aroused widespread resentments that cause political and armed insurrections even at the beginning of the reform. Apart from that, only a small amount of urban bourgeoisie accepted Kemalist secularist and Western ideology. Countless villages constituting most of the country were far-fetched from the reform. The population of Anatolia, though continued the living style that was highly

engaged with Islam. Discrete adoption of the reform between geographical regions and ethnic groups has foreshadowed an implacable social division in Turkey.

The rise of political Islam in Turkey is a reaction to the disappointment and resentment of modernization based on an extreme interpretation of Kemalist secularism. Even some of Atatürk's conservative fellows refuted the radical changes and formed an opposition party named 'Progressive Republican Party,' which was considered as a threat to the Republic and shut down a year after establishment. Despite the attempts to separate state and religion, the defining lines between Islam and nationalism are obscure since the transition to multi-party politics in the 1950s. Political Islam associating with the right-wing came into the mainstream political arena and accelerated with deep antipathy between the right-left groups. Similar scenarios occurred as the following stage: the regime lessening the grip, then Islamic oriented right-wing political party gaining support, and military involving safeguarding the secularism. For instance, Democratic Party, National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP), Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP), and the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) all played the Islamic card to gain public supports especially during the elections (Göl, 2009, p. 803). The presence of these Islamic oriented political parties displayed the strategic changes of Islamic movements from a cultural/ social phenomenon to a vigor political actor seeking to obtain power and to reconstruct the society (Yavuz, 2003 as cited in Kumbaracibasi, 2009, pp. 157–158). The AKP (Justice and Development Party), learning from the previous Islamist parties' flaw, develop a blend of a neoliberal economy with moderate Islamic rhetoric (Kumbaracibasi, 2009, pp. 156–157), triumphed consecutive election in Turkey, which the Islamic movement has approached its final step.

To these days, the AKP, with the increasing visibility of Islam, came into power since the 2002 election, has also been suspected of demolishing Atatürk's legacy of secularity, which in turn stirred secularists' fear that the party would Islamize Turkey. From the perspective of the original secularism, religion is incompatible with secularism and democracy. They also believe that religion is a symbol of primitive society and a hidden threat opposite to the Republic. The resurgence of political Islam exacerbating secularists' insecurity much as the Westernization reform was ostracizing pious believers. Given that the Republic Protests (Cumhuriyet Mitingleri) in 2007, the national wide Gezi park protest in 2013, and the military coup attempt in 2016 to some extent reflected secularists' repulsion

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to AKP's gradual Islamization and determination to protect the secular system in Turkey. The clash between Islam and secularism became fierce, and people are grouped reductively into secularists and Islamists.

To better understand the widening social disparity in Turkey, assuming that political parties affiliating with certain ideologies would affect people's political inclination on voting. The result of the ballot can partly indicate people's perception of their national identity. As seen in figure 1, the AKP steadily winning over 40% of the general election ballot from 2007. Many voters of AKP showed the desire for free expression over their religious identity, which had been constrained in the public sphere (Göl, 2009, p. 803). Besides, AKP's neoliberal market economic policy cultivated a group of 'Muslim Bourgeoisie' who have influential economic power that reflects back upon the traditional, religious value. These business entrepreneurs, having close ties with AKP, in turn, very likely to support AKP in the election. Whereas the secularism safeguard CHP only got around 20%-25% votes. The distribution of the election vote presents considerable support of AKP's political Islam strategy, and the second-highest vote to CHP illustrates adherents of Kemalism and secularization.

### **5.2. Being Culturally Taiwanese or Ethnically Chinese**

The emergence of Taiwan nationalism was the response of KMT's Sino-centrism, re-Sinicization policy, and result of the Formosa incident. Local intellectuals managed the memory of oppression to raise a keen independent Taiwanese consciousness apart from anything but Chinese. The Taiwanization program was continued during the pro-independent DDP's presidency within 2000-2008. The DDP government carried out education and political reforms to actualize Taiwanization and foster Taiwanese national identity, including encouraging indigenous culture, revising history narratives to be more Taiwan-centered. The KMT, however, opposed the Taiwanization program since they saw the need to re-Sinicization that would help them to regain the support of pro-China voters with promoting a closer relationship with the PRC.

After KMT returned to the presidency in 2008 and 2012, the government abolished some of the reforms proposed by the DDP. KMT's presidency can be described as reconciliation with mainland China which can be exemplified by

approving debatable 'one China consensus' based on the 1992 consensus and the trade agreement- ECFA with China.

The belief of KMT's pro-China policy will eventually ruin the democratic and Taiwanese value engendering a new wave of more radical pro- independent Taiwanese consciousness. The reconciliation with China yet torn Taiwanese into pro-China versus independent camps.

The first re-Sinicization during the KMT regime was successful. Specifically, the generation born in the 50s and 60s was deeply ingrained with Chinese nationalism and thus considered themselves as the inheritor of Chinese culture. They were taught traditional Chinese virtue and how to become a good Chinese in Mandarin under the authoritative rule. So they are more likely to relate their national identity and ethnic bonds to China. On the other hand, their successive generation brought up during and after the democratization process having less connection with mainland China, overwhelmingly identify themselves as Taiwanese and prefer Taiwan over ROC in the discourse of describing the sovereignty<sup>5</sup>. Despite the different interpretations of the past, the imminent threats from PRC aggravated the friction between generations.

Some might argue that the Taiwanese identity has formed steadily (see figure 2), with the rate of 67% considered themselves as 'only Taiwanese' and conversely with only 29.9% obtain a 'Pan- Chinese' identity. The figure shows a homogeneous national identity that should not lead to unprecedented social conflicts or cleavages, yet as seen in every election propaganda and mass mobilization, national identity in Taiwan is divided into hostile oppositions (Jiang, 2003). The pro-independent group incline to against and suspect any kind of connection with China, further credit pro-China groups as betrayer and PRC's sycophant. As to the pro-China adherents, Taiwanese culture is comprised of Chinese ethnicity and culture. Those who deny this fact are ignorant of the history and ancestors of Taiwan.

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5 According to the survey, 46.5.9% of the 30-39 age group, 63.6% of the 20-29 age group identified Taiwan instead of ROC, whereas over 60% of the 40 and above age group recognized ROC and ROC in Taiwan (林偉妃, 2019).

## 6. Conclusion

The given cases are distinct, yet they follow a similar trajectory of remaking the national identity (see figure 3) and seek the same goal: building united nation-state. In Turkey, the visibility of Islam and political Islam has increased since the AKP has been in power since 2002. AKP's decades-long reign also represents the majority public preferential ideology in Turkey, which alerts secularists to the threat of undermining the foundation of the state and the freedom granted by democracy, not religion. On the other hand, Taiwan had a second remaking process ongoing (in *italic*), considering as repercussions to KMT regimes' re- Sinicization national identity. The Taiwanese identity prevailed with the DDP third presidential election victory in 2016. This can be summarized that no matter how different the two cases are, top-down/ authoritative approaches of remaking national identity can be dismissed by the public once there is a chance of free choice.

According to the practice of remaking national identity over Taiwanese and Turkish people, the causes for social cleavage can be summarized to a different level of conception and the endurance on the cultural elements that form the national identity. The meaning of shared cultural elements for an individual is subjective and may differ at times (Cohen, 1985, p. 21). During the process of remaking national identity, interpretations of cultural elements were confined by authority (e.g., modern and secular Turkish by Kemalist, Chinese nationalist by KMT regime). Besides, different access to the language and culture of the higher social and political center would prevent the more periphery to the center and induce them to toward cultural nationalism (Gellner, 1983, p. 66). As the ingrainedness of the cultural element (Chinese culture in Taiwan& Islam in Turkey) become more influential within a group of people, the higher of the potential discrimination (toward local intellectuals and religious population) might happen and create entropy resistance, which leads to social division (Gellner, 1983, p. 65).

The elites of the authoritarian regime as Kemalist Turkey and the Sino-centrism KMT regime, which tried to settle a new national unity without the support of the masses, needed to consolidate their legitimate authority through the systematic instillation of nationalism. Accordingly, the top-down approach was efficient in reconstructing national identity. The policies of re- Sinicization by the KMT regime and modernization by Kemalists were indeed successful. However, forceful implementations without the consent of the public would spark a backlash from the repressed group, e.g., Islam resurgence in Turkey and call for Taiwanization.

Taiwanization and un-Chineselization were based on the spontaneous awakening of Taiwanese consciousness against the former authoritative approach. The bottom-up approach articulating with the public was much easier to gain support and to have broader influences and visibilities. It might take a long time to achieve the goal only if they overcome all hindrances on the way. The bottom-up approach is proved to have a more in-depth and more extended influence on society as Taiwanese identity has now prevailed over Chinese identity (see figure 2). At the same time, the ideology developed into populism, which to the extreme denouncing anything related to China.

Social cleavages are indeed the result of biased discourses and interpretations of cultural elements and historiography, which purposely emphasized or neglected. Even though there is a fragile national consensus that can rein the hostile confrontation, it is more important to think about what can be done to prevent the clashes from elevating. First is to recognize the fact that national identity is more constructive, not primordial. Second, the nationalists should not overemphasize the dichotomy of primordality and fabrication of the national culture, which, as a result, ignite social division. As seen in the cases above, a better way to achieve integrated national identity should not be enforcing assimilation or suppressive measures (Linz & Stepan, 1997, p. 27). Multi-identity should not be exaggerated as a threat but a turning point to wipe off the anxiety from divergent identity holders. The gap will be minimized, only if people acknowledge the entities of multi and complimentary identity and when the social equality actualized.

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# 5

## GENDERED AID – THE JORDAN COMPACT AND ECONOMIC INCLUSION

*Lara-Zuzan Golesorkhi<sup>1</sup>*

### ***Abstract***

While the Jordan Compact may have nearly reached its goal of issuing 200,000 work permits to Syrian refugees, Syrian refugee women have been left behind. The appraisal of the Compact for combining humanitarian and development efforts falls short in gendered assessments of labor market participation of Syrian refugees. With only 4.8% of all work permits issued to Syrian refugee women, the Compact has perpetuated labor market stratification along gender and migration lines. In this article, I offer a preliminary assessment of the Jordan Compact and its impact on Syrian refugee women's labor market participation. By drawing on field research conducted in Amman, analyzing emerging research on the Compact, and situating my discussion in scholarship on migration, humanitarianism, and development, I outline gender-specific challenges in labor market participation of Syrian refugees and explain the low issuance of work permits to Syrian refugee women.

**Keywords:** Labor Market, Gender, Migration, Syrian Refugees, Jordan Compact, Humanitarianism, Development

### **1. Introduction**

Since 2011, more than 6.6 million Syrians have fled their country and another 6.7 million have been internally displaced. According to the United Nations High Commissioner (2020), 5.5 million Syrians live in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt, mostly in urban areas and informal settlements. As of January 2020,

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there are approximately 655,216 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan. Nearly half of them are under the age of 18 and there is about an even gender split across all ages. There has been an overall decline in Syrians fleeing to Jordan since 2014 with approximately 1,180 arrivals in 2019 compared to an estimated 59,369 in 2014 (UNHCR, 2020). Despite this changing context, protracted displacement of Syrian refugees and a struggling Jordanian economy have necessitated continuous humanitarian and development aid.

Refugee compacts have been acclaimed as solutions to situations like this. Refugee compacts bring together donors as well as humanitarian and development actors under the leadership of the host country. They generally include multiyear agreements of mutually reinforcing commitments to create sustainable livelihoods for refugees *and* host communities (International Rescue Committee, 2017). The Jordan Compact, signed at the high-level London Conference in February 2016, has combined humanitarian and development assistance including education, growth, investment and job creation for both, Jordanians and Syrian refugees (Jordan INGO Forum, 2016).

While the Compact has been praised for addressing humanitarian efforts and development efforts alike, a gendered analysis reveals that labor market participation of Syrian refugee women remains low. According to statistics by the Jordanian Ministry of Labor - Syrian Refugee Unit, between January 2016 and December 2019, only 4.8% of all work permits have been issued to Syrian refugee women (8,403 in total). These statistics fall in line with a 2017 report by United Nations Women which found that only 6% of Syrian refugee women were employed and that only 2% of Syrian refugee women had a work permit (p.14).

This raises important questions: What are the specific challenges that Syrian refugee women face to access the Jordanian labor market? How can we explain the low issuance of work permits for Syrian refugee women in Jordan?

I attend to these questions by drawing on field research conducted in Amman, Jordan in March 2018 and by analyzing emerging research on the effects of the Jordan Compact on labor market participation of Syrian refugees. By centering Syrian refugee women in my analysis, I engage with gender knowledge and practice in migration, humanitarianism, and development. I argue that the Jordan Compact fails to address the specific challenges that Syrian refugee women face in the Jordanian labor market. Based on my field research, I find that gender-specific

challenges include employment options, employment history, fear of harassment, and transportation as well as childcare options. Under the Compact, the issuance of work permits operates largely in sectors with particular gender dynamics (i.e. agriculture, construction, and manufacturing) while other sectors remain closed to non-Jordanians. The Compact hereby perpetuates labor market stratification in two intersecting ways: by means of gender and by means of migration. This “double” stratification has significantly hindered labor market participation of Syrian refugee women and has led to economic exclusion, rather than inclusion in Jordan.

## **2. Situating the Jordan Compact: migration and economics**

Since the 1940s, migration to, from, and across Jordan has shaped the country's politics, economy, and society. These migration patterns have been informed by geopolitical conflicts and economic growth in the region. In important ways, migration patterns and economic patterns have reinforced each other over time (Migration Policy Institute, 2010). As Lenner and Turner (2019) find, three main underlying dynamics have historically shaped Jordan's economy and provide the contemporary context for Syrian refugee labor market participation: zonal development strategies, informal labor, and labor market structure (p. 66).

Decades of neoliberal development strategies have transformed Jordan's economy by reinforcing free trade and minimizing government intervention, while cutting public spending. A cornerstone of these strategies is zonal development, particularly the establishment of special economic zones (SEZs). Migration patterns, such as labor migration to and from Jordan, have affected zonal development. With Jordanians leaving to the Gulf states during the oil boom in the 1970s, labor shortages demanded migrant workers to keep the economy afloat. Migrant workers have generally been employed in agriculture, construction, and manufacturing. The garment sector (mainly located in SEZs), for example, holds a quota that allows up to 75% of its workforce to be non-Jordanian (Lenner & Turner, 2019, pp. 71-72).

The reliance on informal labor and the country's labor market structure have similarly shaped the Jordanian economy and premise the framework for Syrian refugee labor market participation in the contemporary moment. According to the United Nations Development Program (2013), informal labor accounts for nearly

half of all private sector employment in Jordan. This significance of informal labor to the Jordanian economy directly relates to the country's highly stratified labor market structure: at least 17 employment sectors are closed to non-Jordanians. These sectors include (amongst others) engineering, education, academia, law, medicine and numerous service sector jobs (Lenner & Turner, 2019, pp.73-74). The combination of high informal labor, a stratified labor market structure, and zonal development strategies (especially SEZs) comprise the context within which the Jordan Compact was conceived.

The Jordan Compact has sought to address limitations of various national response plans to engage Syrian refugees in the labor market. For example, while Jordan's 2010 National Employment Strategy held a firm stance on providing basic needs for refugees, the strategy explicitly noted that "under no condition can Jordan absorb refugees in its job markets, even on a temporary basis, given the disproportionate number of Jordanians already unemployed or inactive" (Jordanian Government, p. 28). Similarly, the Jordan 2025 Plan warned that most sectors in which job creation takes place continue to employ migrant workers instead of Jordanians (Jordanian Government, 2014). Subsequently, in 2015, the WANA Institute submitted a White Paper to the Jordanian government that called for a new approach to optimize economic contributions by Syrian refugees. It is in this context, that the Jordan Compact was agreed up in 2016.

By addressing both, Syrian refugees and Jordanians, the Jordan Compact has aimed to take on Jordan's struggling economy while creating sustainable livelihoods for refugees. The Compact has combined humanitarian and development aid through multi-year grants and concessional loans which are linked to specific targets – one of these targets being formal access to the labor market. This has included the goal of issuing 200,000 work permits to Syrian refugees, for example. The Compact has also committed the European Union (EU) to relax trade regulations and to stimulate exports from designated SEZs and industrial areas in return for employment quotas of Syrian refugees. Furthermore, the Compact has entrusted Jordan to provide access to education for Syrian refugee children and to support vocational training opportunities (Overseas Development Institute, 2018).

With 2020 marking four-years of the Jordan Compact, preliminary assessments of the Compact's impact on labor market participation of Syrian refugees, such as my analysis, have been emerging. The International Rescue Committee (IRC)

published one of the first comprehensive assessments of the Compact in 2017. At its one-year mark, the IRC identified weaknesses in the Compact's design and management as well as opportunities for how the Compact can better engage lived experiences of Syrian refugees. Some aspects from this early assessment that still remain to be addressed include the fact that only very few Jordanian companies have applied to export to European markets and that the aspired labor market formalization process has not taken off (International Rescue Committee, 2017, p. 11).

In a joint research and policy project by the Boston Consortium for Arab Region Studies and the UNHCR, Kelberer (2017) offers another preliminary assessment of the Compact with a focus on the legal institutional framework that governs the agreement. Kelberer stresses that under Jordanian Labor Law (1996), there is no explicit mention of refugees or asylum-seekers. Generally, refugee employment has been governed by the migrant worker sector-based quota system. This system allows pre-set numbers of migrant workers in specific sectors while limiting or closing off others (Kelberer, 2017, p.13). These legal-institutional barriers have significantly shaped the Compact's implementation in that competition between migrant workers and Syrian refugees for the allotted sector-based quotas has been heightened. The garment industry presents a point in case here: aspired "workforce replacement" of migrant workers by Syrian refugees has proven difficult despite efforts to quickly issue 2000 work permits (as early as in April 2016) and recruitment job fairs hosted by the UNHCR and Better Work Jordan (Lenner & Turner, 2017, p. 80).

In 2018, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) published a policy brief that outlined further challenges of the Compact. The ODI found that the so-called "work permit maze" hinders the issuance of work permits. Bureaucratic obstacles such as providing the right documentation, having an employer as a guarantor (depending on sector), high costs, limited knowledge about the process, restricted time frames (renewal each year), as well as mistrust of official institutions have deterred not only Syrian refugees but also employers from applying for work permits. Additionally, the ODI identified restricted employment options (open vs. closed sectors) and the limitation of work permits being directly tied to one employer (exception in agriculture and to a certain extent in construction) as further obstacles to labor market participation of Syrian refugees. With regards to Syrian refugees working in SEZs, turn-out has been low. As Amjad *et al.* (2017) find, research suggests that Syrian refugees are not attracted to SEZs given the

distance, transportation options, and working conditions in these employment sectors. Adding to this, Amjad *et al.* (2017) point out that wages in SEZs tend to be lower than in the informal economy and employers are reluctant to become official guarantors, but also see the reliance on informal labor as a way to avoid social security contributions and official inspections.

Several conclusions can be drawn from these preliminary assessments of the Jordan Compact that contextualize my analysis. Underlying historical dynamics at the intersection of migration and economics, such as zonal development strategies, high informal labor, and a stratified labor market structure have significantly affected labor market participation of Syrian refugees: employment in SEZs remains largely absent, informal employment provides an alternative to formalized labor market access, and many employment sectors are closed to non-Jordanians. Additionally, bureaucratic obstacles associated with obtaining a work permit and competition for employment quotas continue to deter Syrian refugees from formally accessing the labor market. While all of the discussed assessments speak to gendered aspects in labor market participation of Syrian refugees in some form, more is to be said and explained: What are the specific challenges that Syrian refugee women face to access the Jordanian labor market? How can we explain the low issuance of work permits for Syrian refugee women in Jordan?

### **3. Findings from the field: labor market participation of Syrian refugee women and the Jordan Compact**

The field portion of my research was conducted as part of my participation in the “Amman Spring Intensive” supported by the Zolberg Institute on Migration and Mobility. The program was an ethnographic study of the impact of development projects in Amman, Jordan (March 16-25, 2018). In this context, I conducted semi-structured interviews with ten representatives from international, national, and local organizations, including representatives from United Nations agencies, the humanitarian and development sector, as well as civil society. The personal communications with the representatives are de-identified, meaning that the reference to specific communications is descriptive based on the preference given by the organizations.

The focus of the interviews was on the Jordan Compact, but also on refugee livelihoods in Jordan more broadly. I specifically centered the experiences of Syrian

refugee women in my conversations with the organizations. Throughout the interviews, employment options, employment history, fear of harassment, and transportation as well as childcare options were named as gender-specific challenges that contribute to the low issuance in work permits to Syrian refugee women. My analysis of these gender-specific challenges adds to previous assessments of the Jordan Compact and highlights experiences that often remain overlooked and understudied.<sup>2</sup>

Across all interviews, employment options, meaning employment sectors that are open to non-Jordanians, were named as the main factor for the low issuance of work permits to Syrian refugee women. Overall, the Jordanian labor market was described as limiting the economic inclusion of Syrian refugee women. Some organizations identified agriculture as the only suitable sector for Syrian refugee women; however, concerns about working conditions and sustainability (given the seasonal character of agriculture) were raised (personal communications, March 2018). The significance of restricted employment options was highlighted in a telling example of the beauty industry in a conversation with a local organization that protects migrant rights. The organization's representative stressed that while non-Jordanians *are not* allowed to work in hairdressing, they *are* allowed to work in nailcare. In beauty salons, where hairdressing and nailcare are often combined, Syrian refugee women with a work permit for nailcare are restricted to this specific type of work while operating within a space in which their labor may be deemed illegal (hairdressing). This - so the organization's representative - has posed challenges to Syrian refugee women in terms of navigating a space in which their labor is legal and illegal at the same time (personal communication, March 2018).

Employment history presents another important factor in the low issuance of work permits for Syrian refugee women. I refer to employment history as previous work experiences by Syrian refugee women in their home country. In the majority of interviews in which employment history was discussed, organizations emphasized that many Syrian refugee women have previously worked in the informal labor

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2 It is important to note that using issuance of work permits to understand labor market participation of Syrian refugee women only serves as a proxy: work permit issuance does not account for the significant informal employment of Syrian refugees and also does not attest to whether the permits are used solely for their intended purpose. As my interviews with international, national, and local humanitarian organizations revealed, work permits have been used for mobility purposes rather than or in addition to the intended purpose of formal labor authorization and participation in the labor market.

market. For example, in my conversation with a representative from a United Nations agency, the lack of experiences of Syrian refugee women in the formal labor market was stressed: “Syrian refugee women have either worked in sectors that are not open to them in Jordan or have never formally entered the labor market before” (personal communication, March 2018). Previous work experience in home-based businesses was a recurring theme throughout all interviews. Home-based businesses as an employment option however was highly contested amongst the organizations. While some critiqued home-based businesses as perpetuating the assumption that Syrian refugee women only want to work from home, others saw home-based businesses as a sustainable solution to an otherwise restricted labor market (personal communications, March 2018).

Fear of harassment was mentioned as another significant gender-specific factor for the low issuance of work permits to Syrian refugee women. Fear of harassment was often mentioned in connection with transportation options, working conditions, or in relation to socio-cultural dynamics. Different forms of harassment were stressed in the interviews such as harassment on the way to or at work *and* harassment at home (personal communications, March 2018). The latter speaks to socio-cultural expectations of women not working outside the home, which was a common point of discussion in my conversations with the organizations. Important to note in this context is what a representative of an international charitable organization described as the “crisis of masculinity” (personal communication, March 2018). The representative noted that with Syrian refugee men out of work or separated from their families, Syrian refugee women have often become the new head of household. This change in socio-cultural dynamics has left a significant impact on family life, including firm objections to and deterrence of Syrian refugee women to participate in the labor market (personal communication, March 2018).

Limited transportation options constitute yet another important factor in the low percentage of work permits issued to Syrian refugee women. Transportation options were mentioned as a particular concern to Syrian refugee women living in camps seeking to work in urban areas such as SEZs. In my conversation with representatives from a United Nations agency working towards economic inclusion, the need for adequate and safe transportation - especially for refugee women - was heavily emphasized (personal communication, March 2018). The representatives offered insights into how their organization has alleviated this challenge by

providing transportation to and from employers since mid 2017. A significant challenge that prevails however is the drop off at the gate of the camps: given the size of the camps, mobility within has posed difficulties for Syrian refugee women to get to the gates for pick-up. Besides transportation options, transportation costs were raised in a conversation with a local civil society organization. Because of the limited public transportation system and the minimal income of refugees, transportation costs are a considerable factor in the decision to apply for a work permit (personal communication, March 2018).

Another gender-specific challenge in obtaining a work permit for Syrian refugee women is childcare. While childcare options were mentioned as important reasons as to why Jordanian women *and* Syrian refugee women alike do not work, Syrian refugee women face additional obstacles due to their migration status (i.e. restricted employment options). An example from the garment industry (mainly located in SEZs) - discussed in a conversation with a national human rights organization - presents a point in case here (personal communication, March 2018): the manufacturing sector is, as are other open sectors for non-Jordanians, highly stratified by gender and migration. Female South East Asian workers make up the majority of employees in this sector. Characteristic of this particular group is not only the intersecting dynamic of gender and migration, but also that of familial status: female South East Asian workers generally come to Jordan without their families. Syrian refugee women, on the other hand, have come to Jordan with their families. This additional layer of childcare obligations has significantly impacted the low issuance of work permits to Syrian refugee women, according to the organization's representative (personal communication, March 2018).

#### **4. Explaining labor market participation of Syrian refugee women: gender knowledge and practice in migration, humanitarianism, and development**

Discussions about labor market participation of Syrian refugee women under the Jordan Compact are situated in three distinct lines of scholarship: migration, humanitarianism, and development. At the intersections of this inquiry are gendered experiences of flight that have an enduring history of constructing and (re-)constructing identity and agency of refugee women. In *Not Born a Refugee Woman*, Hajadukowski-Ahmed, Khanlou, and Moussa find that an explicit and persistent rendering of this identity and agency has been the victimization of refugee

women in discourse and politics. For instance, sexual violence perpetuated against refugee women was addressed as early as in the 1989 “World Survey on the Role of Women in Development.” In this context, refugee women were seen as vulnerable victims that “carry a greater burden” than their male counterparts, and hereby needed special protection (p. 369). While a series of international resolutions throughout the 1980s called for specific protections of refugee women, research during this time largely neglected gendered analyses of flight and asylum - refugee women were often neither footnote nor text in discourse and politics surrounding migration. The experiences of refugee men were taken as the status quo of “the” refugee experience altogether. A telling quote by Indra (1987), who studied South Asian refugees in Canada captures this absence of a gendered lens in research quite pointedly: “People are refugees first, women and men second and gender is never a variable” (pp.12-13).

In the 1990s, the push for empowerment of refugee women was first heavily advocated by women who were not refugees. Feminist discourse and politics on refugee women pushed towards an understanding that the way in which refugees are defined by the state matters to their experiences (Hajadukowski-Ahmed *et al.*, 2009, p. 9). It is within this context that human rights approaches began to be applied to refugee women. Three main human rights themes that were prevalent in discussions on women’s rights included the right to protection of refugee women as well as the right to safety and security of refugee women (see Charlotte Bunch *et al.*, 1994). Following this rights-affirming trajectory of the 1990s, discourse and politics on refugee women took a critical turn in the early 2000’s. Influential to this turn was the assessment by the Women’s Refugee Commission of the “UNHCR Policy on Refugee Women” in 2002. The Women’s Refugee Commission (2002) found that states failed to fulfill their obligations under international law to ensure refugee women’s participation in decision-making and to address specific challenges that refugee women face. This persistent failure to address gender-specific challenges is evidenced many years later in the Jordan Compact. The Compact does not mention gender or women once and reinforces an existing labor market structure that is stratified by gender and migration. Within its four years of implementation, it has been mainly up to organizations on the ground to address gender-specific challenges in labor market participation of Syrian refugees. I find that the neglect of any gender-responsiveness in content, scope, and trajectory of the Jordan Compact significantly hinders the combined efforts in humanitarianism and development that the Compact has been so highly appraised for.

Gender-responsiveness in humanitarian efforts however is not unprecedented; indeed, it has taken various forms over time. Olivius (2014) identifies three general patterns in this context: the basic needs approach, the instrumentalist approach, and the developmental approach. According to Olivius, the basic needs approach is motivated by the classical humanitarian imperative to save lives and to reduce suffering. This approach focuses on gender-specific beneficiary aspects with an emphasis on achieving gender equality through equal access. The instrumentalist approach, on the other hand, rests on the emphasis of gender difference: women and men are differently affected by, and respond in different ways to, conflict and displacement. According to this approach, refugee women are seen as resources in humanitarian effectiveness given the important role they play within families and in sustaining livelihoods. Different from both of these approaches, the developmental approach is based on the idea that gender inequality is a result of structural power relations that are rooted in refugee communities. Discrimination and violence against refugee women are perceived as “symptoms of underdevelopment” and achieving gender equality is thus necessary for the protection of refugee women as part of gender-responsive humanitarianism (Olivius, 2014, pp. 7-12). Olivius’s analysis speaks to my discussion of the Jordan Compact in that it highlights the complexity of gendered humanitarian approaches and their varied forms of implementation. The basic needs approach and the instrumentalist approach are particularly telling in explaining labor market participation of Syrian refugee women in Jordan in that restrictions on employment options for non-Jordanians contradict the assertion of equal access (basic needs approach) and gender-specific challenges to labor market access such as fear of harassment remain overlooked (instrumentalist approach). In the case of the Jordan Compact, it’s the agreement itself and the actors involved that are indeed fostering gender inequality by perpetuating labor market stratification along gender and migration lines, and by continuing restrictive access policies.

Hyndman and Alwis’s (2009) case study analysis of displaced women in Sri Lanka offers further important insights to this mismatch between the Compact’s scope, content, and trajectory, and labor market participation of Syrian refugee women in a humanitarian context. Hyndman and Alwis find that displacement interrupts, changes, and adapts human relationships. These dynamics are further exacerbated by the introduction of humanitarian aid which often destabilizes gender relations. While on the one hand, displacement and aid may increase economic hardship and raise vulnerabilities of women, displacement also opens up new spaces for

transformation. In connection to my analysis of home-based businesses, Hyndman and Alwis discuss an interesting example of displaced women from Eastern Sri Lanka: the women graduated from a welding workshop (provided by humanitarian efforts) and ended up being employed in a shop built onto their family's house. This was conceived as a compromise that bridged socio-cultural dynamics and innovative humanitarian programming (Hyndman and Alwis, 2009, pp. 85 -92). In many ways, this example relates to the contested nature of home-based businesses for Syrian refugee women in Jordan: while on the one hand, home-based businesses were perceived to perpetuate gender stereotypes by confining women to the home, on the other hand, home-based businesses were perceived as providing an employment option in a highly restricted labor market.

This complexity of gendered discourse and politics in the context of displacement is also reflected in development gender knowledge and practice. In *Towards a Radical Re-Appropriation*, for instance, Wilson (2015) argues that neoliberal development frameworks rely upon the extension and deepening of gender inequalities as a means to sustain and strengthen global capital accumulation. This extension and deepening of gender inequalities manifests itself in various approaches in gender-responsive development efforts which have emerged throughout time. The Women in Development (WID) approach, which emerged in the 1970s, combines efficiency and equity arguments to address the exclusion of women in development processes. Critical to this approach was Boserup's (1970) seminal study on women's role in economic development. By studying farming systems in sub-Saharan Africa, Boserup observed that the introduction of cash crops and the promotion of new technology in agriculture perpetuated gender roles that promoted the productivity of male labor while relegating women to the home. With this work, Boserup challenged the ways development theory and practice ignored and marginalized women's role as producers. The subsequent emergence of the Women and Development (WAD) approach has problematized the emphasis on economic growth vis a vis gender equality and has instead focused on women's inherent exploitation in the underlying power dynamics within gendered development (Kalpana, 2015, p. 4). Formative to this approach was Mies's (1982/1986) work on women lace makers in Central India. In this context, Mies explored how local gender relations and global capitalist gender relations interact. To Mies, this interaction was premised on ideas of restricting women's mobility while at the same time perceiving women's work as unproductive.

The Gender and Development (GAD) approach, on the other hand, has prioritized gender relations in the household (and beyond) as a way to understand inequality and conflict. Of particular concern to GAD advocates is the invisibility of female labor. For example, while women-targeted development programs may increase women's labor market participation, these programs fail to recognize reproductive labor and other forms of invisible labor (Kalpana, 2015, p. 2). A telling example to discuss in this context as it relates to my analysis of the Jordan Compact is the aspired replacement of South East Asian migrant women with Syrian refugee women in the garment industry: while South East Asian migrant women generally have come to Jordan without their families, Syrian refugee women have come to Jordan with their families. As my interviews showed, childcare - invisible labor - is an important factor to explain the low issuance of work permits for Syrian refugee women and hereby their labor market participation. The GAD approach highlights the ways in which the Jordan Compact not only reinforces non-considerations of invisible labor in development efforts but also gender-specific challenges to labor market participation of Syrian refugees.

Another interesting concept to discuss in regards to gender-responsive development efforts and the Jordan Compact is the idea of smart economics. In *Fixing women or fixing the world*, Chant and Sweetman (2012) take issue with smart economics and outline the dangers of conflating empowerment of women as individuals with feminist goals of removing structural discrimination more broadly. Chant and Sweetman argue that the majority of development efforts remain focused on narrow economic goals rather than to embrace more holistic ideas of development through rights-based trajectories or notions of human well-being. The narrow focus of smart economics rationalizes investing in women and girls as a means to achieve more effective development outcomes. Smart economics, so Chant and Sweetman, overlooks the fact that the global order is based on and perpetuates gender bias and structural barriers to women's capacities (Chant and Sweetman, 2012, pp. 517 – 523). Smart economics, as a gendered development strategy, is absent from the Jordan Compact. The Compact does not “rationalize” investing in refugee women as a means to achieve more effective development outcomes; on the contrary, the Compact itself does not consider gender as an important factor for economic growth. This lack in measures of gendered development efforts is telling: while the Compact's main financial source comes from development funds, it does not align with mainstream gendered approaches in development such as smart economics.

## 5. Conclusion

While the Jordan Compact may have nearly reached its goal of issuing 200,000 work permits to Syrian refugees (179,445 as of January 2020), Syrian refugee women have been left behind. The appraisal of the Compact for combining humanitarian and development efforts alike falls short in gendered assessments of labor market participation of Syrian refugees. With only 4.8% of all work permits issued to Syrian refugee women, the Compact's aspirations of creating jobs for Syrian refugees has perpetuated labor market stratification along gender and migration lines. My analysis shows that the Jordan Compact has failed to address the specific challenges that Syrian refugee women face in the Jordanian labor market. These gender-specific challenges include employment options, employment history, fear of harassment, and transportation as well as childcare options. The absence of gender-responsiveness in content, scope, and trajectory of the Jordan Compact has significantly hindered the combined efforts in humanitarianism and development that the Compact has been so highly appraised for. In important ways, the Compact contradicts gendered approaches in humanitarianism and development such as equal access opportunities, stabilization of gender dynamics, invisibilities of female labor, and smart economics. In my assessment, the Jordan Compact's gender-negligence has been detrimental to the livelihoods of Syrian refugee women, furthering informal labor, precarious working conditions, and risks to well-being. Moving forward, I hope that my analysis serves as a cautionary tale to future refugee compacts that aid is inherently gendered, whether intentionally or deliberately conceptualized as such or no

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# 6

## IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON THE DAILY LIFE OF FEMALE ACADEMICS

*Emek Yıldırım-Şahin<sup>1</sup>*

### **Abstract**

Having started by December 2019 from China, COVID-19 pandemic emerged in the beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> century as the most extensive worldwide pandemic of the last one hundred years since then the Spanish flu had burst in the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century. By initial times of the occurrence of this centenary pandemic, it was put forward that this process could equalize all differences between people, societies, regions and/or countries. However, later stages within the development of the pandemic have demonstrated that tout au contraire pandemic process deepens the inequalities, discriminations and subalternities already existing. Nevertheless, one of the explicit inequalities increased by the pandemic is gender inequality between men and women, and because of that reason, clearly leading social group primarily affected from this process is composed of women. In this work, it is aimed to discuss the effect of COVID-19 on the daily life of the female academics who are among the most educated women for investigating one of the aspects of pandemic process upon the living conditions of women.

**Keywords:** Women, university, academic, pandemic, COVID-19

### **1. Introduction**

By March 2020 the whole world experiences a complete transformation to a new order including “new normal” circumstances within all areas in daily life. The reason of this transformation is a contagious disease, which first appeared in China in December 2019 and has spread to the world so quickly. Afterwards,

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the epidemic was announced as the global pandemic by World Health Organization (WHO) in March 11, 2020, and some provisions were made immediately and strictly right after such as quarantine, lockdown, travel restrictions, closing up nearly all public institutions and workplaces, working at home, flexibility in working hours, distance education, social distance implementations and new public hygiene measures. The pandemic originated from a new type of Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2), which is presumed that it was sprung from wild animals living adaptive with this virus, and labelled as COVID-19. However, so many assumptions and opinions have arisen about the pandemic. First days of the pandemic, it was put forward that it had an equalizing aspect for all human beings all around the world as everyone is affected in a similar way in the presence of the pandemic. After a while, views focusing on the increasing of the inequalities by the quarantine conditions began to gain more importance, and the inequalities, which currently existed at a certain level because of the nature of the patriarchal and/or capitalist system, have been drawing the attention much more under “new normal” circumstances. Furthermore, new prevalent crises have been added to the existing crises based on the global capitalism as the results of neoliberalism applied throughout the world. Economically, politically, socially new crises shakes the foundation of the present structure that people got used to live within for a very long time. In other words, “[n]eoliberalism was quickly shown to have hollowed out, fragmented and part privatized health systems in several countries, while it also created a precarious and impoverished working class that is highly vulnerable both to disruptions in their earning capacity and to health scares because of their low savings, poor housing, inadequate nutrition and work patterns incompatible with healthy lives” (Saad-Filho, 2020).

In fact, on the one hand, many people have to stay in their houses, and this situation causes some important problems relating their daily life such as working from home, looking after family members in need of care, doing houseworks while all family member are at home all day or even worse losing job and/or income due to the obligation of staying at home. On the other hand, there are people who have to work under hard conditions outside their houses for essential services in this kind of state of emergency such as health, delivery and retail sectors. Nonetheless, the endeavor for providing the maintenance of the societies demonstrates the vital significance of these people and the crucial deficiencies of

the system. One of these defects of the system is the inequalities among the population, and although it varies all around the world, the chief point is that it exists in every corner of the globe. However, the instances of these inequalities resemble each other all over the world. One of these instances is based upon the experiences of women across the world. The gender inequality is one of the prominent inequalities increasing during the pandemic process. In spite of the identities, qualifications, attributions possessed by women, they experience the gender inequality further more according to their pre-pandemic life. Every woman has to assume financial, social, domestic responsibilities much more and make a great effort mentally, bodily, emotionally for all of these responsibilities in comparison with the men who are under same circumstances. Therefore, in this article, it is aimed to discuss of the daily life experiences of the female academics in the course of the pandemic process to understand how the gender inequality has occurred within the life of well-educated women under the quarantine conditions. For that reason, firstly a general view upon the actual situation of women and gender inequality within the pandemic days will be handled, and then, secondly the current difficulties female academics recently confront during the pandemic process will be discussed.

## **2. Impact of the Pandemic on Gender Inequality**

In a short while after the outbreak of the COVID-19 disease, the epidemic has been quickly spread throughout the globe and started to influence every single person and change all forms of the life. In both domestic and public areas, there appears many changes to form the new normality people henceforward should begin to live in. In fact, this new normality not only includes quarantine conditions and rules about hygiene, masks or social distance but also new job descriptions, becoming more flexible and insecure of the working conditions, rising unemployment rates, high poverty levels, increasing income inequalities, getting more vulnerable of subordinate social groups such as migrants/refugees, poor, ethnic/religious minorities, LGBTI+ people, children, elders, disabled people and women. "Direct and indirect discrimination towards vulnerable groups such as people with disabilities, refugees and migrants and the poor become more visible" (United Nations, 2020a). Indeed, these most vulnerable social groups have been affected from the pandemic at the utmost and this highest level of exposure to

the socio-economic troubles of the pandemic would reformulate the life of these people. In this respect, according to Alfredo Saad-Filho (2020):

*The social implications of the pandemic emerged rapidly, for example, through the differential ability of each social group to protect itself. In brief, the uber-rich moved into their yachts, the merely rich fled to their second homes, the middle class struggled to work from home in the company of overexcited children and the poor, already having worse health, on average, than the privileged, either lost their earnings entirely or had to risk their lives daily to perform much-praised but (needless to say) low-paid 'essential work' as nurses, care workers, porters, bus drivers, shopkeepers, builders, sanitation officers, delivery workers and so on; meanwhile, their families remained locked up in cramped accommodation. Since they were, effectively, treated as being expendable, it is not surprising that poor and Black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) people are dramatically over-represented in the death statistics [...]. The class and racial impact of the pandemic overlaps with its gender implications, as women tend to crowd the lower and more precarious rungs of the labour market, cluster in the 'caring' professions, take primary responsibility for their households and the well-being of elderly parents and children and suffer more heavily from loneliness as well as the burdens of caring for others. They are also highly vulnerable to violence, abuse and neglect at home during the lockdown.*

Hence, as to the intersectionality of class, race/ethnicity and gender inequalities, it is clear that women are members of the foremost subordinate social group, which is evidently exposed to oppression and suppression all over the world. However, by the pandemic process, the discrimination, which is already sometimes overtly sometimes secretly experienced by women from all around the world, shows an increase as the consequence of the fact that life is getting more difficult for women. As the United Nations (UN) (2020a) declares, “[w]hen pandemics such as COVID-19 strike, gender inequalities are often exacerbated.” The gap between men and women with respect to their circumstances in both domestic and public areas is deepening by the pandemic process. Women are under threat of many troubles caused by the disease and its impacts because all around the world women are the main actors for caring people in need of care. For example, “UN Women stresses that women, who are at the center of paid and unpaid carework, are affected more and hit harder by the crisis” (United Nations, 2020a). For that reason that pandemic affects the service sectors concerning caring and nursing,

women not only now feels the crises of the disease much more but also they are going to be overcome with the negativities of the process because of the responsibilities they have to shoulder in their houses and works.

On the one hand, by the outbreak of the pandemic, women were the first names on the list of people being dismissed while impact of the pandemic conditions deactivated the working life, which had even diminished efficient activity rates so low because of the existing economic crises since the beginning of 2000s. Although already women have been less active in the labor market according to men and even most of them have worked under insecure or low secure working conditions all over the world, the fact that women lose their jobs, their income and their social security opportunities means that they have to live more insecure, more vulnerable, more impoverished, more needy. For instance, as UN (2020a) asserts, “[g]lobally, women make up 70% of the workforce of health and social services sectors [... and] 42,2% of women employed in Turkey work in the informal employment sector as carers, cleaners and seasonal workers without a social security. Women working in the informal employment sector are hit by the crises first and lose their incomes. As they do not have any social security, they also cannot benefit from unemployment assistance.” Nonetheless, women as the weakest link in the chain within the labor markets are the most vulnerable group of the societies that they are wide open to the threats of the pandemic and the circumstances it brings forth. To exemplify, “[a]round the world, women make up a majority of health care workers, almost 70 percent according to some estimates, and most of them occupy nursing roles – on the front lines of efforts to combat and contain outbreaks of disease” (Gupta, 2020). Therefore, it is explicit that the pandemic process affects them in terms of not only their job and income situation but also the security and prosperity they necessitate in their daily life.

On the other hand, during the pandemic process, most of the world population has stayed at home because of the the quarantine conditions, and women have also experienced this difficult times as a rough passage. By the outbreak of the pandemic, women have started to go back to *oikos*<sup>2</sup> from *koine*<sup>3</sup>, in which women

2 In ancient Greek, *oikos* means “family, house and/or domestic area”, and refers to the private sphere where was the place that women and slaves were allowed to continue their life by doing works for their families or masters.

3 In ancient Greek, *koine* means “common”, and refers to the public sphere of the Polis as the common area apart from the *oikos*.

had begun to make themselves apparent for almost a century. Nonetheless, with the pandemic process, within the houses, there are much more work load waiting for women than the usual times because all family members were always at home twenty-four-seven due to the lockdown and it is expected to do all house works predominantly by women. Similarly, as UN (2020a) also indicates, “[g]lobally, women do three times as much unpaid house and care work as men. In Turkey, women do as five times as much unpaid house and care work as men. Self-isolation measures overburden women with the unpaid house and care work as more family members spend time home. For women who also need to work from home, this also means increased working hours.” Furthermore, beside the house works including cooking, cleaning, shopping, taking care of all family members consisting of children, elders, patients and/or disabled ones and other such responsibilities, working women also have to work from home but men working from home are merely responsible to do their jobs and to help the woman/women require to do all house works all the time of their daily routine in the house.

In addition to these responsibilities, another problem women confront within the pandemic process is the rising number of violence and abuse instances in the houses. Under the quarantine conditions, all family members are in the house and spend much more time together than before. In addition to financial and socio-economic troubles caused by the pandemic, psychological and physiological problems are arisen as the results of the lockdown, and family members have to confront these kinds of problems within the house instead of an aid may come from the units dealing with health and public assistance, which now struggle with the pandemic laboriously. Indeed, domestic violence and abuse cases increase with the pandemic process. However, “[a]ll of these impacts are further amplified in contexts of fragility, conflict, and emergencies where social cohesion is already undermined and institutional capacity and services are limited” (UN, 2020b: 2). On the other side, because of the fact that people are online more than usual, violence and abuse cases against women from all ages in the social media and other online mediums show an increase as well. According to UN (2020a), “during crises such as the current COVID-19 pandemic, violence against women increases. Families spend more time at home due to the pandemic, and social and economic insecurities cause increased tension in the household. As a result, domestic violence and sexual abuse increases. Meanwhile, young women are subject to

increased cyber-violence as people spend more time at home and online as quarantines and self-isolation measures continue.”

Consequently, women with different backgrounds and within various conditions all over the globe are affected by the pandemic process very intensively whether they are at work or at home, and it would appear that in a short time the influence of the disease in addition to the economic, political and social crises could not lighten especially upon women. For that reason, as the International Labour Organization (ILO) indicates, together with “UN Women and the European Union [they] have called on G7 nations to put in place measures to promote gender equality amid the COVID-19 crisis” by taking such steps (ILO, 2020):

- *Design and implement strategies to address COVID-19 related gender issues that are aligned with International Labour Standards, to tackle the new challenges posed to the changing world of work.*
- *Expand and invest in universal social protection, including effective and affordable access to quality health care, as well as immediate income and food support.*
- *Ensure that Support to enterprises targets women-owned micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as hard-hit sectors and occupations where women are over-represented.*
- *Provide health care and other front-line workers with adequate occupational safety and health equipment, training and decent working conditions.*
- *Allocate additional resources to address violence against women and girls in COVID-19 national response plans.*
- *Invite businesses to commit to equal pay for work of equal value and zero tolerance against sexual harassment in workplace policy responses.*
- *Encourage financial stakeholders to accelerate the promotion of responsible business conduct and inclusive corporate cultures that promote gender equality as an effective crisis response.*
- *Design economic recovery packages that recognize and place a value on unpaid care work and care jobs and provide adequate levels of quality childcare.*
- *Ensure that girls are included in learning and skills development programmes during and after the crisis.*

- *Collect gender-related statistics and data to inform crisis response and recovery plans (ILO, 2020).*

### 3. Impact of the Pandemic on Daily Life of Female Academics

First of all, it is obvious that women meet with difficulties much more by the pandemic and the quarantine conditions by comparison with men. Both living and working conditions of women are blown off course at that era, and they have to shoulder all workload, which is composed of multi-tasks being critical not only for themselves but also for the people surrounding them at the same time. By the lockdown, women have to do the duties of cleaning lady, cook, caretaker, teacher, nurse, psychologist, playmate and other roles normally they got help from people to perform these duties. Moreover, the pandemic process also deeply influence the daily life of all women in some degree in reference to their pre-pandemic days without regard to their nationalities, socio-economic situation, socio-cultural backgrounds, ages, qualifications, attributions. Among women all around the world, according to the circumstances within they live, from the pandemic process some of them are affected financially and/or socio-economic, some are affected mentally, psychologically and/or physiologically, some are affected social and/or socio-culturally, and so on. Under the circumstances of the disease, women face with the patriarchy severely one more time in their houses in spite of the bicentennial progress they have made against it by giving a fight under difficult conditions. In the pre-pandemic times, women have already carried out all these responsibilities but with the pandemic process the hidden aspects of all these workload reveal into sight. As Deniz Kandiyoti discusses, the system and its ingredients cannot be grasped when they work regularly under normal conditions but they could manifest themselves during a crisis time (Başaran, 2020). For that reason, the pandemic process reverse the life style of modern women by capturing the time and room they spared themselves. However, by the pandemic process, they are obliged to face the patriarchy although they have thought that they could obtain a gender equality as the consequence of working, being well-educated, having a career, receiving an income or living a life as they wish. Nevertheless, the pandemic process Demonstrates that the patriarchy is much stronger than some minor developments women provided

only for two centuries, and there is a long way to defeat the patriarchy and its mechanisms for implementing a gender equality for all women throughout the world. Moreover, a certain part of women who sacrifice their gains, achievements during the pandemic process is composed of female academics. Female academics work not only with their mental labor but also with emotional labor as well, and by the outbreak of the pandemic they have also come back to their houses and started to work from their houses.

### **3.1. Daily Life**

On the one hand, at homes, the domestic workload waits for them. As working women in the pre-pandemic era, they received help for cleaning, cooking, taking care of children, elders and/or needy-indigent persons or such duties. On the other hand, they also start to work from home because universities throughout the globe announce that the education would continue from distance online, and in the remaining time from the domestic workload teaching and dealing with the details of online courses occupy a remarkable amount of time and attention. However, in the quarantine, all these duties should be undertaken by these women in a never-ending vicious circle twenty-four-seven. As a matter of fact, female academics are not safe from these duties. However, even they are used to do multi-tasks simultaneously in their daily life in the pre-pandemic times; it is evident that they are obliged to perform many duties more than previous days. Nonetheless, they also have to both teach and study upon their researches beside the domestic workload. In fact, in the course of pandemic process, it is so hard to cope with all works for female academics who have only twenty-four hours in a day, and for that reason they relinquish one of these duties. This is mostly academic career goals such as making researches, studying, reading, writing and publishing. For example, Dr. Feyza Akınerdem from Boğaziçi University states that during the lockdown she spared her time for the care of house and household and she could not devote enough time for her academic works physically and mentally beside the anxiety caused by the pandemic (Kap, 2020). Moreover, even sometimes it can be hard to provide an appropriate conditions for teaching and studying in the lockdown circumstances because the fact that “[s]ilence and concentration are pivotal for [...] thinking and teaching” (Minello, 2020).

### 3.2. Academic Career


Hence, another major problem of female academics is their academic career that they cannot pay sufficient attention during the pandemic because of the domestic and teaching responsibilities under quarantine conditions. All these tasks and duties appear as obstacle for female academics to make and/or continue their researches to the last within an enough time for a study. However, it is not prevalent for male academics, while female academics cannot find time and room to sustain their academic productivity. In fact:

*[W]omen face other barriers to productivity. Female faculty, on average, shoulder more teaching responsibilities, so the sudden shift to online teaching – and the curriculum adjustments that it requires – disproportionately affects women, [...] and because many institutions are shut owing to the pandemic, non-research university commitments – such as participation in hiring and curriculum committees – are probably taking up less time. These are often dominated by senior faculty members – more of whom are men. As a result, men could find themselves with more time to write papers while women experience the opposite (Viglione, 2020).*

Additionally, in other words, “the number of male preprint authors is currently growing faster than the number of female preprint authors. In other words, on average, women are not advancing their research as much as men during the pandemic” (Frederickson, 2020). For instance, as Figure 1 indicates, proportion of the papers, which are accepted and written by female academics/researchers as the first author, in first five months of last five years demonstrates that between 2015 and 2019 there is a steady increase in number of papers but in 2020 the number of the paper has an evident decrease with each passing month by the outbreak of the disease all around the world. Furthermore, Figure 2 signifies “[s]hown are the number of male and female authors of arXiv and bioRxiv preprints during (darker colours) or before (lighter colours) the coronavirus pandemic. Numbers are percent increases in preprint submissions” (Frederickson, 2020). Figure 2 also shows that the gender inequality and gap between male and female academics with regard to their academic studies deepen by the pandemic process because of the intensive workload of female academics in their houses in comparison with their male colleagues. Additionally, according to the data from 2020 and 2019, there is a 50% decline in the academic performance of female academics who studies astrophysics, and “the number of submissions from men has increased more than 50 percent” in Comparative


Political Studies Journal (Kitchener, 2020). Additionally it is obvious that this claim about the increasing problems of female academic during the pandemic process in regards to their daily life and academic career needs more quantitative and qualitative data but there is not enough information upon the developments emerging in this process because of the recency of the pandemic process and difficulties on reaching the sources for the sufficient information. Nonetheless, it is also evident that the existing gender disparity and disadvantageous situation of female academics in the academic environment still survive and even increase incrementally because “[a]cademic writing and research requires “the time and space to breathe and be creative”” and under the pandemic circumstances female academics have not necessary time and space for their academic studies (Kitchener, 2020). Consequently, although the drop in productivity of female academics may seem as a fact emerged in the short term, not only academic careers of female academics but also subsequently academic environment might be affected critically and irrecoverably in the long run. For that reason, by university administrations and all academics as well as governmental institutions and non-governmental organizations, it is necessary to take certain measures to avoid the unfairness of the academic competition between male and female academics who are under difficult circumstances because of the excessive responsibilities and tasks women have to shoulder for the sake of the future of universities and academic/scientific progress.

**Figure 1.** *Rate of Accepted Research Papers with a Female First Author*



Source: Matthews, 2020.

Figure 2. *The Gender Inequality in Preprint Submissions*



Source: *Frederickson, 2020.*

#### 4. Conclusion

To sum up, nowadays world experiences an extraordinary time as the consequence of COVID-19 pandemic, which is a centenary event since the outbreak of the Spanish Flu in the last century. Moreover, beside the current economic, political, social and ecological crises all over the world, the disease causes a new kind of life transforming completely day by day with regard to the circumstances of the pandemic process and taken measures against it. Within this context, most of the world population is overcome with the pandemic because of their economic, social or other attributes causing many challenges incidental of the “new normality” notion as the result of the transformations produced by the pandemic process.

Nonetheless, the pandemic process reveals many inequalities apparently, and one of them is gender inequality. According to UN Policy Brief (2020b, p. 2), “[a]cross every sphere, from health to the economy, security to social protection, the impacts of COVID-19 are exacerbated for women and girls simply by virtue of their sex.” So, women are the members of most vulnerable social group, which is affected by many aspects of the pandemic process in comparison to the other subordinate social groups affected by the several aspects of the disease. However, the crux of the matter is about the fact that the vulnerability of women could vary as to their backgrounds, qualifications or conditions but the vulnerability of women is real and evident. By this period, again women confront with the harsh face of the patriarchy in their houses, while they have made a great progress against it for almost two centuries but the hard times of the pandemic process demonstrate that women should endeavor harder for their rights based on a significant gender equality.

Within this context, one of the sections among women is composed of well-educated women, and they are affected from the pandemic process troubledly as well. They have returned their homes, and they are obliged to deal with many tasks including domestic works and workload of their jobs and careers. Female academics are from this part of women, and within this period they have three-some workload composed of domestic works, distance education and studies regarding their academic career. With regard to the pandemic process, it is evident that female academics endeavor harder than their male colleagues in their daily life. Because of this reason, female academics have to select one of these three responsibility they should assume, and this one might be their academic career instead of domestic works and/or distance education tasks. In fact, even female academics are behind male academics academically, by the pandemic process female academics fall behind much more, and the outcomes of these days will come in sight as to the situation of female academics within the academic life. Therefore, in days to come, from the point of female academics as well as all women all over the globe, it is probable that women will live harder times in respect to the multi-tasks in the course of their daily life. On the one hand, from now on some certain measures should be taken for strengthening the situations of women by related international and national governmental institutions and non-governmental organizations. On the other hand, in near future, women are also certainly in need of rising feminist awareness much more and a stronger women movement globally regardless of their backgrounds, attributes, qualifications and conditions.

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# 7

## LABOR MIGRATION FROM GEORGIA: PROBLEMS, CONSEQUENCES AND CHALLENGES

*Madlena Kotsotsashvili<sup>1</sup>, Nino Otxozoria<sup>2</sup>*

### **Abstract**

The chapter deals with the processes of modern migration which are highly relevant and topical, as migration is one of the most important challenges and the geopolitical issue of the globalization era, which affects the security, economic and social stability of countries.

The growth of labor migration from Georgia initially took on an explosive character due to the economic stagnation caused by the post-Soviet transformation.

According to official statistics, from 2002 to 2019, more than 1.4 million people left Georgia. Most of these immigrants are in Russia (630,000).

Georgia's immigration policy is in the process of being formulated in the context of the challenges of modern reality, as the new sovereign state has neither the experience nor the institutions to manage large-scale forced migration. The study of this process on the example of a country receiving Georgian labor migrants - Russia, which has continued to confront Georgia during the occupation since the August 2008 war, is particularly noteworthy. The legal status of migrants is especially relevant. For a country of 4 million, which, according to the UN, will face a demographic crisis in 20 years, researching migration processes and sharing best practices in problem management is crucial.

**Keywords:** Migration, Labor, Georgia, Russia, Politics, Modern

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## LABOR MIGRATION FROM GEORGIA: PROBLEMS, CONSEQUENCES AND CHALLENGES

*Madlena Kotsotsashvili, Nino Otcozoria*

### 1. Introduction

Migration is one of the major geopolitical issues facing many countries today, primarily because of its impact on security, economic, and social stability. The fact is that the migration processes of the beginning of the twenty-first century are unprecedented due to the huge interactions between immigration policy, social order, and the economy of the host countries (Goularas, Turkan Ipek, 2018).

Modern research on migration processes is highly interesting and topical. This is one of the significant challenges of the globalization era, which poses serious political, legal, socio-economic, or demographic problems. Voluntary migration to settle elsewhere is mainly driven by economic considerations, which are facilitated by the development of technology, the diversity of the labor market, and even the desire for change.

Migration became a major component of population change in some countries in 2010-2020. In this decade, several countries are experiencing a significant influx of migrants, which, according to experts, will help compensate for the shortage of people in these countries due to high mortality rates and low birth rates (World population prospects, UN Population Division, 2019).

One of the largest and most dynamic influx of labor is migrants from post-Soviet countries due to the dire economic situation and the catastrophic rise in unemployment. The increase in labor migration in these countries initially took on an explosive character, but very soon it fled into a mass event. It should be noted that labor migration plays a very important role in the transformation of the post-Soviet society: it charges the society and at the same time extinguishes social grievances and tensions (Baynova et al. 2017). There is no doubt that labor migration in the post-Soviet period gives a significant part of society a chance to escape poverty in the face of a sharp economic downturn and ensure job growth in manufacturing (Bening, 2001).

Migration has been an important issue in history and even today migration has a significant impact on history (Bonifazi; Mamolo, 2004). Because migration flows in the post-Soviet space are still largely within the hereditary states, and existing and potential problems of forced migration have serious and far-reaching consequences for neighboring countries and the international community due to their scale and complexity (Zubiashvili, 2014).

In Georgia - in the newly independent post-Soviet state, the transformation processes were very difficult. According to the report "The Role of Human Capital in the Development of the Country's Economy", Georgia is one of the four countries in the world where the population is declining not at the expense of natural increase, but the expense of emigration. These countries are Albania, Puerto Rico, Spain, and Georgia (Society and Banks. Org., 2018). From 2002 to 2017, 1.4 million people left Georgia, and if not for the high rate of emigration, the population would have increased. The number of births in Georgia since 2008 exceeds the number of deaths.

In addition to reducing the country's population as a result of emigration, emigration is accompanied by an outflow of qualified personnel, which reduces the country's productivity and further reduces the country's economic performance.

According to 2019 data, the "top three" countries with the highest number of Georgian immigrants in 2000 have not changed - Russia (630,000), Ukraine (70,000), and Greece (70,000).

Georgia, as a new sovereign state, has neither the experience nor the institutions to manage this large-scale forced movement of people. From this point of view, it is especially important to study this process on the example of Russia, a country that receives Georgian labor migrants, which is a hostile state and appears as an occupier in the reality of the 21st century and which is still creeping occupation and continues confrontation with Georgia in a regime of constant so-called borderization.

Georgia's immigration policy is being formed in the context of the challenges of the modern reality. The subject of our research is the study of the results of similar studies for these countries as separate phenomena. The legal status of migrants is very important for Georgia, as a country of 4 million people, which, according to the UN, has been facing a severe demographic problem for 20 years and which may face serious security problems, is of particular importance. Analysis of global migration processes sharing international experiences and best practices to find alternative ways to solve a problem. In this regard, the research question we have selected and the recommendations provided go beyond the cognitive field and take on a practical nature, which further increases the urgency of the research problem.

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### 2. Literature Review

Migration has been an important issue in history and the current state of migration still has a significant impact on history (Bonifazi; Mamolo, 2004). Zubiashvili (2014) in his study notes that political instability accelerates migration processes, while Lukic and Ancelkovic Stolkovic (2017) emphasize the fact that there is a correlation between migration and socio-economic processes.

The precarious nature of migrant worker employment is widely discussed in the literature, focusing on what happens to migrants when they enter the labor market of the host society (Castles, 2006; Ruhs and Martin, 2008; Dauvergne and Marsden, 2014; Basok and López, 2015). There is ample evidence that migrant workers are paid less than locals would receive for the same type of work; Sometimes they reimburse salaries under the laws of the host countries (Attas, 2000; Bartram, 2004; Wickramasekara, 2006). Even when labor migrants officially have the same social rights, they may find it difficult to access these rights due to a lack of awareness, ignorance of whom to turn to in case of rights violations, and fear of losing their job and deportation. Abolish their employers (Kushnirovich, 2012; Basok and Lopez-Sala, 2015). Secondly, our data show that the reduction in hiring fees after the implementation of bilateral agreements was accompanied by a reduction in the wages of migrant workers. This finding is new because the relationship between fees and wages has not been discussed in the literature to date, focusing mainly on cases where migrants' wages meet the minimum standards set by labor law (Ruhs and Martin, 2008) or sometimes even below. These standards are given in Attas, 2000; Bartram, 2004; Wickramasekara, 2006) in papers. Canales notes in its study that the benefits of low-wage labor are scarce and that it hinders access to the social rights of migrant workers in 2019.

Dermendzieva conducts the first comparative empirical analysis of labor migration in the South Caucasus, based on household studies, examines the impact of emigration flows on the region's economic outcomes and shows that Russia is the most common destination for migrants in the South Caucasus.

The present chapter presents the results of numerous important researches of the world, regional and local organizations, official statistical data, scientific works in the context of the research topic, and other data, which allows us to fully understand the issue.

### **3. Labor Migration as a Phenomenon of Global Transformation**

The historical migration of the human population has no exact date. For whatever reason, human migration has influenced the great epochs of history and forever changed the demographic landscapes around the world. The oldest migration theory is neoclassical economics, which cites regional wage differences as the main cause of labor migration, which is due to geographical differences between labor demand and labor supply (Porumbescu, 2015). The neoclassical theory views migration in an international context as a solution for countries with labor shortages concerning capital, with high wages, while countries with a relatively high labor supply have low wages (Jennissen, 2007). And the dual labor market theory argues that international migration is mainly due to the attractiveness of developed countries that host migrants (Porumbescu, 2015).

Migration is about people and fundamentally about development, human rights, and social welfare in today's world. It is estimated that more than 260 million people live in foreign countries today (UN. DESA., 2017). This is an important indicator. However, many individuals are not included in other UN and migrant statistics due to temporary, short-term, or seasonal employment or other circumstances when they have left their home country for less than a year and if they retain their citizenship registration - although they may be eligible. Definition defined by the UN - Migrant worker (Taran, 2018).

Before social science researchers study the historical view of external causes of migration, which includes events such as climate change and political-religious factors, economic problems, researchers consider migration as a separate phenomenon that brings people together and changes the demographic picture.

In particular, migration has a demographic impact, not only in terms of population growth but also through it changing the age pyramid of the host countries. Migrants are younger and more economically active age groups than locals and are therefore concentrated in contributing to dependency reduction rates (Gagnon, 2014). Second, migrants arrive with skills and abilities. Thus replenishing the stock of human capital in the host country. More specifically, the influx of experienced and highly developed immigrants will facilitate research and innovation as well as technological progress (Hunt, 2010).

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Migration also contributes to the development of innovation and economic growth, therefore international migration has both a direct and indirect impact on the economic growth of countries. There is no doubt that migration is expanding the workforce, which is stimulating GDP growth.

### **4. Historical and Political Dimension of Georgian Immigration**

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia went through a process of civil war, ethnic conflicts in the two major country autonomous regions, and economic collapse. According to official estimates, Georgia's GDP decreased by 70% compared to 1990-1994. Internal displacement and external migration during this period were essential for the physical survival of the nation. There are three separate phases of Georgia's external migration. According to the two most recent censuses in Georgia, from 1989 to 2002, approximately 1 million people (20-25% of the Georgian population) left permanently (Hakkert, R. 2017). Among them are quite a large number of ethnic non-Georgians: Jews, Russians, Armenians, and Greeks. It is suggested that Georgia ranks third (after Albania and Kazakhstan in the share of the missing population in international migration among the 25 countries of Eastern Europe and the CISSU (Mansoor; Quillin. 2007).

The massive and uncontrolled movement of the population of the countries, which includes millions of people, has become a characteristic and disturbing feature of the post-Soviet space. Amid political instability, economic downturn, and ethnic conflict, the vast and diverse post-Soviet space soon emerged as the head of the largest migration wave since World War II (Tukhashvili, 2018).

The most pressing problem in Georgia is the resolution of ethnic conflicts and the elimination of their consequences, first of all, the return of refugees to their homes. Scientific assessment The many negative effects of forced migration as a phenomenon as a result of ethnic conflicts have been reflected in numerous studies (Tukhashvili, 2018). Ethnic conflicts in any country lead to an intense increase in migration processes. This creates an abnormal political situation and forces a large part of its population to flee to a more politically stable region or the neighboring country to maintain a normal family life and continue economic and general activities (Zubiashvili, 2014).

Although the first phase of migration (1990-1994) involved a very large ethnic component, the second wave, from 1995 to 2003, was largely motivated to seek

better economic opportunities abroad. The outflow of the population in the second phase was significant, albeit somewhat less by the first phase. According to the UN Global Migration in 2006, net emigration from Georgia amounted to 598,000 people in 1995-2005 (International Migration Report 2006: A Global Assessment, DESA UN, 2009). During this period, the Georgian economy grew by about 5%. However, productivity was very low, forcing people to emigrate to Russia and other countries, Western Europe (especially Greece) and North America.

Emigration from Georgia slowed down to the third stage, which began during the Rose Revolution in 2003. Reforms to liberalize the economy began in early 2004, leading to significant improvements in business environment indicators and boosting a sharp economic turnaround. In 2003–2011, the one-time income of the employed population of Georgia increased almost threefold and increased the country's GDP per capita (Georgian National Statistics Office, 2004). New business opportunities and increased productivity have encouraged many, and some Georgian migrants have decided to return home, which had reduced the outflow of labor migrants from the country. During this period, migration became circular in nature, with many young Georgians choosing to go abroad for better education and, to return, to occupy senior positions in government, the private sector, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations.

The share of remittances also increased sharply during this period, only declining in 2007. It is noteworthy that a relatively small share of remittances was used for investment and the most part financed current consumption.

Although accurate data on emigration flows are not available because the migrant housing registration system is not perfect, there is a common view among experts in the field that labor migration is still high from Georgia, although it is much more circular today. Georgian migrants are now mainly targeted in the US and EU member states, as issues such as labor mobility costs and benefits in the EU and the Eastern Partnership partner countries are important to them.

As we have mentioned, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the economic and political breakdown in Georgia in 1991-95 was caused by several factors: the country experienced civil wars and ethnic conflicts. In 1993, inflation reached 2,000%, reflecting an almost complete collapse of the economy. The shock caused by the military conflicts and the overthrow of the state government, as well as the vague

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process of transition to a market economy, left the Georgian population in complete uncertainty and hopelessness.

Despite the ambiguity of official statistics, all evidence indicates that Georgia has experienced a catastrophic decline in industrial output since 1989, with real incomes, consumption, capital, investment, and almost all other economic indicators that had approached the lowest point. Interruption of energy supply - has been simultaneously the cause and symptom of a deep economic recession.

Georgia has undergone a significant dramatic change in ethnic composition. Almost all Jewish and Greek communities left the country. The protracted economic crisis - a decline in GDP of more than 70% in 1990-1994 - was again marked by migration. Even after 1995, migration remained the main survival tactic for many Georgian families, with people migrating not so much for employment as for security. The disruption of the rule of law has made it impossible for normal living conditions through economic activity.

Restoration of political stability, national consolidation, and economic growth was more or less achieved in 1994-2003. During this period, the Georgian economy grew by an average of 5.9% per year. GDP almost doubled. This "improvement" reflects some economic growth, although there has been a steady decline in population from a fixed 5.4 million in 1990 to 4.4 million in 2002. The population has shrunk in part due to declining birth rates. There was a higher mortality rate, but the main cause was still migration.

During this phase, unemployment and unproductive employment led to labor migration of people. According to official statistics, the unemployment rate in Tbilisi in 1999 was more than 32%. Due to the rapid deindustrialization process in Georgia, for many, the decision to migrate was the only way to retain or update their knowledge. Under these conditions, Georgia's best entrepreneurial talent left the country in search of better business opportunities, moved to Russia, and joined the very successful Georgian diaspora.

Economic liberalization began after the Rose Revolution in 2004-2012. President Saakashvili's administration has been able to implement radical reforms and macroeconomic management, which has greatly improved the economic situation (Labadze. Tukhashvili. 2013). Corruption and criminal violence have declined. As a result, Georgia has made very rapid progress in sovereign credit ratings and

has improved key indicators such as ease of doing business, international finance, and the elimination of corruption. As a result of economic recovery and property protection, the investment climate has greatly improved: the increase in foreign direct investment increased from \$ 500 million in 2003 to \$ 2 billion in 2007 (reaching a peak before the August 2008 war). Georgia has also benefited from significant financial and technical assistance from the European Union, the United States, Japan, and all major international financial institutions. This assistance was aimed at improving public services (electronic system creation, database, policies and procedures, staff training, etc.) and critical infrastructure.

The real economic growth in Georgia in 2005-2007 was really impressive. GDP per capita increased from about \$ 3,000 in 2003 to \$ 5,400 in 2011.

However, the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia and the impact of the global financial crisis changed the situation radically. The economy shrank by 3.8%. As a result, a new stream of labor migrants left Georgia.

Even today, more than half of the employees work in agriculture. In Georgia, an able-bodied member of a rural family who owns at least 0.5 hectares of land is not considered unemployed. Thus, the real unemployment rate is probably higher than the official statistics. According to a 2011 survey by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), 31% of the 16,161 people surveyed consider themselves unemployed and looking for a job, 5% say they are not looking for a job, and 30% are inactive.

The age structure of the emigrants was more or less uniformly distributed in contrast to the third phase, which is characterized by the dominance of young emigrants. This change may have been due to a relative improvement in the general economic situation and a reduction in migration among older people. Young people have more chances to get a better education abroad, more enthusiasm, and other needs. This explains the relatively high unemployment rate among people under 24 in recent years.

The age characteristics of employment have changed radically since the Rose Revolution. In a series of crucial structural reforms, in particular, people over the age of 40 have been replaced by younger staff despite their relevant workplace skills. "Generation Replacement" is one of the important features of the third phase of Georgian labor market migration during 2003–2008.

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It should be noted that these numbers are not recorded in the overall statistics, but in everyday life, it appears that returned young migrants with Western education and/or work experience are in almost all elite jobs. For example, ministers, deputy ministers, and leading business leaders as well as non-governmental organizations are staffed with Western-educated staff. This serves to stimulate young people to travel abroad to study and thus ensure a high quality of education and career in the homeland.

This view is supported by the data of the third phase, which shows that educational reasons become the motive for the development of emigration. Most people in this category have no language barriers and the psychological losses of migration associated with this age group are less.

### **5. Key Characteristics and Management of Migration in Georgia**

Managing international migration –people moving across national borders– is a global challenge for the 21st century. Almost 200 nation-states issue their passports and visas and regulate who can cross their borders and stay (Martin, 2003). All recognize the need for multifaceted approaches and international cooperation to expand legal avenues for migration, reduce the problems of irregular migration, protect the rights of migrants and create decent employment opportunities in the homeland (Wickramasekara, 2008).


Georgia is a country of pure emigration, which is mainly due to the high level of unemployment and poorly functioning labor market (OECD/CRRC, 2017). According to the latest UN DESA data, the total number of emigrants from Georgia in 2019 is 852,816, which is 22.9 % of the total population of the country. 168,238 Georgian emigrants live in 28 EU countries. At the same time, Geostat data show that 98,935 people emigrated from Georgia in 2018 and compared to 2017, the flow of emigrants increased by 15.8 %. According to Geostat, the largest number of emigrants (including the largest number of Georgian emigrants) was registered in 2018 during the last four years. 57% of emigrants who left Georgia in 2015-2018 are men.

However, according to a survey conducted by the Caucasus Barometer in 2017, the majority of Georgians are not interested in permanent emigration. The survey showed that more than half (55%) of the population is interested in temporary emigration, with only 8 % of respondents wanting to leave the country permanently.

To determine the flow of emigrants, Geostat uses the methodology recommended by the UN, according to which any person (regardless of citizenship) who meets the following 2 conditions is considered an immigrant: 1. Left Georgia in the last 12 months and at least 183 days (this may be the sum of several departures) Was in the territory of another state; 2. Georgia was a country of permanent residence for him, ie. Before leaving the country, he had spent at least 183 days in Georgia in the previous 12 months (cumulative sum of duration). Accordingly, both Georgian and foreign citizens meet emigrants.

As can be seen from the first graph, the majority of immigrants (in the case of both sexes) are of the working-age population. 64% of the total number of immigrants are in the relatively young age group (under 40).

*Chart 1. Percentage distribution of Georgian migrants by age and sex*



*Source: Geostat (2018)*


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Besides, labor emigration is often illegal. According to the 2019 migration profile of Georgia, the number of illegally identified Georgian citizens in EU member states increased significantly in 2018 (see Figure 2).

In 2015-2018, the share of Georgian emigrants illegally staying in EU countries ranged from 0.6% to 1%. In 2018, the largest number of illegal Georgian citizens was registered in Germany, France, and Greece.

According to the Global Migration Database (Wittgenstein Center), there has been a steady decline in migration from Georgia to Soviet countries, mainly the Russian Federation (Sander, Abel & Bauer, 2014). In particular, the outflow of population from 400,000 migrants in 1990-95 to 2005-2010, approx. Reduced to 150,000 migrants. Migration from Georgia to the Russian Federation in 1990-1995 was approx. Decreased from 300,000 migrants to 60,000 migrants in 2005-2010.



*Source: Georgia Migration Profile, 2019.*

According to Georgia's 2017 migration profile, most Georgians in the EU are in the 18-34 age group, suggesting that these people are more likely to seek employment opportunities abroad. The visa-free regime with the EU increases the need for Georgia to regulate labor emigration and provide legal employment opportunities for immigrants abroad.

The Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Development published a report in 2009 on "Labor Migration from Georgia and Bilateral Labor Agreements: Perspectives and Needs" (Abashidze, 2009). It states that most of the labor migration from Georgia is illegal. According to the experts involved in compiling the report, regulating labor migration should become a priority for the state. "Although there is no exact data on how many labor migrants have left Georgia, there is no doubt that their number is in the hundreds of thousands. Since Georgia does not have a large-scale agreement on the regulation of labor migration, Georgian labor migrants, when their rights are violated, are deprived of the possibility of legal protection by the state. "Georgian consulates abroad have limited capabilities." According to the authors of the report, a bilateral agreement between the states on this issue will be effective in solving a similar problem. It is explained that the government expressed interest in the issue of people who left the country in 2008 by setting up the Office of the State Minister for Diaspora Affairs of a special agency.

In recent years, Georgia has made significant progress in developing migration management mechanisms. Georgia developed and approved a migration policy in 2015.

## **6. Georgian Labor Migrants in Russia and Russia's Immigration Policy**

Most of the Georgian migrants are in Russia. Amid the military confrontation in August 2008 and the complete breakdown in political and economic relations between Russia and Georgia, there is no accurate data on labor migrants in Russia. Since 2006, when new Georgian migrants began to flow to Russia, many things have happened between the two countries that have made it impossible to manage the migration process.

In 2018, the number of emigrants from Georgia has increased and most emigrants from Georgia are still in Russia; Russia is one of the main countries of emigration for Georgian citizens. This is facilitated by the proximity of countries

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and the minimization of the language barrier. However, in recent years, the number of Georgian citizens who came to Russia from Georgia is decreasing, and the number of Georgian citizens who have left Russia is increasing. As a result, the migration balance of Georgian citizens in Russia has decreased.

The volume of remittances from abroad has increased by 32% in the last four years. In 2018, the number of remittances exceeded foreign direct investment in the same year. The largest amount of remittances to Georgia still comes from Russia. However, compared to 2017, the volume of remittances transferred from Russia to Georgia in 2018 has slightly decreased.

Russia attracts millions of labor migrants from post-Soviet countries, fueled by both aging processes and other demographic problems. It is noteworthy that in 2015 Russia received as many migrants as Germany. Over the past 2 years, 10 million people have arrived in Russia to get a job. Russia remains an attractive country for migrants, and the number of labor migrants is growing. Despite the devaluation of the ruble, employment there is still interesting for foreigners. According to Bloomberg, the flow of migrants helps to reduce inflationary pressures on the Russian economy and the process of economic growth (Ragozin, 2017).

“The elasticity of the Russian labor market helps to reduce inflation. Wages in Russia in 2015-2016 were attractive for migrants. In March 2017, the unemployment rate in Russia fell by 0.2% to 5.4%, while wages increased by 1.5%. Nevertheless, at the same time, the level of retail trade has been falling for almost 2 years in a row. Currently, migrants make up 5-7% of the total workforce in Russia. In 2016, the number of able-bodied citizens of Russia amounted to 76.6 million people.

Russia, like many countries in the world, is facing demographic problems. For him, the reduction of national labor resources, the influx of emigrants, and the attraction of foreign labor capital are important development resources. However, neither in society nor in official circles there is no consensus about the role of migrants in the Russian economy, even though their number is in the millions (Ryazantsev, 2013).

Labor migration causes conflicts, because in Russia it is characterized by a high level of unemployment and, at the same time, a shortage of labor throughout the country ( Baynova at all, 2017). Unfortunately, there is a large share of xenophobic

sentiments in Russian society. According to opinion polls conducted by sociologists, the slogan “Russia for Russians” is supported by the majority of those surveyed. These are the sentiments in Russian society from the first years. If in 1998 this slogan was supported by 43% of the respondents, then in 2002 it was already 49%, and in subsequent years its support did not diminish. Anger, hostility, mistrust, and fear towards other ethnic groups dominate (Sulyagina, 2016). Having a negative attitude towards labor migrants is dangerous not only for the migrants themselves but also for the population of the host country.

There are no convincing in-depth studies on this topic. Official statistics on migrants employed in the Russian labor market are very limited and the scale of employment of registered migrants is also important (Tkachenko, 2014).

Recently, the Russian Interior Ministry drafted a bill that provides benefits to certain categories of migrants. In particular, migrants who have received higher or vocational education in Russia will receive a long-term residence permit upon completion of their studies. Another innovation concerns migrant workers, whose qualifications are included in the list of preferred professions of the Ministry of Labor. Under the new bill, such migrants will receive a residence permit six months after employment if their employers have paid contributions to the pension fund.

A new initiative to introduce “gold passports” in Russia, which means investing in obtaining a residence permit, suggests that migration is not a problem for Russia, on the contrary, it can become an important resource for development. The Ministry of Economic Development is preparing a program to allow foreigners to have a residence permit to invest in real estate or business - this initiative appeared in the press amid the global pandemic (Ivakhnyuk, 2020).

This is no coincidence: The strict travel restrictions imposed in Russia and elsewhere have forced the government to focus on population migration as a potential source of post-crisis recovery and economic growth. Russia has already lost more than 10 million able-bodied people in the last decade and will lose another 10 million by 2050 (Tkachenko, 2014).

The concept of Russia’s state migration policy for 2019-2025 is mainly aimed at increasing the country’s migratory attractiveness, ie creating incentives for migrants to live permanently in Russia, as well as attracting temporary labor migrants from the global and regional labor markets. In 2019-2020, real legislative steps were

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taken to achieve this goal, it is planned to simplify the procedures for obtaining Russian citizenship for several categories of foreign citizens and to return to the practice of residence permits. These facilitating circumstances are likely to be attractive to Georgian labor migrants as well.

### 7. Conclusion

Researches show a strong link between inadequate employment opportunities for migrants from Georgia and unsatisfactory working conditions. Poor labor market conditions lead to labor migration, while returnees are unable to benefit from the experience gained in migration. Moreover, given the government's liberal economic policies, employment and job opportunities are the biggest help for migrants and this should be a top priority. The migration of Georgians may continue as the only solution for many families who have survived thanks to remittances.

The largest number of labor migrants from Georgia is in Russia and this is still a reality today. Well-thought-out political solutions to migrants' problems are necessary for the interest of accepting labor migrants, but so far such a policy does not exist in Russia or Georgia. Such a policy should become part of an integrated policy, both in terms of migration and social protection. Measures against xenophobia and migrant phobia are necessary.

Establishing effective mechanisms for managing and monitoring migration flows is also essential to ensure a win situation for all parties involved. Removing the language barrier will help migrants make full use of their skills and qualifications abroad and increase decent employment opportunities, this will reduce the Brain drain from the country. Circular labor mobility schemes under legal agreements can facilitate greater benefits from migration and return.

We think it is important to improve labor market conditions and provide assistance to returnees to make effective use of remittances and savings in business investments. Labor resources, which are important for the development of Georgia, can be attracted through support for return and realistic employment policy.

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## LABOR MIGRATION FROM GEORGIA: PROBLEMS, CONSEQUENCES AND CHALLENGES

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# 8

## FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN GEORGIA

*Manana Darchashvili<sup>1</sup>*

### **Abstract**

The issue of women's involvement in politics is widely discussed in Georgia, as it is considered to be one of the most urgent means of establishing democracy, therefore, several measures have been taken in this regard in the country. However, it does not follow the international democratic standards and the rate is still low. Civil society is involved in tackling the problem because the country has a solid historical experience.

Due to the activities of the civic society, after the restoration of state independence in Georgia, especially in the last election cycles and in the current period, there have been active debates at the legislative level to involve women representatives in representative bodies at all levels. The Georgian government has made some efforts to achieve gender balance, there have been several initiatives for intra-party gender equality, and a recent decision by the legislature hopes to enable the state to overcome this challenge, this standard of a fair society and enhance democracy in Georgia.

**Keywords:** Politics, Participation, Gender, Georgia, Democracy, Challenge, Law

### **1. Introduction**

The issue of women's involvement in politics, as one of the contributing factors to the establishment of democracy, was well understood by Georgian political thinkers a century ago, which is evident even in the election of the first democratic republic of Georgia. The statement is as follows: "The Constituent Assembly shall

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consist of members elected by the residents, regardless of sex, following the rules of proportional representation by equal, direct and secret ballot.” Due to this approach, there were six women in the electoral list, including one non-Georgian nationality, on the 130-member electoral list of the Georgian Social Democrats (ruling party) nominated for membership in the Constituent Assembly. However, in the 1919 founding council's election only 5 women out of 109 occupied a place in the legislative body (Sharashenidze, 1990).

Consequently, despite its political inheritance, even in the twentieth century there was a deep interest in this issue. The purpose was to find the solutions to that existed political situation - increasing the participation of women in politics. It is very relevant and topical in the modern era as well, since many scholars consider that balanced participation is a necessary condition for a democratic society.

## **2. The Aim of Research**

The paper aims to study, analyze and present - the current situation of women's involvement in the political process in Georgia, through legislative measures, electoral processes - based on data from the Central Election Commission (CEC) and develop recommendations to overcome the existing challenge and strengthen women's involvement in politics.

Research method: the study of the issue is based on the method of empirical research, based on the found material and monitoring the political processes. The paper will try to show the reflection of several taken commitments (national and international) on the current situation. The research hypothesis is the following - in the post-Soviet period, the problem of involving women in Georgian politics is a long process and develops very slowly.

## **3. Literature Review**

Due to the urgency and importance of the topic, there are numerous works and papers written by the field experts and researchers of the Georgian reality, however, we will discuss only a few of them.

At the modern stage, when studies on equal rights for women and men occupy a large place in socio-political theories, the scope has expanded from research on women's issues to gender (Phase III), the researchers on women's issues (Kiknadze,

Donadze 2006) highlight that approaches toward all aspects of human society in terms of culture and interdependence are gendered biased.

In this regard, it is interesting to discuss the status of women's rights in Georgia, which dates back to the feudal times Georgia, which can be found among the variety of scientific work of Ivane Javakhishvili, a prominent Georgian scientist of the twentieth century. His scientific discussion of the legal status of women is still relevant today. On the contrary, the connection of his thought with modernity gives the issue more urgency. In volumes II, VI, VII of Ivane Javakhishvili's "History of the Georgian Nation", regarding the issue of women's involvement in politics, the author discusses the mentioned issue out of the Shota Rustaveli's book "The Knight in the Panther Skins" where it is said that "Lion cubs are equal be they male or female", thus emphasizing the equality of a woman and a man, which can be an indicator of the high development of Georgian thought in the XII century (Javakhishvili, 1984).

Numerous studies on the issue of women's political participation in the modern period have been devoted to a paper edited by Tamar Chugoshvili, Chairperson of the Gender Equality Council of the Parliament of Georgia (with the involvement of various organizations) - "Gender Equality in Georgia: Barriers and Recommendations" refers to the mechanisms for enforcing the Law on Gender Equality in Georgia, gender equality in various fields, the elimination of all forms of discrimination, gender-based violence and women's political participation, where the study shows the ineffectiveness of the existing political system, temporary special measures and the development of a recommendation to increase the political participation of women in the state (Chugoshvili, 2018).

Giorgi Urchukhishvili in his research "Women in Parties" highlights that the involvement of women in politics as one of the most important challenges, especially in the period of transformation in Georgia. In his work, the author presents the existing reality, the difficulties, and the involvement of women in politics, regardless of taken measures. He notes that political parties in Georgia should form working groups in which members will work to raise awareness of both intra-party and gender in general and to promote the merits of women before the parties (Urchukhishvili, 2017).

The involvement of women in elections and electoral processes has been highlighted by many researchers. In this regards, Nino Dolidze's work "Women in

Georgian Politics” is noteworthy, since here the author discusses women’s involvement in politics during the 2016-2018 election cycle in Georgia. She is concerned about the existing data in the country and calls the government to implement legislative reform for gender equality (Dolidze, 2017).

#### **4. The Issue of Involving Women in Modern Georgian Politics**

Numerous studies and facts at the present stage prove that the involvement of women in politics is one of the defining conditions of a country’s democracy.

Well-known political scientists Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris point out that women’s involvement in politics is more equal in the post-industrial society than in the developing or post-communist world (Inglehart, Norris, 2003). Consequently, the high rate of women’s involvement in politics is one of the important features of democratic development. Based on this approach, it is a fact that the situation in Georgia is unfavorable, as more than half of the population 53.76% is women, however currently represented by only 16% in the legislative body, it should be noted that this figure is alarming for a country with a great historical experience.

In this regard, even representatives of different spheres, are interested in such issues as the involvement of women in politics. However, to improve the situation, many researchers note that the introduction of mandatory quotas at different levels of elections has increased the representation of women.

The studied materials reveal the fact that the involvement of women with passive suffrage in elections is low, despite that it has been actively discussed for more than 10-15 years. We have to say that there are indeed a few changes, but this reflects the insufficient attitude of politicians and the public towards the issue of women’s involvement in politics in the country.

The Georgian government has taken the obligation to increase its rate through certain national and international documents. One of the 12 key issues which had to be discussed at the 1995 Beijing Conference by the participating countries, including Georgia, that should have been considered in their National Action Plan, was “Women’s Participation in Governing Bodies and Decision-Making Bodies”.

Accordingly, several measures have been taken in Georgia following the Constitution, international obligations, and democratic principles to improve the

situation of women's involvement in politics. Particularly, the Law on Gender Equality was adopted in 2010, Article 4 of which recognizes equality between women and men in political life.

It is worthy to say that, since 2011 the Gender Equality Council has been established in Parliament as a permanent body that oversees issues related to women's issues. The measures taken by this council serve directly the involvement of women in politics since the state is obliged to do that, as it is mentioned above, soon after the restoration of its independence.

The experience of democracies has been actively discussed since the beginning of the century. Supporters of the issue have repeatedly pointed to the need to impose a gender quota.

Initially, in 2011, a policy based on the recommendation of the Venice Commission introduced an incentive norm in the Organic Law of Georgia to increase women's participation in the political process. In particular, funding for a political party would be increased by 10% if the party has not less than 20% of females representative of the electoral roll.

A similar measure was taken in 2013, which meant a 30% increase in party funding if there were different genders in each of the ten voter lists. In this regard, in almost all pre-election periods, was tougher and therefore the demand was getting more strict.

It is worthy to note that after the implementation of the first change - according to the results of the 2012 elections, although the number of women in parliament has increased, doubled, the situation remains unfavorable. Particularly, out of the total number of registered candidates - 2,742 - 788 were women, which constitutes 28.74%. 729 of them participated in the proportional list, and 59 in the majoritarian list. According to the available data, out of 16 election subjects, only six used the so-called, voluntary quota. The winners of the parliamentary elections, the National Movement and the Georgian Dream, did not use this rule. "Georgian Dream" violated the law in the top ten places of its electoral list, it included only 33 women out of 200 candidates. The National Movement violated it in the second ten place of the electoral list, including only 17 women out of 150 candidates. We should underline that both political forces have always supported the involvement of women in politics in their election campaigns

or program documents. According to election results in 2012, 18 women, which constitutes 12%, gain a place in parliament.

The event held in 2013, despite the repeated support, did not bring the desired result. In particular, in the 2014 local self-government representative and executive elections, only 8 out of 84 nominated candidates for mayor of 12 self-governing cities were women. However, they received the lowest rates. The ruling Georgian Dream party out of 12 mayoral candidates did not nominate even 1 female candidate.

Often, those who oppose women's activism or have a neutral attitude appeal to passive attitudes toward women's politics themselves. To dispel this attitude, we note that for the first time in 2014, voter turnout was calculated by gender. The data was as follows - 50.2%, and in the second round - 53.91% of women participated.

In 2014-2015, the issue became more active, which was expressed in the slogan - "More women in politics." The activation of the issue was the reason that the current President of Georgia declared 2015 the Year of Women, at the same time expressing her attitude towards the 20th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration, where a large part of humanity was making plans for gender equality. Even though the issue was actively on the agenda, in 2015, the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs did not support an amendment in the Organic Law of Georgia, "On the Election Code of Georgia", having one out of every three candidate female, an initiative was significant because 25% of the legislature should be women.

In the 2016 parliamentary elections, 24 women, which is 16%, gain the status of parliamentarians. In 2016, to improve gender equality, an amendment was made to the law, according to which gender councils were established in each city council. Despite the existing efforts, before the 2017 local self-government elections, out of the total of 2083 seats in the city council, women held only 245, which is 11.8 %.

It is obvious that in terms of women's involvement in politics in Georgia, according to official data, there is a positive trend. Since we can observe that for the past two decades, the number of female members of parliament did not exceed 10%, especially, in 1992, only 6.22% of the members of parliament were women, in 1995 - it was 6.64%, in 1999 - 7.17%, in 2004 - 9.33%, in 2008 - 6.00 %, in 2012 - 12.00%, and 2016 - 16.00% (Tsurtsumia, 2019) (see table #1).

*Dynamics of Women's Representation in the Parliament of Georgia in  
Percentage Table # 1.*

Year	1992	1995	1999	2004	2008	2012	2016
Women in Parliament	6.22%	6.64%	7.17%	9.33%	6.00%	12.00%	16.00%

Despite the positive trends in female representation in Georgian political circles, the number of women politicians in Georgia remains low. It is noteworthy to say that, the issue of quotas, which has been the subject of much debate in recent years and has been actively discussed for decades, has already achieved some results. Since in current (2020) year the gender quota is adopted as a temporary measure. The following changes have been proposed: in the parliamentary elections held before 2028, political parties must submit to the CEC chairperson a party list in which at least one candidate out of the four candidates will be of the opposite sex, otherwise, the party will not be registered. In the parliamentary elections held from 2028 to 2032, all parties will be obliged to have at least one out of every three candidates of the opposite sex on the list submitted to the CEC. These and other developed mechanisms will help the country to improve its condition.

## **5. The Issue of Women's Involvement in Politics - the Context of the Presidential Election**

For certain reasons, while discussing the issue of women's involvement in politics, the existing situation of the presidential elections in Georgia is less discussed. For this reason, in this part of the study, I will discuss the involvement of women in politics on the example of the presidential elections in Georgia, since it is very relevant and topical in the given current political situation. It is also important to note that in the post-Soviet period in Georgia, only three of the held seven presidential elections so far had female presidential candidates.

It is important to study the pre-election political process during the presidential elections to find out the women's activities and the existing obstacles that prevent them from political involvement.

The institution of the President in Georgia, according to the constitutional law adopted by the Supreme Council after the declaration of the restoration of state

independence April 9, 1991 states: "On Establishing the Position of the President of the Republic of Georgia and Making Amendments in the Constitution of the Republic of Georgia", on 14 April 1991, a special chapter was added to the Constitution of Georgia, as a result of the amendments 131 - "The President of Georgia" where it is stated that this position was introduced "To strengthen the state system of the Republic of Georgia, the sovereignty of the country, the rights of citizens, freedom, and security."

Based on the newly adopted law, on May 26, 1991, the first President of Georgia was elected by direct, universal suffrage (this was the first democratic presidential election in Georgia), who had broad domestic and foreign powers under the Constitution as a representative of the government.

None of the six candidates on May 26, 1991, presidential election was a woman. The number of the received votes was distributed as follows: Zviad Gamsakhurdia (Round Table - Free Georgia) - 87.03%, Valerian Advadze (from the Union of National Consent and Revival of Georgia) - 7.17%, Jemal Mikeladze (Independent Communist Party of Georgia) - 1.58%, Nodar Natadze (People's Front of Georgia, Republican Party) - 1.14%, Irakli Shengelaia (Democratic Union) - 0.88%, Tamaz Kvachantiradze (Union of Free Democrats of Georgia) - 0.25%. Zviad Gamsakhurdia became the President of Georgia, the total number of estimated voters had to be - 3 594 810, participated - 2 978 247 people, the candidate gathered - 2 565 362 votes (CEC, 2017).

The 1995 presidential election was held in parallel with the parliamentary elections. These elections were important because the constitution of August 24, 1995, established a ruling presidential republic and (according to experts) endowed it with powers that are unlike those of a typical presidential democracy, even in the homeland of the presidential system (the United States) (Gonashvili, Eremadze, 2017). In the elections of November 5, 1995, like in the previous one, there were 6 presidential candidates and was not even a single woman candidate. The number of votes received was distributed as follows: Eduard Shevardnadze - 74.04%; Jumber Patiashvili - 19.58%, Akaki Bakradze - 1.48%, Panteleimon Giorgadze - 0.47%, Kartlos Gharibashvili - 0.47%, Roin Liparteliani - 0.37%. The second President of Georgia became Eduard Shevardnadze (total number of estimated voters - 3 594 810, participated - 2 139 369, the gathered votes - 1 589 909).

On April 9, 2000, a third presidential election was held and the situation regarding the woman was the same again, there were six candidates, and women were not presented as presidential candidates. The number of votes received was distributed as follows: Eduard Shevardnadze - 79.82%; Jumber Patiashvili - 16.66%, Kartlos Gharibashvili - 0.34%, Avtandil Jobla - 0.25%, Vazha Zhgenti - 0.14%, Tengiz Asatiani - 0.12%. Eduard Shevardnadze became the President of Georgia for the second term (total number of estimated voters - 3 594 810, participated - 2 343 176, the gathered votes - 1 870 311).

Georgia held its fourth snap presidential election on January 4, 2004, again all the 6 presidential candidates were males. The number of votes received was distributed as follows: Mikheil Saakashvili - 96.27%, Teimuraz Shashvashvili - 1.86%, Roin Liparteliani - 0.26%, Zaza Sikharulidze - 0.24%, Kartlos Gharibashvili - 0.21%, Zurab Kelekhsashvili - 0.10%. Mikheil Saakashvili became the third President of Georgia (total number of estimated voters - 2,231,986, participated - 1,963,556, the gathered votes - 1,890,256). It is worth saying that Mikheil Saakashvili had gathered a high percentage of votes, but according to the number of gathered votes, the first President of Georgia Z. Gamsakhurdia was leading.

For the first time in the presidential elections of Georgia (in the post-Soviet period), a female candidate was represented in the fifth interim presidential election held on January 5, 2008. There were 7 candidates: 6 males and 1 female. The number of votes was distributed as follows: Mikheil Saakashvili - 53.47% (in 2004 - 96%), Levan Gachechiladze - 25.69%, Arkadi Patarkatsishvili - 7.10%, Shalva Natelashvili - 6.49%, Davit Gamkrelidze - 4.02%, Giorgi Maisashvili - 0.77 % And Irina Sarishvili - 0.16%. As we can see, the only female candidate was Irina Sarishvili-Chanturia, who received the lowest number of votes - 3,242 votes, 0.16%. She was presented to the CEC by the initiative group with 56,320 signatures. It is important to highlight that at that time there was only one woman among the 13 members in the CEC. The gender ratio was relatively balanced in DEC's (42% women), PEC's (50% women), and on January 5, more than half of PEC chairpersons (55%), as well as 2/3 of the commission members were women (OSCE, 2008). Thus, Mikheil Saakashvili became the President of Georgia for a second term (total number of estimated voters - 3 527 964, voters participated - 1 982 318 voters, the candidate gathered - 1 060 042 votes).

The sixth presidential election on October 27, 2013, was preceded by the constitutional reform of October 15, 2010, which changed the form of government, according to that, as a constitutionalist A. Demetrashvili notes - "For the first time in the constitutional history of Georgia, the government became the owner, train and executor of the executive power at the constitutional level. This was manifested by the fact that the government is recognized as the highest body of executive power. According to the new edition, the Georgian government pursues the country's domestic and foreign policy" (Demetrashvili, 2013). However, according to the new version, the president is no longer the cornerstone of the governmental system, but it would not be right to "disposes of" him/her and present him as a symbolic figure granted only ceremonial or representative function. The important role of the President is textually substantiated by Articles 69 and 70 of the Constitution of Georgia, which establish his/her high status and the regulations for direct universal suffrage (Gonashvili, Eremadze, 2017). It is important to note that although the activities were statistically low, the percentage of supporters was high.

Three of the 23 candidates running for the presidential election were women, the number of votes was distributed as follows: Giorgi Margvelashvili - 62.12%, Davit Bakradze - 21.73%, Nino Burjanadze - 10.8%, Shalva Natelashvili - 2.88%, Giorgi Targamadze - 1.06%. Tamaz Bibiluri - 0.04%, Giorgi Liluashvili - 0.12%, Sergo Javakhadze - 0.13%, Koba Davitashvili - 0.6%, Akaki Asatiani - 0.1%, Nino Chaniashvili - 0.14%, Teimuraz Bobokhidze - 0.02%, Levan Chachua - 0.19%, Nestan Kirtadze - 0.05%, Giorgi Chikhladze - 0.05%, Zurab Kharatishvili - 0.23%, Mikheil Saluashvili - 0.08%, Kartlos Gharibashvili - 0.03%, Mamuka Chokhonelidze - 0.02%, Avtandil Margiani - 0.04%, Nugzar Avaliani - 0.04%, Mamuka Melikishvili - 0.06 %, Teimuraz acid - 0.08%. One of them, Nino Burjanadze - # 14, is in the top three candidates according to the gathered (10.8%, 166,061 votes), Nino Chaniashvili - 0.14% (2,274 votes), and Nestan Kirtadze - 0.05% (762 votes).

Giorgi Margvelashvili became the President of Georgia (total number of estimated voters - 3 537 719, participated - 1 660 976 voters, candidate gathered - 1 012 569 votes). It should be noted that on March 26, 2010, the Law of Georgia on Gender Equality was adopted. Besides, the chairperson of the 2013 Presidential Election Commission was a woman - Tamar Zhvania.

It is worth mentioning that the application of the current president - Salome Zurbashvili was rejected in the 2013 presidential elections by Decree # 64/2013 of the Chairman of the Central Election Commission. The reason for the rejection was Article 29 chapter 111 of the Constitution of Georgia, according to which - "The position of the President of Georgia, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the Parliament may not be held by a citizen of Georgia who has as foreign citizenship" (Constitution of Georgia, 1995).

The 2018 presidential elections are very interesting for the Georgian reality, an important fact of our research - the president of Georgia became a woman. At the same time, she is the last directly elected president of Georgia, because the rule of presidential elections has been changed (Constitution of Georgia, 2019), which caused a great deal of controversy and arguments during the pre-election period. The social uncertainty, since people were waiting for the announcement of the presidential candidate of the ruling party. In August the ruling party announced that it would not nominate its candidate in the election, it was said, that to avoid the domination of the ruling party. However throughout the whole pre-election process, especially during the second round, they did their best to promote their supporting candidate.

Out of 25 candidates running for the presidential elections of 2018, I will mention only those candidates who received more than 1%, there were only 7 candidates - Davit Bakradze - 10.97%, Grigol Vashadze - 35.74%, Shalva Natelashvili - 3.74%, Kakha Kukava - 1.33%, Davit Usupashvili - 2.26%, Zurab Japaridze - 2.26%, Salome Zurbashvili - 38.64%, Grigol Vashadze # 5 in the second round - 40.48%; Salome Zurbashvili # 48 - 59.52%. It is a fact that only two of the candidates were women, from the # 31 party - "Freedom - Zviad Gamsazurdi's Way" - Tamar Tskhoragauli, who received 0.25%, and Salome Zurbashvili, nominated by the # 48 initiative group, received 38.64%.

During the second round, the parties around the two presidential candidates made every effort to win the majority of votes, revealing a wide-ranging, open confrontation between political entities, which gathered around Salome Zurbashvili and Grigol Vashadze. In the second round, Salome Zurbashvili under the number of 48, the most supportive candidate of the ruling team, despite the country's tense political situation, won the elections by 59.52%, thus, becoming the first female president in the history of Georgia (see table #2).

*Dynamics of Female Presidential Candidates in Georgia Table # 2.*

Year	1991	11995	2000	2004	2008	2013	2018
Candidates / Female	6/0	6/0	6/0	6/0	7/1	23/3	25/2 President is a woman

The study shows that the introduction of a gender quota was considered as an important mechanism to improve women's involvement in Georgian politics. The upcoming elections will show the result of assumptions. The current political process has shown that the result of quotas will work on proportional representation and there is still much to do since there is a demand for the new mechanism development because it is a fact that out of 30 currently nominated candidates for the majoritarian candidacy a woman is only one.

## 6. Conclusion

- Monitoring the issue of women's political involvement in Georgia, on the example of the parliamentary and presidential elections, revealed that interest in the country was driven primarily by the tense political and public opposition that preceded almost all recent parliamentary and presidential elections ( without even considering the female candidate factor).
- Based on the study of the empirical material, it becomes clear that the main controversy of our study related to the legislative changes implemented during the pre-election process, in most cases, to improve the political process.
- The pre-election period has always been marked by excessive use of all means of hate speech, especially during the last, presidential elections, when the opportunities for a female candidate were identified.
- Generally, during the elections in Georgia, in most cases, it was confirmed by several elections cases that the final result is determined by a personal factor and not by program documents or other important characteristics of the electoral process.
- The result achieved by the political entity that won the election, especially in the presidential election, was always due to the support of the ruling team.
- In Dynamics (1991-2018), the rate of women's involvement in politics in Georgia has improved with a slight change.

- The introduction of a new incentive norm in Georgia's organic law, the introduction of quotas, will most likely increase the number of female representatives in politics.

### **Recommendations**

- The Georgian government and political parties, to improve the involvement of women in politics, should be more responsible for taken international commitment, referring to international experience, to increase the growth rate of democracy - to raise public awareness.
- The government should more responsibly realize the existing national, international obligations, recommendations, and implement them in practice.
- The Gender Equality Council of the Parliament of Georgia should work hard to ensure that women are appointed to decision-making positions.
- A study of the issue of women's involvement in politics in Georgia has shown that more public awareness is needed, which should be managed by specially created groups.

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# 9

## DEVELOPMENT OF ENERGY RESOURCES IN OTTOMAN STATE FROM THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO THE REPUBLIC

*Perihan Hazel Kaya<sup>1</sup>, Ning Hou<sup>2</sup>*

### **Abstract**

Resources responding to energy demand evolved over time due to the increasing demands. Particularly, technical improvements after the industrial revolution have been a crucial turning point in this area. Depending on the role of coal in production processes, search for new energy resources made oil a current issue of the world as an industrial product in the second half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. As a result of oil, together with coal, improvements occurring in development indicators encouraged countries to mobilize resources of interest. However, the unbalanced distribution of these resources on global scales, pushing industrialized countries into different searches, directed them to the rich regions in terms of energy resources.

In the current study, we aim to investigate the viewpoint of the Ottoman State in the coal and oil and its activities in this area, dating from the industrial revolution in Europe to the Republic. In this direction, the historical development of coal and oil in the Ottoman State is firstly discussed; then, the legal regulations and applications made for oil resources and coal mining in the 19<sup>th</sup> century are examined. Through the investigations, we search for the answer of whether the regression and collapse are related to energy resources.

**Keywords:** Industrial Revolution, Ottoman State, Oil, Coal, Legal Regulations

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## DEVELOPMENT OF ENERGY RESOURCES IN OTTOMAN STATE FROM THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO THE REPUBLIC

*Perihan Hazel Kaya, Ning Hou*

### 1. Introduction

In the second half of 18<sup>th</sup> century, together with Industrial Revolution that came into existence as English –originated in West, the new processes started. Examples include the emergence of modern states, worldwide enlargement of trade, developments in transportation and production techniques, and putting new production ways into actions. The first industrial revolution began with the use of mechanical counters, driven by water and steam power, instead of human labor. In this period, while the use of mine and metal was increasing, the developments were experienced in transportation area (Innes, 1912).

Since the first known years of history, it is known that coal and oil are used in different areas. However, when it reached the 19<sup>th</sup> century, as a result of energy need emerging with the developments experienced as a result of the industrial revolution, oil was used as an industrial product, and this brought together with it oil exploration. Although oil is the raw material of many products we use in our daily life today, it is one of the most important energy resources of technology. Therefore, it has become a crucial competitive element of political powers and governments. Because of this, it is a highly determinative resource in the economy. The industrialized countries which did not have their own oil reserves exploited the regions in a suitable position in terms of resources.

The Ottoman State established sovereignty is a highly essential region, where the richest oil reserves such as Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Romania, and the Persian Gulf took place. Over the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Ottoman State, being active in many areas from storing oil to protecting and taxing it, provided income from this resource. However, after the 1870s, in other words, beginning from that oil was started to be used as fuel, these lands begun to get out Ottoman State's property rapidly and, with the Sevres Treaty signed after the First World War, were completely lost.

Coal that is another energy resource and firstly used to get heated was firstly used in lightening and later in steam engines. As a result of industrialization, as it is in oil, a search began for reaching coal mine, and [Ottoman State] struggled with Europe. At the beginning, although it is not possible for foreigners to buy property in Ottoman State after Baltalimanı Treaty which was signed with England in 1838, the English acquired the right to buy property in this country. Again, in

the Tanzimat period, via legal regulations, the foreign firms have paved the way for them to process coal mines.

This study aims to evaluate the Ottomans' viewpoint to the mentioned resources over time dating from the Industrial Revolution, in which there was a great need for oil and oil to the Republican period. In this direction, firstly, the historical development of coal and oil in the Ottoman State is discussed and, following it, the legal regulations and application made for oil resources and coal mine in the 19<sup>th</sup> century are examined. Through all of the examinations, we investigate whether or not the regression and collapse of the Ottoman State are also connected with energy resources.

## **2. Variation Of Energy Use In Time**

In pre-industrial societies, traditional energy resources such as wood, animal, and wind power were used. In the 15<sup>th</sup> century, countries met 80% of their energy from the consumption of wood as well as human and animal energy. Between the years of 1750 and 1830, after the industrial revolution that emerged in England, population and life standards began to rise, and people started to use electrical and mechanical power in the goods and service sectors and the areas of textile, metallurgy, and mining (Özdemir, 2016, p.18).

Today, energy, for the sake of which wars were made, is a very important production factor for all societies and economies. In a geography where there is no energy, it is impossible to mention the product, consumption, and economy. Wood is the first energy resource of humankind after the fire. The evolution of energy continues in the way of coal after wood, oil after coal, and natural gas after oil (Ediger, 2007, p.30).

In the time elapsed by the industrial revolution, it is possible to put in order the energy need of people as wood, animal and human power, or running water. With the industrial revolution, a high amount of energy was used due to the technological developments that occurred in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries and afterwards. Time slices, especially to be mentioned about is the 18<sup>th</sup> century, because, towards the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, coal heat began to be used more in industrial activities. The most important results of using coal as an energy resource are: production is no longer made by machinery and that industrial plants are no longer

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able to process in much more amount of raw material and to lead the production volumes of the plants to enlarge.

In the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, new energy resources were discovered. With the turbine and generator, electricity was generated by the power of running waters; how to transmit this energy generated affected the importance of the presence of industrial plants and the distribution of these plants. The production of oil in terms of trade was also enabled in this period. But until the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, oil was an energy resource used for only lightening. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, with the invention of the internal-combustion engine, the value of oil highly increased. Oil became an essential substance in terms of not only being energy resource but also being the raw material. As a natural result of this, the Petro-Chemistry Industry has emerged.

Although natural gas firstly emerged to heat houses as an energy resource in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it turned into a state, which is also used in kitchens in time, and which performs its essential function in generating electricity in thermal power stations. Beginning from the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it came into the use area of nuclear energy.

### **2. Coal Mining In the Ottoman State**

While coal, one of the most critical energy resources, was earlier used in warming, later, it was used in lightening and on inventing steam engines, producing steam. Developed countries invested more in underground mining compared to less developed and developing countries (Seyidoğlu, 2001).

The central dynamic behind the fact that the importance of coal increases and that economy was an essential element in that date was the industrial revolution that began in the 18<sup>th</sup> century and rapid progress in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Steam engines invented in this century can be evaluated as the most important reason for the increase in coal demand (Kömürlü, 2020).

The main determinants leading to energy transformation in the Ottoman Empire is the level of industrialization and technological development. In Ottomans, which is very unlucky in terms of energy resources, neither traditional fuel nor traditional coal was very much abundant. There was lignite in the country, which is in lower quality than coal.

After the industrial revolution, the need for coal of Ottomans that was an agricultural society that emerged in the 19<sup>th</sup> century upon that navy proceeded to steam engines. In time, when the demands of armory, mint, and dockyard are added to this need, for Ottomans, which could not operate its mining pits, and which imports coal, this case meant a significant economic burden. Empire needed to use its own resources.

In the period of Sultan Mahmut II (1731), the first coal was discovered in Sarajevo, but these machines were invented by Humbaracı Ahmet Paşa. In 1731, Conte de Bonneval (Humbaracı Ahmet Paşa) was exploring mineral deposits, and he excavated coal mine for finding gold. In the leadership of Baron de Tott, Hungarian –originated French, burning tests were made for melting metal by extracting a metal in the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. To supply fuel to Tophane-i Amire, the mine in Yedikumlar (north of İstanbul) that was active was extracted in 1773. But it did not last long (Tok, 2017, p.10). In the Period of 3<sup>rd</sup> Sultan Mustafa (1774), coal was discovered in Yedikumlar Region. However, coals discovered were both lignite coal and their calorific values were lower. But there was a need for hard coal with high calorific value (Kömürlü, 2020, p.20).

Coal business administration in Ottomans dates to the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. This region, which takes place on the western coast of the Black Sea exits of Bosphorus and sustains activity at the moment. In the period of Selim III (1793), the coal reserves, which are existent and will be discovered, were subjected to a rule related to combining the other coal reserves, depending on the coal. Again, in the period of Selim III, When Resmi Mustafa Ağa, former chief artillery (humbaracıbaşı), wanted to operate 3<sup>rd</sup> reserves that are taken place in Yedikumlar after the testing process of 3 years, in exchange of a proper price, Selim III granted a license to him (Öğreten, 2006, p. 137).

Together with that the use of steam engines became widespread and that the sectors increase they are used, in Ottomans that meets its coal need, investing from England, it became obligatory to operate hard coal deposits. With an edict that Mahmut II enacted, it was commanded that leathernecks were disembodied after they were told them the importance of coal, and a piece of coal is given to them, for them to seek when they return to hometowns. This edict worked, and Uzun Mehmet among leathernecks found hard coal in the regions of Ereğli and Amasra in 1829 (Yüksel, 2017, p.158). In the Ottoman Empire, although coal

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mine was discovered in the era of Sultan Mahmud II in 1829, it began to be operated in the era of Sultan Abdülmecit. Those coalpits were opened, and empire utilized this mine could hardly be realized in 1841. Any production was not made by 1841, and coal used by factory and navy was imported. Between the dates of November 5, 1942 and November 30, 1945, Ereğli Coal Pits was firstly combined under the name of Coal Corporation by a group of Galata moneylenders with domestic entrepreneur and capital. From this date, this company operated Ereğli Coalpits (Kaştan, 2016, p.4).

The capital of mines belongs to Sultan. With the Free Trade Treaty in 1838, the rights to buy properties and run were granted to foreigners. English, French, and Italian companies utilized these rights respectively, and they made small scale production here until the transfer of [Mine] Basin to the administration of Hazine-i Hassa. In 1864, Sultan Abdülaziz granted Havza administration to the Ministry of Maritime, in which coal need was the most intensive and which is under the administration of Ahmet Vesin Paşa, Capitan Pasha, upon the desire of this Pasha. Ahmet Vesin Pasha, in the examination he made, he reported that the desired productivity could not be obtained from hard coal of the region because there is no adequate and smooth road, that railway is short, that the number of coal troughs was not sufficient, and that there was especially labor force deficit, although this region is a place covering the best and largest area (Yüksel, 2017, p.158).

To be able to increase production in Ereğli Coalpits, some engineers, doctors, technicians were brought from abroad. From 1851 to 1854, some part of here was operated by sappers with the name of "Public Pits." However, upon that, these sappers were sent to the Crimean War against Russia in 1851-1854, production went wrong. Therefore, to meet the needs of allied ships, the operation of pits was given to France and England for some time. Because coal scarcity was experienced in the county, the right to operate was taken back from Mehmet Ali Pasha and transferred to Ismet Pasha, Kastamonu Governor. In this process, in the pits under English management, coal production increased, and the needs of allied ships were met and stored; these goods were also sold to Ottomans. Due to monetary problems in the process of the Crimean War, agreements were made with Parisian and London bankers, and credit was received in exchange for that English ships purchased from Zonguldak Pit Mining (Kaştan, 2016, p.6).

Ottomans, due to having large stocks of pit coal, given increasing needs, was initially importing coal from England. In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, the leading mine as the value and quantity produced is coal. Lignite was also operated before the Republic and used in railways. In Ottomans, the first mine regulations were made in 1861, but Zonguldak Basin was administered by idiosyncratic rules until 1920. There is no export target in coal policy. Until 1982, it was sold to state-owned enterprises from fixed price. In 1983, the sale of its 40% was liberalized. In lignite pits operated in a privileged way, the government would be able to buy cheaper than 10%, when it desires (Yorulmaz, 1998, p.284).

In the coal business administration, foreign capital gained predominance. In 1925, in a report, it was said that “it was allowed for a light railway to be made for lignite mines to be able to make competition with foreign coals.” Republic governments made arrangements for developing with national capital in this area. In 1926, upon the strike of mineworkers in England, in Turkey, which was obliged to import coal from the USA, Zonguldak and Soma gain importance, and their works for increasing production become successful. During National Struggle, supply activities from Zonguldak to national forces, and gasoline and diesel were exchanged with Russia. On the date of August 15, 1920, the Law on Export Duty To be Levied from Pit Coal was accepted. Thanks to this, it was prevented Allied Powers utilizing from Basin as desired, and administration was transferred to National Government. In 1926, Türkiye İş Bankası were in service in this basing for 15 years. In 1935, MTA and Etibank were established (Yorulmaz, 1998, p. 294).

### **3. Naphtha And Oil In Ottomans**

Although oil is a raw material of many products, as it is today, it is one of the most critical energy resources of the technology. Therefore, it has become a competitive element of the political powers and government. Because of this, it is a highly determinative resource in the economy. The formation of oil keeping an essential place in the economy dates to very long years. Oil taking place among exhaustible resources, passing through certain processes, is made usable by humankind by being processed (Başgöl, 2018).

Oil, firstly used in the areas such as lightening, wall, sculpture making, painting, chemistry, roof insulation, coloring, and medicine, was used as caulking material

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in ships, depending on improvement of maritime as a result of the discovery of America in 1492 (Ediger, 2007, p.16).

Oil, as all over the world, was also a known material in Ottoman State. As other countries using this mine, it also took form in Ottomans according to the needs of the age. Oil is the main material used in a large area from fuel to cosmetics at present. However, its importance increased when motor engines started to use fuel, beginning from the last quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In the time elapsed by that time, oil use remained dependent on traditional methods. It is mostly used in the process of bituminizing the lower part of ships so that they are not damaged. In Ottomans, oil was expressed with the word “neft (naphta).” The process of bituminizing the lower part of ships is called “caulking,” and the master making this process is called “cauker”. This was also used as the surname of the family occupying this work. This family comes to our face as the first family receiving a licence for making naphta production and trade. In Kerkuk, where oil is abundant as it spontaneously comes up, it is natural that such a license is given. Nettiçzade Family primitively extracted the oil extracted from here, and it was enough for their trade. This process routinely continued until that oil gains international prominence ( Koyuncu, 2017, p.125).

Naphta was accepted as a mine together with 1968 Mining Regulations, and bitumen and naphta were defined as oil (Ediger, 2007, p.103). In contrast to the claims of Western countries, in the sources belonging to the different centuries, that it was mentioned about incomes obtained from naphthas proves that oil was known and used in this geography (Çark, 2016, p.54).

Since oil is a nonrenewable energy resource, governments have become dependent on oil, and the countries having oil obtained considerably high gains and caused changes in world balance. 19<sup>th</sup> century means fragmentation and riots in the political area in terms of the Ottoman State. In the reign of Sultan Abdülhamit, large governments attempted to fragment Ottoman State. Western countries took advantage of the development of modern industry and went toward energy resources having economic value, starting construction of Baghdad Railway. Especially in the period of Abdulhamid II, Ottoman State, comprehending the importance of oil, took important steps in foreign politics. Ottoman State consciously used oil and its derivatives, and, to preserve oil, it imported from foreign countries, constructed storage tanks (Karataşer, 2017, p.384).

Because the Ottoman State did not include in the industrialization process in Europe, it could not form a realistic oil policy. Therefore, in Ottoman State, having rich oil deposits, the share of income obtained from oil in the treasury was rather low. Operating and trading oil deposits subject to special permission and are under the monopoly of the government. For those wanting to obtain a privilege, it is permitted with an edict of Padishah. In Ottoman State, a specific effort is made to consume oil in the domestic market (Başa, 2013).

Before taking out the oil, the local community utilized the leakages from pipelines. As a result of applications for exploring and operating, oil was found in Tercan and Van Lakes. In 1638, Neftçizade Family giving the crude oil they took out from Baba Gurgur to Ottoman Army taking the field toward Baghdad obtained the first concession about the use of oil resources from Murat IV (Şavklı, 2019).

According to the information acquired from İbn-i Batuta, Arab Traveler, it is known that oil was taken out by the previously known primitive methods in Ottomans. Evliya Çelebi (1611-1682) mentioned about the places where there was oil and its uses in its "Seyahatname/Travel Book." With the information acquired from this resource, we learn that the government has some rules related to operating oil deposits and that the law establishes a supervision mechanism (Başa, 2013, p.9).

When Germans are aware of the importance of oil resources, Ottomans weakened, and the mining law was not being implemented. Safety was not enough, and there was a negative viewpoint against foreigners. Just as there was not any attempt except shallow wells and galleries in the quarries of Marmara and places that were extension of oil in İskenderun, the primitive and unimportant activities were being performed (Başgöl, 2018, p.39).

When Sultan Abdülaziz was aware of the importance of mining and industry in his Europe Journey, as soon as he returned, he had a regulation prepared consisting of 98 items, based on French Mining Law. This regulation forms a basis for the laws in the Republican Period. In this regulation, that substances such as bitumen, naphtha, etc. are included in the class of original mines that are present under the ground was a great development (Şavklı, 2019, p.377).

#### **4. Development In Mining Area In Abdulhamid II**

While the Ottoman State under in the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid, on the one hand, experienced internal disturbances, on the other hand, it faced intensive intervention. In this period, Ottoman State had important lands with an important value in Europe and Balkans from strategical points of view. Especially in the places where Baghdad railway project will be implemented, that the resources such as oil and coal modern industry needs are dense reveals the strategic and economic importance of this region (Çark, 2016, p.50). In the period of Abdulhamid, publishing three regulations, it was targeted to be better carried out the works related to the mines. These regulations included the information about the properties, productions, exploration, taxes of mines and bids related to mines. Mining regulation enacted after Restoration and Reform Edicts (Tanzimat and Islahat Fermanları), considering European Laws, were rearranged in 1885-1888-1901-1906. For the sake of executing these regulations, the studies on the ministry of forestry, mining, and agriculture were started (Ediger, 2007, p.107).

In this period, Europeans almost acquired all of Ottoman mines. European capital owners were using all opportunities in their hands to have the most incomes from the regions they acquired with a concession on behalf of them or together with people from Ottomans. Between 1870 and 1898, while the government received ten demands a year for a petroleum exploration license, in this period, interest in mines increased, and license demand rose to 139 on average. Another reason for the increase in license demands was that investment capital in Europe became abundant. By 1908, Europeans primarily used mine concessions. Coal previously used for meeting the needs such as lightening and energy replaced with naphtha and oil (Karataşer, 2017, p.386)

Abdulhamid II had the studies made for exploring, especially oil, coal, and coal-like mines in Anatolia. In this period, the mines operated by governments were (Karal, 1988, p. 458);

- In Ergani – Copper and Iron
- In Ereğli –Coal
- In Bulgardağ- Gold and Silver
- In Eskişehir – Meerschaum
- In Ankara – Clay
- In Iraq – Bitumen, Naphtha, and Oil

Six thousand tons a year, copper from Ergani and approx. 500,000 tons a year coal from Ereğli were extracted. Only 5- 6 kg of gold and silver could be extracted. However, since the necessary expenditures cannot be met, later, these mines could not be produced. Mines in Ereğli and Ergani were extracted and processed in more amounts compared to the others and mostly used to meet the needs of dockyard and navy (Kara, 1988, p.458).

### **5.Oil and Naphtha Concessions in Ottomans**

The dependence on coal in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries was replaced with oil in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Economic balances changed all over the world. Especially in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century that raw material of TNT explosive was begun to be produced from oil accelerated armament race in Europe (Acar, 2013, p.6). This case dragged the developing countries not having oil their lands to the struggle for oil.

In Ottoman State, the property of mines belonged to the state like all other lands. Due to this feature, Ottomans performed the administration of mines through the treasury and mint. In Ottoman State, mines were operated according to the quality of land, where they were extracted. For example, if mine was taken out from treasury land, it was operated by the government, from foundation land, by that foundation (waqf); and from private-registered land that is the subject of a property right in the next year, by the owner. In Ottoman State, due to this property regime mentioned, one of two rights under the name of the license of concession used to give to the entrepreneurs who would like to invest. The most remarkable difference between the rights of license and concession was that concession right recognized the right to become a monopoly to the owner of a concession. In licenses given, it used to clearly state whether or not the job possessed a quality of monopoly (Çetinkaya, 2019, p.76).

Ottoman State, where it thought that there was oil, providing concession for both its own people and researchers and engineers from foreign countries, attempted to obtain income from oil.

On Anatolian lands, the first official concession for oil-exporting permission was given by Abdulhamid II to Ahmet Necati Efendi in Iskenderin Tegion in 1887. The right to operate oil gas found in this region was transferred to Ottoman Corporation (Sırım, 2017). Arif Bey, among the inspectors of Hazine-i Hassa, carried out the studies related to the mines in the province Mosul and, following

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these studies, exploration and operation concession of Musol mines were given by Padishah to Hazine-i Hassa on the date of February 6, 1889 (Terzi, 2007, pp.91-100). In 1887, exploration concessions of Tekirdağ Regions were given to Grand Vizier Halil Rifat Pasha. For coal and oil mines discovered in Şarköy town under Gelibolo Sanjac of Edirne Province, a concession of 99 years was given by Sultan Abdulhamid II (Sırım, 2017).

Around Baghdad, especially Mendeli, many lands were investigated. As a result of meeting rich oil deposits in Baghdad and Basra provinces, the concession of these deposits was included by the Office of Hazine-i Hassa Emlak-ı Hümayun in real estate of Padishah on September 19, 1998. After these developments, Nemlizade Hasan Tahsin Efendi received the concession of Baghdad and Basra Oil Deposits (Terzi, 2007, pp.91-100).

In the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, Ottoman Mining that will almost collapse also lost its power, while foreign minorities came to the forefront, and the share of local capital declined. Although the first mine law in 1861, being revised in 1869, 1886, and 1996, increased mine production, with the concessions given, foreigner obtained a more privileged position, monopolism increased, however, its effect of government revenue did not meet the desired increase. When Ottoman State was dispersed like the Middle East and Caucasia, Mosul- energy-rich- Problem emerged. This problem that cannot be solved in Lausanne was concluded in favor of England in 1926 (Akalin and Tüfekçi, 2014, pp. 52).

In the time of the Ottoman Empire, oil exploring studies that began towards the late 19th century were carried out in the regions such as Trakya, Van, Musul, Erzurum, and İskenderun, where it was previously known that there was oil. The distinctive feature of oil exploration and drilling studies made in the era of Ottomans in the sense of energy policies applied energy policies is that all of these exploration studies were made through foreign countries. Several entrepreneurs receiving concession for domestic production, due to limited technological and financial facilities, could not sustain exploration and finally transferred the exploration concession they have to the foreign energy companies (Çetinkaya, 2019, pp.25-27).

Mesopotamia and especially Mosul became a region, where foreign states competed to be able to receive oil exploration and process concession. Therefore, foreign states wanted to control the region through investments such as railway, harbor, etc. (Öke, 1987, pp. 12). French firstly applied for receiving concession

of exploring and processing oil resources. However, on March 18, 1902, Abdulhamid II gave concession of construction Baghdad Railway to Germans (Terzi, 2007, p.204).

Volkan Ediger accepts that defining this period as only receiving or giving license or concession is to take the easy way out. Besides, it is said that if this valued mine in Ottoman lands can be controlled, the collapse of the empire may be prevented (Ediger, 2007, p.105).

## **6. Conclusion**

In the process of passing from the old ages to this present time, energy resources have been an essential issue for humankind. These resources provided advantages for their owners from different points of view; however, success was earned in many wars. That the use of energy resources becomes, spread shows that it is necessary quite meticulously to behave.

Coal, whose importance gradually increases together with that it was begun to be used in industry, brought a strategic value in the places they are present. Coal basins that become prominent for industrializing states turned into the life area of these states. Although it was firstly found in Ereğli in the era of Sultan Mahmud II, and production was not made in pits until 1841. Oil found in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century posed as an energy resource. In Ottomans, with mine regulations enacted in 1861, oil became a current issue. By Sultan Abdulhamid II, who had the studies conducted on Mosul and Baghdad oils and included these in his private property, a proper policy was not followed. However, when industrialization in Ottomans did not happen as desired, attention paid to oil remained limited. When the countries, which wanted to use oil-operated engines in their armies, participated in the competition of global companies about oil, oil has become a national issue.

In this period, in which Ottoman State became open market step by step, foreigners and minorities turned into an opportunity for themselves the fact that the state of empire gets worse from the respect of legislation arrangements on administrating and operating energy resources. In addition, we see that every passing year, increasing their effectiveness and profits, they sustained their activities by the decrease of the empire, i.e., declaration of Republic. As a result of ethnic division of labor that is existent in the economic area in a sense, it is seen that the rights to operate mines and ownership of mine pits was largely in the hand of foreigners

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and minorities. Although agriculture-based Ottoman's economy and ethnic division of labor in the economy are among the reasons for this case, there's another critical reason: activities of mine exploration and operation are very costly and that the accumulation of Turkish investors is not adequate to execute mining activities in that period.

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# 10

## SOME LITTLE-KNOWN ASPECTS OF OTTOMAN WAQFS AND THEIR FUNCTION IN SOCIAL WELFARE ECONOMY

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### Abstract

The expression of *for the benefit of society* or, *ibadullahın terfihi ahvalleri* which appeared in the court registers was a brief but nevertheless powerful summary of Ottoman economic and social perceptions. The Ottomans genuinely believed in this principle and, their whole social and economic life revolved around it. In this way, while they maintained the balance between rich and poor in social life, they benefited from Islamic pious foundations, waqfs, as a tool for delivering social projects. From education to health, the waqf institution provided all the services for the public, obviously supported by the Ottoman sultans. They built hospitals, soup-kitchens, universities and many other buildings, *hayrat*, under the management of waqfs, and they encouraged their families and government officials to do the same. Although the *hayrat* was the visual representation of the institution, waqf meant much more than just a building in the Ottoman economic and social understanding. In this chapter, I dig a bit deeper and, analyse some little-known aspects of Ottoman waqfs, specifically the waqfs of the state officials, referred to in the literature as *sultanic and vizirate* waqfs. The purpose of this study is to set out details from works which have analysed original archival sources and, to present a wide perspective on Ottoman waqf practice.

**Keywords:** Ottoman waqfs, Islamic pious foundations, Ottoman economy, welfare economy

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## 1.Introduction

Waqfs or pious foundations were one of the oldest practice in the Islamic world and, Ottomans genuinely embraced it. Ottoman elites especially the sultans established countless waqfs all around the empire and, encouraged the spread of the institution that provided all social services for the public. In other words, they were part of Ottoman economic practice in social life and also motivated with religious beliefs. Therefore, it would be difficult to define all the aspects of waqfs or their functions during their time in Ottoman economic and social life only in an academic study. This chapter aims to attract attention to some little-known aspects of Ottoman waqfs from works which have analysed original archival sources and, to present a wide perspective on Ottoman waqf practice. To do this, we should understand first what the meaning of waqf in Islamic understanding.

The word of waqf is originally from the Arabic language, and, means something which is imprisoned or stopped something (Devellioğlu, 2013). In Islamic law, it refers to donating part of someone's individual wealth for the benefit of society or giving up personal ownership of something for that reason (Akgündüz, 1996)). The main motivation behind waqf practice was the most basic instinct of humanity being a good person and serving mankind in the name of God. However, we should not forget that Islamic waqfs were permanent endowments set up with a property, expected to continue forever, and owned only by God. Historical research has suggested that the idea of waqf was as old as humanity and that there were waqf-like applications in Babylonians, ancient Egyptian, ancient Greek, Romanian and Germanic law (Akgündüz, 1996). The main reason why we make a distinction for historical Islamic waqfs is that they were shaped from the Islamic perspective and managed according to Sharia law. They were like a unilateral treatment in law consisting of two components. The first was the *hayrat*, a building intended to serve the public, such as a hospital or a fountain, and the second was *akarat*, permanent income sources for *hayrat*, such as one or more properties and/or cash endowments, which ensured waqfs would continue perpetually (Yediyıldız, 2012).

In the past, people in all Muslim countries, Umayyads, Abbasids, Seljuks, Mamluks, Ottomans, built their foundation on this framework. Since there was no limit to establishing waqfs, it was a widespread practice among the public. Not only individuals but also sultans, their families and high-ranking officials were waqf founders in these countries. In particular, the Ottoman sultans established large

foundations all around the empire and encouraged their surroundings to do the same. There are a wide variety of documents in the Ottoman archives which show how common this institution was in the empire. The Ottomans even developed new types of waqfs such as cash or *nükud*, waqfs and family or *zürri*, waqfs and, new methods for managing their assets such as double-rent endowments, *icareteyn*.

It is evident that waqfs were much more than forms of personal worship for the Ottomans; they were much more like a tool in the economy. Ottomans practised a social welfare economy which included functions such as limiting personal wealth, unlike capitalism today. This paper therefore first describes the frame of the Ottoman economy and then the position of waqfs within it. They were autonomous institutions and clearly the only way of making social investments such as hospitals, schools, libraries and every other form of social institutions. As a result, they employed hundreds of thousands of people all around the empire in their structure and in some cases trained them in waqf universities to be doctors, teachers and religious people. They also employed cooks, gardeners, cleaners and people of all professions. The aspect of their employment practices will be considered next. Ottoman waqfs were also one of the earliest examples in the world of social security institutions for retired, disabled and poor people and were also simple credit institutions in the Muslim world with low interest rates for people in cash emergencies. Each topic will be analysed separately and in the final section, the reasons for the longevity of Ottoman waqfs will be discussed.

## **2.The position of waqfs in the Ottoman economic understanding**

The Ottoman economy was a supply-based economy. This meant that, as in all societies before the industrial revolution, meeting public needs was crucial for sustaining production. In other words, there was a need for people to be producing and consuming goods. With this understanding, the desired human type for society was homo-altruist and not homo-economicus and, *we*, the public, were more prioritized than *me*, unlike today. We call this type of economy a social welfare economy and we know that the Ottomans practised it assiduously until the collapse of the empire (Tabakoğlu, 2009). The state, under the sultan, was cautious about capital accumulation and took efficient measures to prevent excessive saving by merchants or members of the military class because those two groups had the greatest potential to become more affluent in Ottoman society and all the others were rural people who were highly unlikely to be able to save wealth. Mehmet

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Genç (2014) said that the state restricted the profits of merchants and artisans to between 5 and 10% in order to maintain the balance in society. If state officials realized that particular individuals were gaining more wealth than they should be, different methods were applied to prevent it, such as forcingly appointing them to work as butchers. Methods such as these preserved equality between poor and rich, but at the same time they brought various difficulties, such as how to fund huge investments (Genç, 2014). Schools, hospitals, mosques and all the essential buildings for providing public services needed big budgets and the state was the only organization with that kind of financial power.

On the other hand, the Ottomans, especially in the classical period, instead of making regular payments from the treasury, preferred to establish regular income sources for some expenses. For example, they granted land revenues to members of the military class as salary for their services as part of the *timar* system. In other words, the state acted pragmatically and avoided additional financial responsibilities. As a result, it is usually not possible to learn the total revenues of the state from its annual budget reports. (Barkan, 1953-54). The same approach was taken for the provision of public services in Ottoman social life.

Against this background, we can see the position of the waqf institutions in the Ottoman economy. They ensured that all the social services were provided by the state, sultan. The method which the Ottoman sultans used was to make massive investments in public services under the name of waqf and to encourage their family members and high-ranking military officers to do the same with their wealth. One thing needs to be clarified here. Although social equality was an important issue in the Ottoman economic understanding, it was inevitable that higher salaries had to be paid to middle and higher class military officers. They represented the state to the public. Many of them were also directly involved with villagers in the *timar* system and paying them appropriate incomes for their duties prevented them from accepting bribes. The Ottoman state therefore paid high salaries to members of the military class for their services but never ignored the possibilities of them wanting to save. Otherwise, they or their children could have turned into wealthy aristocrats in a few generations. In order to prevent this, the state either intervened in their heritage, *tereke*, or had them use their wealth to establish waqfs (Genç 2014).

In Sharia law, a waqf founder could appoint himself or members of his family as trustees of the waqf, known as *mütevelli*, and pay a salary for this until their death. The Ottomans accepted this as long as the management of the waqf turned into the public in the end. That arrangement could have been sooner than expected: Gabriel Baer (1982) has shown that death rates were higher in the past and, in some cases, life for several generations could end as soon as twenty years. In the literature, waqfs of this type were *zürri* waqfs, or family waqfs, a system which was developed by the Ottomans (Barkan, 1940).

In brief, therefore, the Ottoman state applied flexible precautions to protect the ideal social structure which it had created. Their methods both prevented excessive savings by members of the military class and provided basic public services. In addition, the Ottoman sultans financially motivated their family and members of the military class to establish foundations. For instance, they assigned state, *miri*, land revenues or real estates such as houses and shops to waqf founders, when needed, with an official document called a *temlikname*(*mülkname*). This was initially an Islamic practice and the document could only be approved by the reigning sultan (İpşirli, 2011). At this point, we can say that it was not the state land themselves which funded the waqfs but their revenues donated through the *temlikname*. Because of the sultans' financial support, these foundations were like partly a state investment. As a result, it is known that sultanic and vizirate waqfs handed on their surplus revenue to the central treasury. On the other hand, Kayhan Orbay (2013) showed that at the end of the seventeenth century, when the state encountered financial troubles as a consequence of expensive military campaigns, it seized the salaries, *vazife*, of waqfs employees. In other words, the status of waqfs established by members of the military class was different from that of waqfs established by non-military individuals.

Finally, especially in the classical Ottoman period, from education to health, drinking water to municipality services, these waqfs were the only organizations providing the basic public services. It can therefore be said that the most crucial role of the waqfs was to organize social life.

### 3.The Ottoman waqfs and their employees

The Ottoman state was an agricultural economy and, people, *reaya*, in the rural areas were part of the *timar* system until the nineteenth century. Two out

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of every three people either cultivated their own land, paid their taxes after the seasonal harvest to the state's *timar* soldiery, or did animal husbandry. In cities, the economy consisted of artisans and merchants and their production facilities were small workshops in which ten to fifteen people were employed (Tabakoğlu, 2009). In this simple lifestyle, waqfs were autonomous institutions, so their roles in the economy have been studied under different topics in the related literature.

On the other hand, sultanic and vizirate waqfs were prevalent all around the empire and hundreds of thousands of people were employed in their administration. Because there have been limited studies of this topic, it is not possible to estimate the possible numbers. Fortunately, Ömer Lütfi Barkan pointed out this aspect of the waqfs in his work on the soup-kitchens, *imaret*. According to his calculations, in the fiscal year 1489-90, 496 people were employed in the Fatih soup-kitchen complex. This facility consisted of four main buildings; a mosque, a soup-kitchen, a hospital or *dariüştifa*, and a university, or *madrasah*. In the accounts registers, the largest group of employees (168 people) were university staff, including the students with scholarships.

Ninety-five served in the mosque, 30 in the hospital and 36 in the soup-kitchen itself. The rest included people of various professions (Barkan, 1963). In his another work (Barkan, 2000), we can see the professions of the hospital employees. According to the details in the accounts records, there were eleven general practitioners, *tabib*, two surgeons, *cerrah*, three eye doctors, *kehhah*, and two hospital managers, *reis-i e tıbbā and ser etıbbā*. The rest were the servants of the hospital, such as gardeners and cooks. Barkan calculated that in the sixteenth century, there were more than seven thousands employees paid in the sultanic and vizirate waqfs in Western Anatolia. They served in 45 soup-kitchens, 342 mosques, 1055 *masjids*, 110 universities, 626 *zaviye* and *hankah*, 154 *muallimhane*, one *kalenderhane*, one *mevlevihane*, two *dariülfaz*, 75 *han* and *karbansaray* (Barkan, 1963)

In another example, Canfeda Hatun, a *ketkhuda* woman in Sultan Murad III's harem, established middle-sized waqfs in Istanbul at the end of the sixteenth century. Her *hayrat* comprised four small mosques, two pre-schools (*sibyan mektebi*), one *sebilhane* and fountains in and outside Istanbul. According to the seventeenth century accounts registers, there were seventy-eight people as employees either in religious positions such as imams or as labours and servants (Karademir, 2018).

In summary, we should not underestimate the role of the Ottoman waqfs and the employment which they provided. We know that there were sultanlic and vizirate waqfs across the empire, and they employed not just doorkeepers and maintenance workers but also doctors, academics and teachers who had graduated from waqf universities. Studies of the waqf accounts show that waqf employees were not independent of the state at some level. We can understand their background when their names given in the accounts. For instance, titles such as *efendi*, *çelebi* or *molla* signified to *ulemas* who had trained in Islamic schools, and *beşe* and *ağa* signified *sipahi* soldiers (Barkan, 1966).

#### 4. Waqfs for social security

The Ottoman waqfs were one of the earliest versions of social security institutions. They paid salaries to retired soldiers, disabled people, widowed women and orphans under the heading of *zevaid-horan* payment. *Zevaid* meant the excess of the waqf's income over expenditures. In other words, it was the surplus of the waqf income which was paid to *zevaid-horan* recipients. The payments to *zevaid-horans* in waqf accounts registers were recorded under this specific title among other employees. However, unlike the others, they did not need to do anything for their salary. It was quite natural to find *zevaid-horan* recipients in the accounts registers of sultanlic and vizirate waqfs.

Tevfik Güran (2006) stated that Suleyman the Magnificent's waqf paid high-ranking military officials and high-level officials such as *kadi*, Islamic judges in the waiting period for their next position in the sixteenth century. In the same waqfs accounts, Güran found regular payments being made to people who had lost everything they had but who had previously lived to high standards. There were differences among the daily payments referring to their status. For instance, a *kadi* in a waiting period was paid daily 150 akçe, whereas a *seyh* could be paid only 7.5 akçe.

In the soup-kitchen records for 1489-90 explored by Barkan (1963;2000) described above, the names are given of military personnel with their titles, disabled soldiers and people with disabilities and women but we can say that *zevaid-horans* were not as diverse as sultan waqfs all the time. For example, the recipients in Canfeda Hatun's middle-sized waqf are recorded in the accounts; they were mostly women and freed *jariyes* (as Canfeda was herself) or their children, *evlad-i uteka*. We can see their backgrounds if their full name were written in the records.

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The priority of the waqfs, as has already been explained, to ensure their continuation in perpetuity, so if it became necessary, *zevaid-horan* payments could be cut in an emergency. For instance, in the middle of the seventeenth century, when Süleyman the Magnificent's waqf administration had to decrease most of these payments (Guran, 2006). In another example, due to the renovation of Canfeda Hatun mosque in Beykoz, the waqf administration cut all salaries for six-months in the financial year 1668-70 (Karademir, 2017).

### 5. Cash waqfs for everyday life

The existence of cash waqfs in the Ottoman state dates back to the fifteenth century. The earliest example which Mandaville (1979) found in archival documents was a man named Hacı Muslihiddin who endowed shops and 10,000 akçe in cash in Edirne in 1423. According to the terms of the waqf or *waqfiyya*, the income of a waqf was to be obtained by renting out its shops and lending the cash with an extra amount, *istirbah*. The income from the cash was expected to be a thousand akçe annually, that meant 10% *istirbah* was to be charged (Mandaville, 1979). Even though this is an early example, it was typical of the way in which cash waqfs were managed in the Ottoman state. First, waqf money was lent to borrowers as a credit on condition that they could return it with an extra amount depending on terms of the waqf. The amount received could then be spent on the pious or social activities of the waqf.

Research has suggested that the popularity of cash waqfs increased in the next century so did the disputes about their legal situation. The main discussions revolved around the perpetuity of the cash and some Islamic scholars refused to establish movables as waqf without an immovable base such as real estates. Şeyhülislam Abussud Efendi ended the arguments with a *fatwa* and legalized their status in the middle of the sixteenth century. Since then, cash waqfs spread rapidly in the Ottoman state (Mandaville, 1979). The main thinking behind cash waqfs was to distribute cash to the people as much as possible as a credit with lower cost and thus protect them from bankers', *sarraf*, or high-interest rates. Both Murat Çizakça (1995) in Bursa and Süleyman Kaya (2010) in Üsküdar determined that borrowers from cash waqfs were ordinary people who applied to waqfs for small amounts. In other words, cash waqfs did not act as credit institutions for entrepreneurs. Kaya (2010) confirmed that 696 people had borrowed from Üsküdar waqfs a total of 57.243,5 guruş during the eighteenth century. According to his

calculations, the average sum was 82 guruş for each person, and there was no way that anyone could finance a business enterprise with this amount. Çizakça similarly found that only 9% of the inhabitants in Bursa had resorted to cash waqfs as a source of credit, the rest were small-scale consumers.

On the other hand, Çizakça (1995) found that in two cases in the eighteenth century, trustees, *mütevelli*, had borrowed capital from their waqfs in Bursa at the lower rates and had then lent to *sarrafs* in Istanbul at higher interest rates. He suggested that both the trustees and the *sarrafs* were possibly the same people who injected capitals into the Istanbul market and then used it as credit to merchants and tax-farmers there. Kaya (2010) supported Çizakça's findings of the trustees but reported that the amount involved was less than had been suggested. He stated that although 45 of 70 trustees had borrowed capital from their waqf, the percentages were only 4,8% of the total amount. In his research, Çizakça focused primarily on whether cash waqfs gave credit only to small-scale consumers or whether it was possible that they acted as full-scale credit institutions. Eventually, he established that the capital injections of cash waqfs were ten times greater than the amount withdrawn by the state through tax farm of silk cloth press (Çizakça, 1995)

Furthermore, the ways in which the cash waqfs lent money were the Islamic methods permitted by Islamic jurists. They preferred *muamele-i şer'iyye* or *bey bi'l-istiglal* ways, among others. Although there are no clear definitions of these methods in the sources, it could be said from the recorded cases that both methods involved sale agreements to legalise the extra amount that the waqf gained at the end of the period. The main difference between these two methods was that in the *istiglal* way, borrowers committed their property to the lender as a sale, but actually as a pawn. When they returned the borrowed sum with an average 10% *istirbah* usually after a year, the property reverted to its original owner. According to the law, the surplus of debt was the borrower's rent to the waqf as s/he was a tenant in the property (Bayındır, 1992). The interest rates, *istirbah*, of cash waqfs were usually between 10-15% in the Ottoman state.

In summary, it can be said that cash or *nükud* waqfs were mainly established as cash distribution institutions which lent to small-scale customers for their everyday needs, not to investors. Even so, examples have been found in waqf records

which show that it was possible. Finally, in the coinage system, they were essential sources of capital injection in the economy, as Çizakça suggested.

## 6. Waqfs for affordable standards

In Ottoman judicial records, there was often a brief but powerful term which summarised the Ottomans' economic and social understanding; *ibadullahın terfihî ahvalleri*. It meant that a judge should decide in court 'for the benefit of the public' if he was not sure what to do. The Ottomans genuinely believed in this view and supported equality among people as much as possible. One of the ways which they provided for society was to rent out waqf-owned properties and workplaces at affordable rates. As explained above, waqfs had an income from their properties, such as houses, shops and workshops with all their fixed equipment for manufacturing.

The Ottoman urban economy was based on small and middle-sized businesses which needed to have workplaces and equipment. However, profit levels were limited to around 10% and the percentage of rents were 5-8% of investments between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries. In order to protect artisans and merchants from having to borrow at high interest rates and to ensure production to sustain the economy, waqfs rented their workplaces at affordable rates (Genç, 2014). In this way, the state guaranteed a supply to support the economy.

In the same manner, houses and smaller houses, *oda*, were rented to people to live in. Among them, we should mention *bekarhanes*, which could be translated into English as a house for singles. In some studies, they have been called corporate housing projects, referring to the terms of the waqf of Mehmed the Conquerer and the accounts registers of the Ayasofya waqf. They were described as rooms made from stone, lined up in rows and so small that two people could hardly live in one of them (Kaplanoğlu, 2011). Evliya Çelebi's traveller's book, however, listed some massive Istanbul *bekarhanes* and also called them *müccerredan*, a place for singles, but he gave no details (Kahraman et al., 2011). Although *bekarhanes* were known as places for single men, recent studies have shown that women, girls and members of the military class were among the tenants (Kaplanoğlu, 2011; Karademir, 2017).

## 7. Waqfs for supporting other waqfs

As has been explained, perpetuity was an essential issue for Islamic waqfs and in order to ensure it, waqf founders donated assets, particularly properties, for their foundations. In this way, their endowments could have perpetual incomes whenever they needed. However, disasters such as fires or earthquakes were frequent possibilities, especially in cities like Istanbul. As a result, not only waqf *hayrat*, but also their endowed properties could suddenly disappear. In addition, properties' age and time has an inevitable natural effect on everything. On the other hand, Ottoman waqfs were autonomous organizations and in situations such as these, there was no central authority to take care of emergency situations at least until the nineteenth century when the Ministry of Awqaf, *Evkaf-ı Hümayun Nezaretî*, was established.

Even so, there are many examples in the records which show that there was a relationship between Ottoman waqfs, such as leasing their properties, borrowing from each other or saving one from disappearing completely. Sultanic and vizirate waqfs were kind of guarantor for one another; that was an unwritten Ottoman tradition. Ultimately, foundations such as these were partly a state investment for the public good, and there were an economic, political and social purposes behind them. For instance, the iconic New Mosque, Yeni Cami, in Eminonu, Istanbul, is known as the waqf of Turhan Sultan, mother of Sultan Mehmed the IV. However, its construction was originally started by Safiye Sultan, the mother of Sultan Mehmed III. According to the seventeenth-century historian Selaniki Efendi, while the state was in financial troubles, the cost of the building caused military rebellions. Then, the sultan died and construction stopped for almost for sixty years. After the big Istanbul fire in 1660, Turhan Sultan decided to complete the project (İpşirli, 1989). In addition, a considerable khan, known as the Big Bazaar today, was built, with shops and workshops as income sources for this waqf. During the time, the Eminonu area was a vital trade centre and was dominated by non-Muslims. Some studies have suggested that one of the main motivations behind this project was to take over the area and Islamize it (Şeoncak, 2009).

In another example, Canfeda Hatun rebuilt the destroyed Saraçhane Masjid and turned it to a mosque. It was the waqf of Ayas bin Abdullah, one of the architects of Mehmed the Conquerer. The building, which had been established in 1475 said that its *waqfiyya* was ruined and that it lost its income sources at the end of the sixteenth century (Barkan-Ayverdi, 1970). Canfeda Hatun rebuilt it

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and added it to her waqf under the name of Architect Ayas Mosque, which can be seen in the waqf accounts registers. The waqf paid both daily expenses and wages to the employees of the mosque (Karademir, 2018).

In the same manner, Canfeda Hatun's waqf fountain at Gedikpasa, Istanbul, had been damaged at the end of the eighteenth century. It was Ottoman tradition to put an inscribed stone panel, a *kitabe*, on the fountains, and according to the *kitabe* on Canfeda Hatun's fountain, it was rebuilt twice, first in 1780 then again in 1848. On the second occasion, it was Şevki Nihal Usta, Sultan Abdulmecid's (1839-1861) treasurer or *hazinedar* woman, who reconstructed it. So in some sources, Canfeda's fountain is mentioned with Şevki Nihal's name (Yavaş, 1994).

Cash waqfs were also in a networked relationship and frequently transferred funds between them, but there is no clear explanation in the records of why they did this (Çizakça, 1995).

In summary, therefore, it can be said that sultanlic and vizirate waqfs acted as a kind of insurance for each other. Although we do not know how the process was managed yet, we do know that it was one of the key factors in ensuring the longevity of the Ottoman waqfs.

### 8. Conclusion

In Islamic practice, waqfs were established as a personal initiative and were a form of worship to demonstrate being a good Muslim. The sultanlic and vizirate waqfs, however, were more than that; they acted as an economic tool in social life in the Ottoman perspective on social welfare. They provided every kind of public service, such as health, education, religious services, municipal works and libraries. These waqfs were even supported financially by the state, the sultan, when they were needed. The point which has been made in this paper is that sultanlic and vizirate waqfs were not dependent on the state but cooperated with it. Ottoman waqfs employed hundreds of thousands of people, housed them, protected society from unexpected situations in life, lent them at lower rates for their daily needs, provided affordable standards for living, education and feeding in some cases.

Even so, it should be remembered that waqfs were an Islamic application, integrated perfectly with the Ottoman system. They were very flexible way of maintaining social life, and they filled all gaps with comprehensive services for the

general public. People in Ottoman society lived in the waqf system and at the same time helped to establish them by their endowments. It would therefore not be exaggeration to say there was no space in Ottoman society that was not filled by waqfs. It has consequently been difficult to discuss all the services which they provided in this paper, so I have focused on little-known aspects of the sultanlic and vizirate waqfs, benefiting from academic works which have analysed original archival documents.

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# 11

## THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN TURKEY: A WORKSHOP WITHIN THE SCOPE OF “YOUTHATWORKEU”

*Duygu Hıdıroğlu<sup>1</sup>*

### **Abstract:**

This study aims to discuss innovative entrepreneurship in Turkey in the light of Innovative Entrepreneurship Workshop organized by Mersin University Young Entrepreneur Center in 2019. Asst. Prof. Dr. Duygu HİDİROĞLU has coordinated sessions with Erasmus students and coordinators of the U.N. Strategic Partnership within the scope of “youthatworkeu”. In this study, how Turkish economy supports innovative entrepreneurship, what strategies Turkey develop focusing economic growth by entrepreneurial activities, what should be the basis strategy of innovative entrepreneurship practices, how innovative entrepreneurs could effectively implement these practices to their entrants and what could be the mandatory anecdotes unexperienced entrepreneurs pay attention while start up innovative entrants have been discussed. The study has been exploited by the reports of 120 participants of international organizations such as development cooperation partners, private enterprises, organizations and universities in Europe. The study concludes that innovative entrepreneurship has been supported by government regulations and financial sanctions in Turkey.

**Key Words:** Entrepreneurship, Innovative Entrepreneurship, Turkish Businesses, Innovative Entrepreneurship in Turkey, Strategic Management

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

Entrepreneurs, one of indispensable dynamics of sustainable economies, have many potential roles in economies. A couple of these roles are getting maximum benefit from limited resources, eliminating inefficient functions by renewing production facilities or reducing costs by improving production processes.

New ventures that produce value-added products by developing efficient production methods and technologies could underpin economic growth. Providing improvements in production processes is one of the most important entrepreneurial roles. These entrepreneurial roles could be innovating in existing products, production processes or invent new products (Aparicio et al. 2016). The entrepreneurs having these roles are called as innovative entrepreneurs. Further, considering many researches about innovative entrepreneurship have commonly argued that the development of new discoveries and experimental activities support productive innovative entrepreneurship in a society (Malerba and McKelvey, 2020).

Turkish government has improved new strategies focusing economic growth and decrease in unemployment rate in recently. In this study, how Turkish economy support innovative entrepreneurship will be discussed. What should be the basis of these strategies and how they are linked with the innovative entrepreneurship practices, how individuals could effectively implement these practices to their ventures and what could be the mandatory anecdotes about innovative entrepreneurship entrepreneurs must pay attention while start up a new business will be discussed.

## 2. LITERATURE

### 2.1. The Development of Term "Entrepreneurship"

Nowadays, almost all people know a little bit about the definition of the term 'entrepreneurship'. Every people has own description of entrepreneurship but almost all people have nearly similar sentences for this term. They generally believe that the answer of the question "What is an entrepreneurship?" is so clear and it is well-known. Even they probably could be bored with the question. However, there is no common definition of entrepreneurship. The concept of entrepreneurship may vary from one to another. Just as a business plan practices would be modified with respect to diverse organizational needs, the description of entrepreneurial practices would vary according to multifarious sectors. In other words,

entrepreneurship is a concept that can be defined flexibly in accordance with distinct sectors and there is no absolute definition of entrepreneurship.

In 1755, the Irish economist of French origin Richard Cantillon firstly defined the term 'entrepreneurship' (Filion, 2011). According to Cantillon, the entrepreneur is the person who organizes the business and takes the risk of the businesses in order to make a profit (Cantillon, 1755). There are lots of definitions in academic literature. Entrepreneurs improve new ideas and evolve in atypical perspectives such as facing problems like opportunities which differ them from any other people (Miner et al. 1992). An entrepreneur is the person who undertakes most of the risks and establishes new businesses whom has been motivated by success achieved and the freedom to decide by oneself (Parker, 2009).

Entrepreneurship has become one of the most popular research topics in recently because of the fact that entrepreneurship could sustain continuous dynamism in the Modern Market Economy and contributes the economic growth (Decker et al. 2014). Entrepreneurship has a significant impact on the increase in the number of business investments, improves the employment rate and maintains constantly increasing efficiency and productivity in economies (Szirmai et al. 2011). Besides it has brought about versatile financial market conditions which help to ensure the use of scarce resources into appropriate business processes and entrepreneurial facilities with ease (Linna, 2013).

The entrepreneurship definition of Schumpeter has been widely known and accepted by almost every academician. According to Schumpeter, the entrepreneur is the person who destroys the current economic beliefs and routines by developing new strategies and making risky managerial decisions concerning their uncommon business ideas or newborn attempts to produce innovative goods or services (Long, 1983). Entrepreneurs build up new processes, finding unexplored new international markets, finding undiscovered raw materials, using efficiently semi-finished supply sources or forming a new organizational structure (Śledzik, 2013). These are commonly accepted features that shape the definition of innovative entrepreneurship (Van Hemmen et al. 2015). Namely, all characteristics become more evident a typical entrepreneurship called today as the innovative entrepreneurship.

## **2.2. Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth**

A great entrepreneurial passion has been increasing among many economies in recent years. However, there is a little evidence that entrepreneurship supports economic growth, especially in developing countries (Nabi et al. 2011). This is because most of new entrants are not arisen from personal preferences or the idea of exploiting advantages and opportunities (Urban, 2010). Concerning these compulsory new entrants, entrepreneurs usually start up such initiatives only because of some economic difficulties and obligations such as not being able to allocate the wages of their workers or other sources of income (Carraher et al. 2003).

In general, entrepreneurs are often forced to start a new business and become self-employed owing to arduous environmental circumstances (Birkinshaw and Young, 2005). Whence entrepreneurs by a majority were the managers of such firms vary from small to medium sized in the past (Delgado et al. 2010). Entrepreneurs are self-employed and in some cases they manage family-owned micro level enterprises or macro level companies (Pistrui et al. 2006).

Small sized enterprises generally do not contribute enough to economic growth due to the informalization problems (Williams and Shahid, 2016). Small enterprises may not tend to organize their structures towards formalizing their processes mostly because of undertaking the restructure risks that associated with the transfer venture to the registered formal sector (Williams and Nadin, 2012). Concerning ventures in the informal sector, on the other hand, entrepreneurs do not desire to formalize their enterprises since they have limited capacity or do not prefer to assume vertical growth risks (Thai and Turkina, 2014). Such entrepreneurs would prefer to expand their ventures horizontally rather than formalize to spread risks across different business areas and diversified projects in order to protect their informal structure (Foss et al. 2015). Meanwhile, these informal structures have negative impact on economic growth by and large.

## **2.3. Innovative Entrepreneurship**

Innovation is the most required concept in today's competitive business environment (Urbancova, 2013). Innovation has a key role in the growth and success of businesses in these days. Accomplished strategic leaders could easily overcome the difficulties while adapting innovative way of thinking and innovative approaches

into their small and medium sized non-corporate businesses' organizational structures and business strategies (Ray Gehani, 2013).

Innovation is the ability to apply innovative solutions to problems and discover the opportunities helping to improve life standards (Johnson, 2001). Being innovative require sustainability which means a continuous development in business processes and many trials on innovative practices (Schaltegger and Wagner, 2011). Practically all entrepreneurs have been accepted as innovators due to thriving new entrepreneurial ideas, new goods and new services (Mayhew et al. 2012). An innovative entrepreneur is the person who plans new business or new processes by advancing exceptional business plans, processes and out of ordinary business strategies (Block et al. 2017). Innovative entrepreneurs never give up. They believe that if they see that light at the end of the tunnel, it will help them not to trip or stop (Nidumolu et al. 2009). Because, although many of the innovative ideas have failed at the end of the trial; one of trial could be successful and this result could move new business to the desired point (Melville, 2010).

Innovative entrepreneurship can be referred in two phases: developing stage innovative entrepreneurship and beginning stage innovative entrepreneurship (Śledzik, 2013). These two stages have been shaped and driven by profit opportunities of a venture or growth potential of a new entrance (Baumol, 2010).

Start-up innovative businesses focus on updating existing industries or establish entirely new industries. The decision to update or demolish existing industries or build entirely new industries depends on how skillful an entrepreneur is in terms of innovative practices and in what degree an entrepreneur could successfully cope with dynamic and uncertain environments (Baumol, 2011). Innovative entrepreneurs lead to the successful adaption of new products and services in new markets by dealing risky market conditions with effective and proactive business strategies, they successfully commercialize market opportunities (Park, 2005). To sum up, today providing sustainable economic growth depends on the successful execution of innovative entrepreneurship processes.

"Kenton Lee Shoes" are the rare accomplished examples of entrepreneurship practices that incorporate both innovative entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurship (Coker et al. 2017). The founder and entrepreneur Kenton Lee has visited Kenya. During this visit, he has worked with many children in a small orphanage. In a while he has walked with all the children on a dusty road, he has

noticed a little girl in a white dress walking next to him. He has realized that her shoes were so small not fitted her feet so that she has cut the shoes off to get her toes out. Then he has thought a shoe that people can adjust its size to fit their feet and a shoe that can expand and grow and this idea starts his successful entrepreneurial adventure (Bennett et al. 2019). Transforming the idea to a realistic business plan has taken almost five years and Kenton has begun to manufacture magical shoes that grew in five dimensions and lasted for many years and the revenues of manufacturing have been transferred to financial account of desperate children (Marques, 2019). Kenton Lee Shoes is an extraordinary product that fits one's feet for many years and a thriving example of innovative entrepreneurship; Kenton Lee Shoes also has been a good example of social entrepreneurship since it serves social purposes without any profit concerns (Marques, 2020).

#### **2.4. Innovative Entrepreneurship Trainings**

Education enhances the cognitive ability of individuals to manage organizational growth, thus enables individuals to easily manage the complexity associated with rapid organizational growth when engaged in entrepreneurial activity (Harkema and Schout, 2008). Entrepreneurship trainings contribute rapid achievement of success for innovative entrepreneurs providing them a higher degree of self-efficacy so that trained innovative entrepreneurs tend to set higher strategic growth goals than they did before (Piperopoulos and Dimov, 2015). Entrepreneurship trainings also have a positive impact on entrepreneurs improving opportunity-based business approaches (Marcotte, 2014).

Entrepreneurship trainings have crucial importance for new entrants. Many new entrants have limited time or opportunities to spare time entrepreneurship trainings (El-Annan, 2013), thus they have to reject opportunities to get such trainings as managerial skills training, technical skills development training, business plan preparation trainings, full-time entrepreneurial training (Feder and Nişu-Antonie, 2017). On the other hand, while practicing innovative entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs can spend so much time to renew business strategies what had been established at the beginning of innovative entrepreneurship while learning new entrepreneurial practices.

## **2.5. Innovative Entrepreneurship Financing**

Entrepreneurship financing is often accepted as the biggest obstacle for start a new innovative enterprise or a new small business to grow (Kerr and Nanda, 2009). This obstacle mostly has arisen from the fact that new entrepreneurs are not willing and ready to be deemed eligible for lending, that is, new entrepreneurs do not have the credibility in terms of the evaluations of financial institutions or do not lay down the conditions to obtain corporate loans and indemnity bonds (Khalil and Olafsen, 2010).

Many of new entrepreneurs take the initiative by getting financial support from their family or close friends (Bruton et al. 2015). Financing resources such as access to corporate capital and angel investment are often available for promising entrepreneurial business ideas with a well-structured business plans (De Bettignies and Brander, 2007).

Micro-credit loans are quite costly for new entrepreneurs since these type of loans do not have a long lasting effect on life cycle of new business entrants and do not provide sustainability of new ventures (Idris and Agbim, 2015). Despite the fact that the presence of many commercial banks give new enterprises some certain advantages to lend financial loans at lowest interest rates, these low rate do not serve for the majority of new enterprises since these commercial banks still opt to debit low risky customers which have at least 5 years annual working report (Darnihamedani et al. 2018). While banks prefer to participate in risky capital decisions for their propriety customers such as large corporations (Chava et al. 2013); banks do not allocate enough amount of their financial reserves to the applicants having small and medium-sized enterprises (Saetre, 2003). Additionally, providing finance to new entrepreneurs while start up new ventures (Shane and Cable, 2002) and maintaining flexible financing opportunities are also crucial for new innovative entrepreneurs because they could easily apply these financial concessions when they stuck and face with a significant problem in different stages of their enterprises lifecycle (Bartz and Winkler, 2016).

On the other hand, it is possible that the government financially assist new entrepreneurs by arranging some regulations in many sectors which the government request to have high growth rate (Cumming, 2007). Government intervention including various planning processes into financial markets is another way to facilitate new ventures without any hitch (Minniti, 2008). In spite of the lots of

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advantages of government interventions, interventions could give a lead one prominent disadvantage in economies which government incentives and support programs may force new entrepreneurs into not all sectors but some certain sectors (Stam, 2015). This ends up with negative results since in order to economic development, governments do not desire to focus on certain sectors but they preferably support innovative entrepreneurial practices in all sectors on account of empower the economy in all business areas (Yoon et al. 2018).

### **2.6. Entrepreneurship and Innovative Entrepreneurship in Turkey**

In Turkey, the fact that rural people constantly act with the instinct of seeking "assurance" for themselves and therefore they desire to work for the government and the term "entrepreneurship" seem as a phenomenon or a utopia for them.

One study searching the expectations of the Turkish people on their business outcomes argues that the most important business outcomes in Turkish society could be high wage level (Öner and Kunday, 2016). %90 of Turkish people give importance to financial outcomes, %85 of them give importance to job security and comfortable working environment, %81 of Turkish people expect to have understanding colleagues and only 80% of them mind the social benefits of their business to society (Benzing et al., 2009). Considering entrepreneurial practices firstly focus on the opportunities of having a respectable job, promising businesses, and social responsibility; it could be claimed that 80% of Turkish society may be willing to entrepreneurial activities (Tunali and Sener, 2019).

Another study doing research on innovative entrepreneurship in Turkey has concluded that Turkish people mostly prefer occupations that do not disrupt their family life. 90% of Turkish people have tend to have flexible working hours and offices, and 75% of them avoid business stress (Demirbas et al., 2011). These business expectations are entirely opposite to the requirements of accomplished innovative entrepreneurial practices. Turkish culture is not appropriate for entrepreneurship culture. Turkish society indicator of entrepreneurship is only 1% in 2019 (Tunali and Sener, 2019). This indicates that only 1% of Turkish population includes entrepreneurs and senior managers and this percentage is very low compare to other developed and developing countries. In the 21st century, while economies of scale in many countries decrease, the economic, social and political benefits of entrepreneurship come into prominence.

Turkish economy is improving day by day and there is a high demand and consumption rate. Turkish society consist mostly youth generation that bring a natural entrepreneurial spirit and dynamism. As a matter of fact, many studies have ranked the unique entrepreneurial skills and intelligence of Turkish people first among any other nations. However, this great entrepreneurial potential has not well supported by Turkish Government. Although there are some regulations assisting entrepreneurial practices, there are couple of regulations that promote innovative entrepreneurship. Innovative entrepreneurship could contribute the economic development and financial growth (Demiray and Burnaz, 2019). Only developing unique innovative products, services and enhancing discoveries could improve economies and make them sustainable in intensive competitive environment. So that Turkey should remove the barriers on innovative entrepreneurial facilities.

In Turkish economy there are many factors that negatively affect innovative entrepreneurship. The most influential of these factors is the excess and complexity of bureaucratic procedures while start a new innovative venture (Öner and Kunday, 2016). Someone who is currently starting a new innovative enterprise has required to complete almost 100 tasks in tax offices, extending to the municipality, ministries and notaries (Onder and Nyadera, 2019). Bureaucratic procedures are the most important obstacle to innovative entrepreneurship. Reducing the tax bureaucracy burden of innovative entrepreneurs is extremely significant in terms of support and sustainability of innovative entrepreneurship (Fernández-Serrano et al., 2019).

Most of innovative entrepreneurs may not be aware of the policies and legislation on innovative entrepreneurship and the regulations on innovative entrepreneurial practices are still not completed. New inaccuracies in applying the legislation provisions could result in irreversible damages. Legislative information may be neglected by innovative entrepreneurs due to the fact that innovative entrepreneurs are like scientists; they only focus on new discoveries and inventions and their technical issues (Öner and Kunday, 2016). Most of innovative entrepreneurs may miss the organizational issues and government sanctions or inducements.

Financial liquidity is a serious problem for innovative entrepreneurship in Turkey (Onder and Nyadera, 2019). The bulky financial procedures and lingering financial provisions are barriers of innovative entrepreneurial practices. They prevent innovative entrepreneurs to start a new business and liquidate the expenditures

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such as research and development expenses, rentals etc.. Besides the insurance transactions have to be simplified by Turkish Government.

Recently, time is the most important source for every business and simplified procedures could save time. Furthermore, facilitation of importation and exportation practices could eliminate troubles while adapting the government regulations to the ventures. Since entrepreneurs must have informed their employees who need to apply the regulations on their job tasks. Facilitation also could obstruct unfair competitive environment because innovative entrepreneurs could spare time more on research and development activities (Uner et al., 2013).

In Turkey the common problems that limit innovative entrepreneurs are financial problems. Financial problems may be generally and unnecessarily time consuming. New innovative ventures require unpredictable payment somehow at the beginning stage of the entrepreneurial practices, thus innovative entrepreneurs are usually limited in terms of supply variable sources (Cinar et al., 2019). While procurement of limited resources they may generally be unable to focus on their exact occupation: innovative entrepreneurial activities.

### 3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The purpose of the study is to discuss innovative entrepreneurship development in Turkey. The study has some goals to develop innovative entrepreneurial attitudes, behaviors and skills. To realize these goals, a workshop would have been practiced by 120 participants of diversified international organizations such as development cooperation partners, private enterprises, organizations and universities in Europe. The participants have given a case about the challenges of development of innovative entrepreneurship and employment growth in Turkey.

The participants have been selected by "youthatworkpartnership". This is a transnational institutional alliance aiming to foster youth employability and entrepreneurship through the Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps EU Programmes (Available: <https://youthatworkpartnership.org/>, [Accessed 1 September 2020]). The features of participants are having the ability to generate synergies between different entrepreneurial activities and supporting youth employability and entrepreneurship in the context of the Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps EU Programmes (Available: <https://youthatworkpartnership.org/>, [Accessed 1 September 2020]). By these features the workshop could help to foster youth employability

and innovative entrepreneurial practices, and to allow social network among different countries and European Union partner regions including the partnership.

By the help of innovative entrepreneurship workshop, participants have asked to discuss whether innovation is an entrepreneurship tool for large companies or for small and medium-sized businesses. An interactive workshop has been completed among all participants. Discussions were done and participants have given some suggestions about which business plan is applicable to which enterprises and which environmental opportunities and organizational skills entrepreneurs should apply, which innovative entrepreneurial practices could provide the most efficient strategies that offer effective solutions to business problems.

While discussing the participants' results, the study aims to reach a helpful report including information of how innovative entrepreneurship could stimulate economic growth, employment rate in Turkey and what are the suggestions of participants to increase in involvement of innovative entrepreneurial activities into Turkish economy and lastly; how Turkish government should integrate innovative approaches to its economic operations. The report prepared after data gathered from this workshop will be expected to guide policy makers, decision makers in bureaucratic positions, managers in financial markets, and people directly and indirectly linked to the entrepreneurship ecosystem.

*The questions in the working sheets handled all participants in the workshop having been prepared to reach the following information. The participants' results report at end of the workshop would have been included below issues:*

- The personal traits of innovative entrepreneurs,
- The entrepreneurial way of thinking of successful innovative entrepreneurs,
- The requirements for the development of innovative entrepreneurial attitudes, behaviors and skills,
- The features of impact-oriented innovative entrepreneurship,
- The importance and role of innovative entrepreneurship in current competitive business environment,
- The explanation of how innovative entrepreneurship creates value in new markets and social networks,

- The impact of innovative entrepreneurship on leader industries and pioneer business sectors,
- The determination of which innovative entrepreneurship strategies can be applied to promote new products, services, processes or to implement changes in existing business models.

## 4. RESULTS

### 4.1. The Research Questions and Responses for The First Group

The first group of the participants have identified the questions: What is innovative entrepreneurship?

What are the major challenges for the economic development and employment rate with respect to innovative entrepreneurship in Turkey? What are the innovative ventures processes that contribute to growth and employment?

**Case 1:** There are many innovative initiatives and great innovative entrepreneurship potential in many regions of Turkey. However, macro-level studies show that there is no significant relationship between the development of innovative entrepreneurship and both economic growth and employment. There is a clear contradiction between the researches and studies in the field discussing how innovative entrepreneurship brings about new employment opportunities.

**Question 1:** How could the economic growth caused by the innovative entrepreneurship be measured?

Responses: Quality indicators, Sustainability indicators, Qualitative financial indicators, Quantitative

financial indicators, Unemployment rate, Impact analysis, Performance indicators.

**Question 2:** What training programs are required for the development of innovative entrepreneurship?

Responses: Entrepreneurship and technical lessons organized in schools, Remote entrepreneurship trainings, Trainings to be organized in companies on a sectoral basis, Defining deficiencies and training by comparing them with companies in the sector that will undertake an innovative initiative.

**Question 3:** What role Turkish government should play in the development of innovative entrepreneurship?

**Responses:** Eliminating the raw material shortage required for entrepreneurship, Ensuring the entrepreneur to obtain the raw material at an affordable price, Having practices that encourage local production, Tax practices planning that will make the sale of the local enterprise product attractive.

#### **4.2. The Research Questions and Responses for The Second Group**

In the second part, the participants were divided into three groups to discuss the following sub themes of the main discussion issues mentioned in the first part:

**Case 2:** Take a holistic approach to a business areas linked between local businesses, universities, and multinational companies. Take a focused approach when choosing sectors such as sub-sectors with the highest potential added value. To support private sector, entrepreneurs have to have willingness to take risks; in other words, they should not be risk averse. Entrepreneurs should focus on choosing winners rather than losers. An attentive influencing assessment should be done to see what works for innovative entrepreneurs.

1. What do you think is more suitable for that sector of innovative entrepreneurship in Turkey and why?
2. What are the opportunities for innovative entrepreneurship in Turkey?
3. Does saturated markets can be found in innovative entrepreneurship in Turkey?
4. Have human resources will continue to invest in innovative entrepreneurship that are specific to the industry in Turkey?
5. Is there adequate infrastructure for innovative entrepreneurship in Turkey?

**Question 1:** Which sectors having high growth and employment rate are integrated with the innovative entrepreneurship in Turkey?

**Responses:** Food / Beverage Industry, Construction Sector, Education Sector, Agriculture, Food and Livestock Sector, Health sector, Fashion design, Textile sector, Energy sector, Furniture Industry (Home, Office etc.).

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**Question 2:** What are the opportunities for innovative entrepreneurship in Turkey?

**Responses:** The presence of strong suppliers in the market, the venture products are qualified and the production volume could meet the demands of local markets, the infrastructure of Turkey support and is convenient for international trading facilities

**Question 3:** Could saturated markets promote innovative entrepreneurship in Turkey?

**Responses:** Considering consumption habits, it is observed that innovative products are closely followed and demanded by end consumers. In this regard, saturated markets are attractive markets for entrepreneurs who target being innovative entrepreneurs in emerging market in Turkey.

**Question 4:** Will human resources department in organizations continue to invest in innovative workforce in related innovation oriented industries in Turkey?

**Response:** Turkey is a potential market having diversified human resources and skilled innovative workforce. Yes, human resources departments will hire employees whom have innovative perspective.

**Question 5:** Is the infrastructure appropriate for innovative entrepreneurship in Turkey?

**Responses:** Turkey have enough financial infrastructure in terms of assorted financial resources, transportation infrastructure is also well in Turkey, the supply of materials and resources could meet the demand, communication infrastructure and networks are so steady and consolidated. As well as, most of firms' infrastructure is a great alternative for entrepreneurs who are the potential new innovative entrants in Turkey due to the fact that Turkey has a very strategic geopolitics position.

## 5.DISCUSSION

### 5.1. The Evaluation of First Group Reports

In line with the opinions of the participants, innovative entrepreneurship processes are mostly affected by early age education in the family and family members.

When an innovative entrepreneur decides to start up the venture, the entrepreneur must have to predict both revenue and cost items throughout the processes that are consistent with reality. For instance, while assuming cost items if entrepreneurs could access right information about markets like exact number of supplier information they foresee the future costs and this helps to reduce the new investment risks.

It is very hard to clearly measure the economic growth grounded by the agency of innovative entrepreneurship practices, despite the fact that it is easy to measure the impact of entrepreneurship facilities on economic growth. This is because the valuable data of entrepreneurial facilities is accessible and technological systems and infrastructure have been easy and fast lately.

Participants give a sight in listed questions in the workshop that provide their brief opinions about the the majority of the criteria. These opinions could help to achieve some useful indicators that influence directly the innovative entrepreneurship. These; indicators are sustainability indicators, quantitative financial indicators, unemployment rate, impact analysis and performance indicators.

According to opinions of participants, the effectiveness of entrepreneurial trainings of innovative entrepreneurs depend on both the quality of the trainers and the entrepreneurial orientation. Moreover, entrepreneurial trainings should cover topics such as the provision of new information and technology. Participants are of the opinion that entrepreneurship and technical skill trainings should be taught during high school education. The optimum period for entrepreneurial trainings may be undergraduate and postgraduate education with respect to participants' insights.

Considering that people could access information quickly and easily by online method, dissemination of entrepreneurship trainings with the help of online tools will be very effective in terms of the access to new entrants and online tools improve the entrepreneurial promotion and success. Apart from the entrepreneurship trainings, other trainings such as technical skills trainings to be held in companies specifically for the needs of the variable sectors are also undeniable for new ventures. To identify the shortcomings of the new entrants who aim to start up innovative enterprises, new entrants should compare their fulfillment with the other entrepreneurs in companies doing similar business facilities that are in the same sector with the new venture. By this comparison, innovative entrepreneurs

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could smoothly identify their deficiencies in their own projects and this will enable them to reach success and their venture to sustain this success.

Most of governments impose quotas and restrictions on certain products. Before an attempt of innovative entrepreneurship in a new market, the detailed market search should be done well and the institutional restrictions should be comprehensively investigated. Innovative entrepreneurs expect from Turkish government to develop policies that promote their new enterprises. Thus, in accordance with participants the role of Turkish government should be supportive to new ventures, especially innovative ones.

At the end of the workshop, it was concluded by the participants that the financial success of the new innovative ventures mostly relies on the well-structured business plan and Turkish government interventions to financial institutions in order to support new enterprises by fiscal policies. New entrepreneurs generally access to capital by applying to micro loans, commercial bank loans and venture capital at all stages of life cycle of their new ventures. The financial resources are required all processes of a new venture not only required for beginning stage. But another important point that entrepreneurs should take into account is that the financing of ventures must be at the right time and the right amounts.

Besides financial regulations, Turkish government policies should be regulated in accordance with entrepreneurial needs so that policy makers should get in touch with entrepreneurs in a soft and interactive manner. Therefore, Turkish government policies could be updated constantly and the infrastructure could be adapted newness by following the innovations.

The infrastructure of many sectoral areas is decent and well-developed in Turkey. Although the infrastructure is in good conditions, Turkish government should also continually improve transportation infrastructure, road maintenance and energy production activities accepted as hard infrastructure practices in order to support innovative entrepreneurs. Furthermore, Turkish government should provide incentives by assisting and inspecting the packaging facilities of goods and transportation of the products and services. Policy makers are the biggest external stakeholders and partners of innovative entrepreneurs hence entrepreneurs desired to be better understood by Turkish government in terms of the correct evaluation of their problems, exploring the causes of these problems and finding solutions to them.

## **5.2. The Evaluation of Second Group Reports**

Participants attending the workshop have opinions that food and beverage industry, construction industry, education sector, agriculture, health sector, textile sector, energy sector and furniture industry such as home and office furniture are the sectors having high growth and employment rate are integrated with the innovative entrepreneurship in Turkey. When evaluated the innovative entrepreneurship based on industry, it is observed that entrepreneurship rates regarding mentioned sectors tend to increase more than the other sectors in Turkey and entrepreneurship facilities have a high growth potential for these sectors. The reason for participants choosing these sectors is that these sectors could adapt new changes quickly by developing approaches focused on innovations and added values. According to the participants, these are the sub-sectors that are considered to have the highest added value. These sectors and industries in Turkish economy are open to innovations and discoveries by research and development facilities so this is another reason why participants have intended for these responses.

However, the only critical point of the discussions in the workshop is that identifying sectors having the niches for successful entrepreneurs by only asking questions is not a proper method. It may be more appropriate asking such questions and giving a chance to choosing these sectors where high growth and employment potential of innovative entrepreneurship to the experienced entrepreneurs and new entrants rather than the participants in the workshop. Since the participants such as the delegations of universities, multinational cooperation and private enterprises have been gathered by a holistic approach and they could not exactly form an estimate of local business areas opportunities for innovative entrepreneurship in Turkey.

The presence of strongly capable suppliers in Turkey help new entrants to compete with existing business rivals easily. Having sufficient amount of resources, having satisfactory number of buyers, could help new entrepreneurs to produce their innovative products meeting readily the demand of both the local and international markets. Turkey have the potential and the strong infrastructure in compliance to engage in international market trading which brings lots of innovative entrepreneurial opportunities.

According to the participants having innovative entrepreneurial experiences in Turkish unsaturated markets, customers are so aware in terms of their personal

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expectations and selections in Turkey. While customer purchasing behavior in Turkish markets has been examined, it has been observed that innovative products are more closely pursued and preferred than other products by intermediaries and end consumers. In this regard, Turkey is an attractive market for innovative entrepreneurs who aim continuous development of their innovative facilities and ventures.

Also, in order to increase and support innovative entrants into Turkish emerging markets, Turkish government constantly allows business development agreements with foreign partners and strategic alliances of private international businesses. All the foreign entrepreneurs need to do is keeping alive their willingness to take risks on implementing their entrepreneurial decisions and enter Turkish markets. When human resources in Turkey has been evaluated by the participants, Turkish market has a diversified human resources from all ages and nations and has a skilled labor force.

Finally, the participants have evaluated the Turkish Government role on regulating fiscal policies, they concluded that Turkey has strong financing infrastructure and financial incentives for new entrants.

On the other hand, it should be better logistics infrastructure to be improved. Utensils are not scarce and social network dominates all markets and communication infrastructure is fairly in a strong position. The strategic geopolitics position of Turkey because the country is in the location of crossroads of continents makes Turkish market as a good alternative for innovative entrepreneurs who desire to start up innovative ventures.

## 6. CONCLUSION

An innovative entrepreneur benefits the economy in many ways. Innovative entrepreneurs take advantage of unused production factors to increase productivity and combine all resources by undiscovered methods. In order to increase innovative production facilities, they renew the existing production facilities by research and development practices with a diverse point of view.

The workshop held on the subject "Innovative Entrepreneurship in Turkey" includes questions, results and suggestions parts that lead any future social debates providing entrepreneurial motivation and inspire for innovative entrepreneurs.

With the help of participants' knowledge and experiences shared on debates at workshop, it is possible to answer the questions how innovative entrepreneurship could be improved in Turkey, which future input is necessary for development and what kind of policies should Turkey plan to support innovative entrepreneurial practices including foreign aid. The participants have argued that the innovative entrepreneurship development is satisfactory and the acceleration of economic growth consequential of innovative entrants is satisfying respecting Turkish economy. This is mostly because of Turkish government support on foreign aid would contribute innovative investments.

In this study, the development of innovative entrepreneurship cooperation with the new innovative strategies is whether necessary or not to support innovative research and development practices for Turkish economic growth and increase in employment rate has been discussed. The aim of this study is to debate the role of Turkish government on the development of innovative entrepreneurship and to discuss whether the infrastructure in Turkey is enough to stimulate innovative entrepreneurial growth and increase in employment in Turkey. As a result of the literature research and discussions on workshop this study argues that there are several barriers on the development of innovative entrepreneurship in Turkey. Hence, there are some significant policies that Turkish Government should regulate to support innovative entrepreneurship are mentioned below:

- Government should plan some incentive and premium systems for successful innovative entrepreneurial outcomes.
- Government should invest more on Research and Development expenditures.
- Government should provide innovative entrepreneurs with privileged financial practices such as crowdfunding by financial institutions through various sanctions.
- Government should train students by incorporation innovative entrepreneurship trainings to school curriculums.
- Government should support the competitions on new inventions and innovations.
- Government should pay some expenses of Turkish scientists who will represent Turkey by participating in certain scientific congress abroad.
- Government should provide some facilities to foreign R&D investors.

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To sum up, the study concludes that innovative facilities have crucial importance and priority for Turkish economy. The kindly responsive attitudes of policy makers have a highly positive impact on innovative entrants in Turkey. At the end, all evaluations and discussions of this study purposes to give innovative insights to new entrants, disseminate and accelerate the implementation for innovative entrepreneurs.

### 7. LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

Financial aspects are vital for innovative new entrants in Turkey. Financial investments and returns have arisen from the increase in the number of accomplished innovative ventures. Additionally, the increase in the number of successful ventures increase the wealth of society as well as provide financial development. But if the wealth increases the number of innovative entrepreneurship attempts decreases since the entrepreneurship abilities and motivation have been improved by financial obstacles and constraints. Thus at the end of the study there is a significant contradiction whether well regulated financial policies have a negative or positive impact on the increase in innovative entrepreneurship rates.

After all, this study suggests that the future studies in the same field should be focused on the relationship between the adequacy of government fiscal policies and financial intuitions for new entrants and innovative entrepreneurship rates. Further researches on how well structured financial markets influence the motivation of innovative entrepreneurship with a new sample of data by different quantitative methods will make substantial contributions to the literature.

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# GEOPOLITICS DISCRIMINATION GENDER & IMMIGRATION

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